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Foreword
Notwithstanding the significant increase in publicly supported sources of risk cap-
ital available to Young Innovative Companies in Finland, there still remain impor-
tant challenges to be addressed. We have to ensure that the business environment
in Finland becomes increasingly attractive to risk taking by private investors. This
means matching exciting new technologies with increasingly world experienced
and ambitious managers in a transparent and competitive environment that is
strongly supportive of investors in entrepreneurial finance.
We also need Finnish based venture funds that are bold enough to invest in early
stage ideas and big enough to maintain that commitment across multiple rounds of
finance. As yet, such VC funds are more likely to be found in California or Boston
rather than Helsinki or Tampere.
In 2006, the MTI commissioned three academic specialists to give an expert view
as to how the Finnish Venture Capital market might develop in the next five to
seven years. Importantly, they were also asked to state their opinions as to the opti-
mal future role for the Finnish government and its business support agencies.
I would like to extend my thanks to the three authors of this report and to the many
persons in Finland and beyond who assisted in their enquiries. I strongly believe
that it provides a number of important foundations on which both public and pri-
vate interests in Finland can construct a commercially successful, and conti-
nuingly innovative, entrepreneurial economy.
Kalle J. Korhonen
Director General
Industries Department
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Executive Summary
The access of young innovative companies (YICs) in Finland to professionally de-
livered sources of start up and early growth finance has improved significantly
over the last decade. Today, YICs have a considerable choice in the selection of
both debt and equity financing instruments. In contrast to the recent past, funding
for promising young companies is relatively easy to arrange through currently
available public sources, particularly in the seed and startup stage. Also an entre-
preneurial career has become a much more widely accepted option in Finland both
for recent university graduates and seasoned executives alike. Compared to the sit-
uation ten years ago in Finland, there are now many examples of successful entre-
preneurs providing relevant role models. In line with this growing awareness, the
sophistication and knowledge of Finnish entrepreneurs has increased considerably
over time.
Despite this long-term positive trend in the financial provision to young innovative
companies, there aremajor challenges that still remain. Finland’s world class inno-
vation reputation is not yet matched by equivalent commercial success for its inno-
vative products and services despite many recent successes. At the start of the pres-
ent century, the international decline of the financial markets following the burst-
ing of the dot.com bubble caused serious damage to technology investors in Fin-
land given the immature venture capital infrastructure at the time. The market has
not yet fully recovered and institutional investors remain reluctant to consider Eu-
ropean venture capital as a relevant asset class. However, an increasing number of
success stories, improving investment returns in European VC funds, and the exis-
tence of several professional, private general partners currently raising new funds
are each likely to contribute to a market recovery in the coming years.
With both the increased experience of the Finnish entrepreneurial infrastructure
and the economy’s continued technology and innovation development, there is a
much more robust base for a vibrant venture capital market now than ever before.
During the bearish years of 2002–2005, it was very difficult to raise private ven-
ture capital funds. Promising but early stage enterprises were particularly vulnera-
ble to negative market sentiments. At this crucial time, Tekes, Finnish Industry In-
vestment Ltd., Finnvera, and Sitra all directly addressed elements of the financing
problem for entrepreneurs. Each agency helped to fill the ‘financing gap’ experi-
enced by young but high potential Finnish firms with a range of targeted financing
instruments. Public policy enacted through these agencies has been extremely
valuable, and probably essential, in helping many new young innovative compa-
nies to emerge and in supporting existing young enterprises to survive the hostile
first years of the twenty-first century.
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However, over the next five to seven years, Finland needs to further develop the fi-
nancing of young innovative companies to reflect current and new challenges, and
to ensure the continuing effectiveness of the Finnish financing system across dif-
ferent stages of the economic cycle. The key recommendations, discussed in more
detail in the body of the report, are:
1 Ambitious goal. Improve the ambition level in growth oriented enter-
prises and set a national goal to make Finland one of the most vibrant in-
vestment markets in the world for investing in and creating and captur-
ing value from young innovative companies. This market should be pri-
vately led and provide clear incentives for professional investors as well
as for the entrepreneurial owner-managers to invest in and create and
capture value from young innovative companies.
2 Clear signals of commitment. Make a clear statement that high
growth entrepreneurship and private risk taking is highly valued and
rewarded in Finland. Use tax incentives to catalyze entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and private investment and to reinforce this signal. Improve the
coordination of the tax and legal environments and the provision of
public financing in order to facilitate a more effective enterprise
policy.
3 Open and global approach. Leverage all available financial and hu-
man resources to the nation’s long term advantage regardless of their or-
igin. Invite foreign investors and entrepreneurs to invest in young inno-
vative companies in order to help commercialize rapidly and worldwide
Finnish R&D outputs. Innovate new ways to create and capture value
from Finnish R&D investments in global markets.
4 Determined execution. Remove duplication, fragmentation and un-
warranted growth of public services. Improve inter-agency coordina-
tion and improve the customer orientation in the provision of public fi-
nance. Use the strengths of existing agencies to ensure the optimum
delivery of public services. Major additions to public interventions by
existing agencies should be fully justified and independently vali-
dated. The state’s primary responsibility is to create the long-run con-
ditions for the working of competitive and efficient markets. The pur-
pose of public agencies addressing market failures is the correction of
such problems and, where appropriate, the necessary interim provision
of state support. The closer the activities of public agencies replicate
the fully commercial operations of the private sector, the greater
should be the need to justify the continuing allocation of public mon-
ies.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this study was to examine the challenges and development opportuni-
ties in the public financing of young innovative companies over a relatively long
time frame, i.e. from five to seven years. We were asked to develop recommenda-
tions for the Ministry of Trade and Industry and other stakeholders as to how sup-
port for the financing of young innovative companies might be developed in Fin-
land. The central research problems, as defined by the Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry, were:
1 To what extent does the large number of public finance organizations
cause problems particularly in the development of young innovative
companies? How could these problems be reduced or eliminated?
2 Is the division of labor between public finance organizations clear and
appropriate? Is their collaboration coordinated sufficiently from the per-
spective of individual client companies, and how the coordination could
be improved?
3 What problems does the limited availability of private finance/private
financiers cause in the finance of young innovative companies? How
could those problems be reduced, and how could the willingness of pri-
vate investors to invest in young innovative companies be improved?
4 What conclusions can be drawn from the recent development trends in
public finance of young innovative companies in comparable countries?
5 How is the financing of young innovative companies estimated to
evolve over the next five to seven years, and how is this taken into ac-
count in the development recommendations?
In addressing the research questions we have leveraged both the scholarly litera-
ture related to the financing of young innovative companies as well as currently
available evaluations and studies of the Finnish market. We have looked at similar
evaluations of relevant public organizations in other comparable countries. We
have carried out interviews with experienced individuals representing various
stakeholder groups including entrepreneurs, advisors of entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, business angels, institutional investors, government funding organiza-
tions, and policy makers, and scholars in order to identify the challenges and de-
velopment opportunities in the public finance of young innovative companies in
Finland. In addition to information and views provided by more than 40 interview-
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ees listed in the end of report (some of them by telephone or by email), we have
been able to benefit from numerous discussions with other experts both informally
and in various seminars, round tables and workshops held both in Finland and
abroad.
The rest of the report is structured as follows. First, we briefly review relevant re-
search. Thereafter, we provide a description of the funding of young innovative
companies in Finland as well as the role of the public sector. Finally, we present
our conclusions and recommendations.
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2 The Role of Government in the
Financing of Young Innovative Companies
Over the recent years, the literature on the role of government in the finance of
young innovative companies has expanded considerably. The public policy chal-
lenges facing Finland are not unique. Helpfully for us, there is broad consensus in
the literature on the key principles determining government support for young in-
novative companies. In this study, we referencemore detailed research reviews but
only provide a brief summary to give a basis for our analysis of the Finnish market
and international experience.
2.1 Motivation
Governments are motivated to ensure the availability of finance for young innova-
tive companies given their important role for the growth and renewal of modern
economies. In particular, it is the small number of the nation’s most growth-ori-
ented companies that have a disproportionately high impact on employment
growth.1 These growth oriented young companies often require substantial
amounts of external finance. This high risk finance is often not forthcoming from
traditional bank sources and venture capitalists or business angels assume an im-
portant role. A functioning venture capital market has been shown to be a very im-
portant element of the economic infrastructure. Active, informed and experienced
risk capitalists promote innovation and thereby assist the growth of employment
and economic activity.2
However, markets do not always function effectively to produce automatically a
socially optimum outcome. This is particularly the case for the market provision of
sufficient risk finance demanded by growth oriented, innovative young companies
13
1 See e.g. Autio (2005), Autio et al (2000), Birch et al. (1997), Kirchhoff (1994), and Storey (1994) for evi-
dence of the bulk of employment growth coming from a very small share of the fastest growing new enter-
prises. This has very important implications to policies aiming to contribute to employment creation
through supporting entrepreneurship (see e.g. Autio, 2005; Hyytinen & Rouvinen, 2005e; Pajarinen &
Rouvinen, 2006a; Pajarinen, Rouvinen, & Ylä-Anttila, 2006b). Recent research suggests increasing skep-
ticism towards policies focusing simply on quantity of new companies particularly in low enterprise areas
(see e.g. Greene, Mole, & Storey, 2004; Van Stel & Storey, 2004)
2 (e.g. Achleitner & Klöckner, 2005; Alemany & Martí, 2005; Berg & Gottschalg, 2005; BVCA, 2001;
Engel & Keilbach, 2002; EVCA, 2002; EVCA., 2001; Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Romain & van Pottels-
berghe, 2004).
at the earliest stages of their development.3 Investors believe that the returns do not
compensate fully for the risks incurred. In such situations, governments are fre-
quently urged to intervene.
There are certain theory-based explanations why markets might not produce a so-
cially optimal balance of supply and demand and why government intervention
might be needed: spillovers (positive externalities), information asymmetries, and
network externalities have each been cited as being important.4
Knowledge spillovers or positive externalities refer to the fact that young innova-
tive companies and their investors may not be able to capture all, or a sufficiently
attractive proportion, of the total benefits such ventures create for the wider econ-
omy and society. This may lead to underinvestment and provide a reason for gov-
ernment intervention.5
Information asymmetries refer to the ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ prob-
lems in choosing growth oriented young innovative companies.6 Lack of full infor-
mation makes it hard for outside investors to evaluate the quality of the enterprises
and to separate good ventures from bad ones. Unless good ventures can effectively
signal their superiority, information asymmetries may hamper the functioning of
the market and lead to underinvestment from society’s point of view. Venture cap-
italists use an expensive and time-consuming ‘due diligence’ process to assess the
real value of prospective investments. Such due diligence costs are relatively in-
sensitive to scale. It therefore becomes much more cost effective for investors to
appraise more established companies with a known history and track record. This
is one important reason why risk capital investors have moved away from seed and
start up investments to later stage companies where better information is available
and larger sums of money can be invested. Scale economies severely prejudice
earliest stage ventures and their investors.7
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3 (e.g. Cressy, 2002; Cressy & Olofsson, 1997; European Commission, 2005a, 2006c; Harding, Cowling, &
Murray, 2003; Lerner, 1999; LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 2005; OECD, 2006; Paasivirta & Valtonen, 2004; Storey
& Tether, 1998; Westhead & Storey, 1997)
4 For reviews, see e.g. Hyytinen and Väänänen (2003e), Lerner, Moore, & Shepherd (2005), and Murray
(2007)
5 See e.g. Griliches (1992), Lerner (1999; 2002), Lerner et al. (2005), Hyytinen and Väänänen (2003e)
6 (Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006; Lerner, 1999; Myers & Majluf, 1984)
7 (Murray & Marriott, 1998; Söderblom & Murray, 2006)
Network externalities relate to the nature of entrepreneurial finance and entrepre-
neurship in an economy.8 It is hard to build the first successful venture in an econ-
omy without access to experienced entrepreneurs, financiers, service providers
and other stakeholders. The building of the required infrastructure takes time and
is influenced by a positive feedback loop. Hence there is often a need for the gov-
ernment to “jump start” the venture capital industry and support directly the devel-
opment of the professional infrastructure needed for an entrepreneurial, knowl-
edge-based economy.9
As an additional consideration and a potential challenge in the globalizing venture
capital market10 may have to do with home bias i.e. investment barriers that lead
investors investing much more in domestic companies than what the portfolio the-
ory would imply.11 Several factors can cause the bias including taxation,
cross-border transaction costs, hedging, agency-related costs such as control of the
company, and culture and language. When domestic institutional investors in-
crease their international diversification, the financial system should enable the
general partners to raise increasingly funds from foreign investors. The role of lo-
cal investors appears to be important in overcoming home biases and attracting
foreign investments.12
2.2 Approaches
The key role of the government in growth-oriented entrepreneurship is unques-
tionably to provide a conducive framework and environment for informed and
profitable risk taking by private investors.13 Growth oriented entrepreneurship
simply cannot develop as a government driven and managed activity. Supportive
15
8 (See e.g. Lerner et al., 2005)
9 (Gilson, 2003; Lerner et al., 2005)
10 (Baygan & Freudenberg, 2000; Deloitte, 2006a; Heikkilä, 2004; Hursti & Maula, 2006b; Maula & Mäke-
lä, 2003b; Mäkelä & Maula, 2003)
11 For a discussion and empirical evidence on home bias in different markets, see e.g. Grinblatt and Kelohar-
ju (2001), Kang and Stulz (1997) and Stulz (1981). For a discussion of home bias in venture capital con-
text, see Hursti and Maula (2006).
12 (Deloitte, 2006a; Mäkelä et al., 2003).
13 (Armour&Cumming, 2006; Bottazzi, Da Rin, &Hellmann, 2005; Cumming, Fleming,& Schwienbacher,
2006a; Cumming & MacIntosh, 2006b; Da Rin, Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006; Lerner et al., 2005;
OECD, 1997, 2004; UK Presidency of the EU and the European Commission, 2005a)
government involvement should best be seen as an interim and temporary activity
to allow the evolution of an informed and experienced private market.14
The primary role of the government’s entrepreneurial focus should be to ensure
that the tax and legal frameworks do not inhibit well functioning markets.15 In this
role government supports improvements in the tax and legal environments, entre-
preneurial culture, stock exchanges for growth companies, and other framework
conditions that influence the supply and demand for both formal and informal ven-
ture capital.16 Of particular importance is the effective functioning of a range of
exit markets available to investors.17 Without a means of liquidating both good and
poor investments, early stage activity is highly unattractive to professional inves-
tors.
Secondarily, in the absence of sufficient private finance being forthcoming from
commercial capital markets, the government can also intervene the markets by
supplying risk capital.18 The state can invest directly in individual portfolio com-
panies. Alternatively, the state can invest indirectly by contributing finance as a
16
14 The recent communication by the European Commission (2006c) states: “Public investment to compensa-
te for market failure should as far as possible be at arm’s length, so that investment decisions are solely dri-
ven by market discipline, and in partnership with the private sector.”
15 An OECD report (1997) concludes: …it must be recognised that, in many cases, direct government prog-
rammes are second-best solutions. The best approach is to enhance the macroeconomic and regulatory en-
vironment in order to overcome some of the financial obstacles to high-risk investments.” See e.g. Armour
and Cumming (2006), Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2005), and Cumming, Fleming and Schwienbacher
(2006a) for empirical evidence on the importance of tax and regulatory determinants on venture capital.
16 (Armour et al., 2006; Cumming et al., 2006a; European Commission, 2005a; Gilson, 2003; Hyytinen,
Rouvinen, Toivanen, & Ylä-Anttila, 2003d; Mason & Harrison, 2001; Maula & Murray, 2003a; OECD,
1997; UK Presidency of the EU and the European Commission, 2005).
17 (Ali-Yrkkö, Hyytinen, & Liukkonen, 2003; Audretsch & Elston, 2006; Black & Gilson, 1998; Black &
Gilson, 1999; Da Rin et al., 2006; European Commission, 2006c; EVCA, 2005; Gompers & Lerner, 1999;
Jeng & Wells, 2000)
18 We want to emphasize the word secondarily. For instance, Da Rin et al. (2006) conclude based on their
econometric analysis of the determinants of early stage venture capital: “…we believe our results have a
clear message: sensible policy should consider a wider set of policies than simply channeling more funds
into venture capital.” More specifically, they conclude: “we find that policies which increase the expected
return of innovative projects are more successful in altering the composition of venture capital markets to-
wards early stage projects and projects in high-tech industries. A reduction in capital gains taxation raises
the share of early stage and high-tech investments. The availability of stock markets targeted at entre-
preneurial companies – which provide a lucrative exit channel – also has a positive effect on the innovation
ratios, while a reduction in barriers to entrepreneurship leads to an increase in the high-tech ratio.”
limited partner to one or more professional, venture capital funds.19 The clear con-
sensus in the existing literature is that indirect intervention is preferred to direct in-
tervention by the state.20 For example, rather than civil servants selecting enter-
prises to be funded with tax payers’ money, governments should create the neces-
sary conditions and incentives for professional investors to emerge and fill the gap.
Another important role could be for the state to help grow the overall demand for
the products or services of these finance rationed companies.21 Direct investments
by government agencies in ventures should be the last resort of the government.22
Even when pursuing direct interventions such as publicly provided capital, gov-
ernments should employ and incentivize market actors rather than its civil servants
to select commercially attractive companies.23
Whatever the public intervention, research clearly suggests that governments
should take a long term perspective. It is crucial to understand the simultaneity
problem: both supply and demand should be addressed simultaneously with the
17
19 For reviews of policies created to facilitate the creation of new privately managed funds, (including incen-
tive structures and bidding processes), Appendix 2.3 and prior studies, e.g. Gilson (2003), Maula and Mur-
ray (2003a), Jääskeläinen et al. (2004), Cumming (2006), and Avnimelech and Teubal (2006) among ot-
hers. For a recent model, see Enterprise Capital Funds model in the UK which resulted in 45 bids from
prospective general partner teams in 2005 (“£40 million Enterprise Capital Funds announced”, Small
Business Service Press release on May 22, 2006).
20 (Armour et al., 2006; Bannock Consulting Ltd., 2001; European Commission, 2005a, 2006c; Florida &
Smith, 1993; Gilson, 2003; Karsai, 2004; Manigart & Beuselinck, 2001; Maula et al., 2003a; Modena,
2002; Murray, 2007; OECD, 1997, 2004; Teubal & Luukkonen, 2006; United States Department of Com-
merce and European Commission, 2005)
21 (Aho, Cornu, Georghiou, & Subirá, 2006; Georghiou, Smith, Toivanen, & Ylä-Anttila, 2003; Science and
Technology Policy Council, 2006; Virtanen & Lipponen, 2006)
22 For instance, an OECD report (1997) recommends: “A successful programmewill elicit private sector par-
ticipation in the design stage and will look to the private sector to play a professional role in the
programme’s management.While the government should monitor programmes, its involvement in invest-
ment decisions should be minimal.” Similarly, Gilson (2003) concludes: “…government programs are
commonplace in countries seeking to develop a venture capital market.Most such programs, however, ha-
ve been unsuccessful. The reason, I will suggest, is that most government programs have tried to deal with
the simultaneity problem by having the government both provide capital and act as the financial interme-
diary. Programs structured in this fashion fail because the government cannot respond to the trio of cont-
racting problems inherent in early stage, high technology financing. Rather, a specialized financial inter-
mediary is a necessary ingredient for which the government is not a substitute.”
23 See Hirsch (2006) for a recent theoretical analysis showing the superiority ex post grants (i.e. tax breaks)
over other types of government support measures for venture capital. See also Da Rin, Nicodano and Sem-
benelli (2006), Gompers and Lerrner (1998), Poterba (1989a; 1989b), and Jeng et al. (2000) for empirical
evidence on capital gains tax reductions stimulating venture capital.
understanding of proper intermediation mechanisms.24 Government must be
mindful to not distort the functioning of the extant capital market and substitute for
(i.e. ‘crowd out’) private actors.25 Government should listen to commercial inves-
tors and the market’s participants very carefully in order to best correct identified
market failures.26 Furthermore, prior to any intervention, government should have
a plan as to how their involvement will be phased out the clearly specified goal has
been reached.27 Accordingly, government venture capital programs should be
evaluated periodically. An important criterion for measuring program success is
the extent to which venture capital funds or small firms are created which can oper-
ate on a commercial basis independent of any direct state involvement, i.e. gener-
ate an attractive, risk adjusted, rate of return.28
2.3 International Experience
In addition to surveying the literature on the effective government intervention in
the finance of young innovative companies, we also reviewed briefly government
interventions in selected countries. References included Sweden and Denmark (as
close comparable countries in the Nordic region); Ireland, Israel and New Zealand
(as other small open economies); and the UK and USA (as the two largest markets
with most experienced venture capital and private equity industries). In addition,
we also reviewed the use of some popular policy instruments in contemporary us-
age such as government sponsored venture capital funds, business angel co-invest-
ment funds, research commercialization funding, business angel tax incentives,
and support for business angel networks in several countries (See Appendix).
18
24 In a very useful review of the venture capital contracting mechanisms and the related engineering prob-
lems Gilson (2003) summarizes: “…replicating the U.S. venture capital contracting structure confronts a
daunting simultaneity problem. Three central inputs are necessary to the engineering process: capital, spe-
cialized financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs. The problem is that each of these inputs will emerge if
the other two are present, but none will emerge in isolation of the others.” See also OECD (2004).
25 OECD (2004) notes: “Over time, public programmes tend to converge towards the same market segments
as the private sector rather than addressing gaps in the provision of risk capital. This could “crowd out” pri-
vate investors and even delay the development of early-stage financing, especially if the market is limi-
ted.” See Armour and Cumming (2006) for empirical evidence on the crowding effect in a sample of 15
countries over a period of 14 years.
26 For instance, an OECD report (1997) recommends “Venture capital programmes should seek to stimulate
private sector investment and create a commerciallyviable market.” See also e.g. Georghiou et al. (2003).
27 OECD (2004) states: ”Government equity programmes can pump-prime private venture financing, but
should be phased out when private markets mature.”
28 (OECD, 1997)
Overall, from the review of comparable countries, it can be clearly observed that
countries have learned both from their own experience and other nations how to
design (and not design) policies that catalyze the growth of efficient capital mar-
kets. For instance, considering government sponsored venture capital programs,
Israel learned from its unsuccessful Inbal program and designed a completely dif-
ferent Yozma program with a clear focus on creating a competitive venture capital
industry in Israel. Critically, it designed simple and attractive incentives for pri-
vate investors and directly invited experienced foreign investors to Israel in order
to achieve its developmental goals.29 The new design was successful. In many
countries such as New Zealand, newer programs have adopted a similar design.30
Overall, it appears that experience has resulted in many countries coming to rely
more on private actors (both funds and angel investors). Such countries have de-
signed policies that more effectively harness private resources instead of creating
government operated investment activities.
Concerning the governance of government policies and operations, there is again
considerable variation between countries. For instance in Sweden, there are many
agencies which more or less overlap with each other depending on the develop-
ment stage of the target companies. In UK, Israel, Ireland, and USA, there is per-
haps somewhat clearer coordination via one primary agency.31 There are also dif-
ferences between countries in how well integrated issues related to tax and regula-
tory environment are dovetailed with government support activities for the finance
of young innovative companies. For instance in UK, the Small Business Service
and HM Treasury have had deep collaboration with joint reports and strategies and
a balanced portfolio of policy instruments including both direct support measures
as well as tax incentives. However, the full integration and consistency of support
arrangements for young innovative companies is highly challenging given that
government measures and programs from virtually every department of state will
have some effect (good or bad) on the operations of such companies.
Concerning specific program instruments, we reviewed the use of government
sponsored venture capital funds, business angel co-investment funds, research
commercialization funding, business angel tax incentives, and support for busi-
ness angel networks in several countries.
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29 See e.g. Teubal and Luukkonen (2006) and Avnimelech and Teubal (2006).
30 The architect of the Yozma program was invited to New Zealand as a consultant.
31 Small Business Service under the Department of Trade and Industry in UK, Chief Scientist’s Office in
Israel, Small Business Administration in the USA, Enterprise Ireland in Ireland, and NewZealand Venture
Investment Fund Limited under the Government of New Zealand.
In the case of government sponsored venture capital funds, some of the key lessons
are that the role of government in VC is usually seen to be to help jump start the
market. This is done by enabling professional new management teams to enter the
market through well designed programs involving a bidding process and profes-
sional due diligence. The existence of a professional (and ideally independent32)
selection process provides some certification that helps then the teams raise the
rest of the funding from private markets. Pari passu33 principle may be a default
option for supplying capital, but it is not very effective in catalyzing new funds in
market failure areas in which institutional investors are not willing to invest.
Therefore, many governments have started to employ more advanced programs to
facilitate the entry of new professional management teams to invest in market fail-
ure areas.34
Concerning research commercialization funding, lessons learned are that the
schemes should be easy to access with rapid decision making. Furthermore, they
ideally should provide some certification effects and thereby facilitate access to
further finance from other (private sources) after the proof of the concept.
Concerning business angel co-investment funds, lessons learned are less categori-
cal given the novelty of the programs and lack of accumulated evidence on the
consequent development of portfolio companies. Co-investment programs seem to
be valuable in catalyzing business angel investment and in helping angels and an-
gel syndicates with limited resources to make bigger deals in an environment
where scale economies are important.
Concerning government support for business angel networks, one lesson is that
that a critical role of business angel networks is to assist in the professional learn-
ing of essentially professionally inexperienced risk capital investors. These
schemes are unlikely to take off without direct government financial support for
set up and early administration costs. The government’s role is supposed to reduce
as the network develops and gains sufficient scale and autonomy to become self fi-
20
32 The UK government hired specialist consultants to provide a selection methodology in order to select the
general partners for their government supported VC programs. Similarly in New Zealand (NZVIF) and
Belgium (ARKimedes), external professional private equity consultants are used in the due diligence and
selection.
33 I.e. all shareholders have the same rights and privileges for any distributions related to their stock holdings
in the business.
34 The examples of programs based upside incentives for investors and fund managers of funds focused on
market failures using open bidding processes and professional due diligence include Israeli Yozma (asses-
sed e.g. byAvnimelech et al., 2006), Industry Innovation Investment Funds program in Australia (assessed
e.g. by Cumming, 2006), New Zealand Venture Investment Fund program (assessed e.g. by Lerner et al.,
2005), and most recently Enterprise Capital Funds program in the United Kingdom.
nancing. Experience would suggest that the networks take several years to reach
self-financing. Scale continues to be an important influence on the business angel
network’s income given that it is often generated from both members’ fees and
success fees from arranged investment rounds.
Concerning business angel tax incentives, some of the key lessons are that they are
seen as an important catalyst of business angel activity particularly when comple-
mented by professional training and network development for angel groups. The
experiences and few existing evaluations are quite positive for well designed
schemes. The main criticisms and problems in unsuccessful schemes have been
too broad targeting reducing the effectiveness and cost-efficiency, and excessive
complexity or too tight constraints reducing their use. Based on experience, ex
ante tax credits are seen to be most effective in catalyzing new investors. However,
evaluations have shown that an exemption of a capital gains tax after a three year
holding period appears to be nearly of equal value for investors.35 Capital gains re-
lief is more likely to incentivize more professional or experienced private inves-
tors. In Finland there are currently no tax incentives for business angels, but such
incentives have been recently proposed. Their potential role has been considered
in many studies and reports.36
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35 (Boyns, Cox, Spires, & Hughes, 2003b)
36 (e.g. Grönholm, 2006; Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2003b; Hyytinen et al., 2005e; Hyytinen et al., 2003d; Kari,
2005; Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö, 2004; Lahti, 2004, Forthcoming; Maula, Autio, & Arenius, 2005;
Maula et al., 2006a; Maula, 2007; Ministry of Finance, 2005; Niemi, 2003; Paasivirta et al., 2004; Science
and Technology Policy Council, 2006; Sitra, 2005; Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2004, 2006; Virtanen et al.,
2006)
3 Financing of Young Innovative
Companies in Finland
3.1 Market Analysis
3.1.1 Financing Needs of Young Innovative Companies
In Finland there were 236 435 companies in 2005, of which 220 184 (93.1%) were
micro-companies with less than 10 employees, 13 352 (5.6%) small companies
with 10–49 employees, 2320 (1.0%) medium sized with 50–249 employees, and
579 (0.2%) large companies with 250 or more employees.37 According to the EU
commission SME definition 227 900 were small companies, 3 200 medium sized
and 4 500 large. According to the latest SME survey in the fall 2006,38 23% of
Finnish SMEs will seek external finance within the next 12 months. Of these, 84%
will approach banks, 31% Finnvera, 11% venture capitalists, 5% insurance com-
panies, and 15% other sources. However, there are important differences in the fi-
nancing needs of companies depending on their growth orientation. For strongly
growth oriented companies, the share of companies seeking external finance is
40%. This figure is nearly twice as large as for SMEs in general. Fewer strongly
growth oriented companies will approach banks (65%) but a significantly higher
share of these companies seeking external finance will approach Finnvera (46%),
30% venture capitalists, 6% insurance companies, and 23% other sources. The fi-
nancing needs and behavior of high growth young innovative companies are dif-
ferent from the average SME. This reality needs to be clearly recognized in
schemes targeting high potential YICs.
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37 Statistics Finland (http://statfin.stat.fi/statweb/start.asp?LA=fi&DM=SLFI& lp=catalog&clg=yritykset)
38 (Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2006)
Figure 1. The share of SMEs reporting the lack of finance as the most serious
obstacle to developing their company in 1985–200639
Overall, most Finnish SMEs do not have problems in accessing finance (see Figure
1).40 This appears to be the case in all regions of Finland – the differences in the
perceived difficulties in accessing finance between regions are relatively small.41
Young age increases the cost of capital, but alone should not prevent access to fi-
nance.42 Not even many young innovative companies have currently problems in
getting finance.43 The majority of companies do not even need external finance be-
cause they do not pursue growth.44 However, those young innovative companies
23
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39 Based on data collected in the bi-annual barometer of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises,
August 2006. Information kindly provided by Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises. No indi-
cator for the innovativeness or R&D expenditure was available to enable analysis of the financing situati-
on of “young innovative companies”. N=831. The number of responding companies in the group planning
to close operations within the next year was only seven.
40 Also the financing survey 2005 of non-financial corporations of Bank of Finland and Ministry of Trade
and Industry (2006) finds that only some 3% of those companieswho had obtained or applied for financing
had encountered problems in availability.
41 (Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2006)
42 (Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2007)
43 (Pajarinen, Rouvinen, & Ylä-Anttila, 2006c)
44 (Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2006)
who are most growth oriented are more likely to experience problems.45 This char-
acteristic of a relatively small proportion of high potential firms being those firms
which are most disadvantaged by current capital market provisions is not unique to
Finland.46 Therefore, we focus primarily on this segment of growth-oriented
young innovative companies in this report.
Figure 2. The share of small young companies (less than 50 employees and
established between 2001–2006) reporting the lack of finance as the most
serious obstacle to developing their company47
Despite of the overall financing situation of young innovative companies being
relatively good, the interviewees and statistics identify a clear challenge in helping
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45 (Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2005d; Hyytinen et al., 2003e; Kari, 2005). Hyytinen, Rouvinen, Toivanen and
Ylä-Anttila (2003d) conclude: ”…our empirical findings that the growth-oriented and innovative subseg-
mentswithin the SME sector are held back by financial constraints. It therefore seemswarranted to conclu-
de that Finland would above all benefit from having a continuum of strong markets for external equity ca-
pital. In particular, the Finnish economy would benefit from having i) more risk capital available for seed
stage firms, ii) a more mature venture capital industry, iii) and a stronger stock market for growth com-
panies.”
46 For example, comparable difficulties for a minority young growth companies are also recorded in several
other countries including the UK (Small Business Service, 2004c).
47 Based on data collected in the bi-annual barometer of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises,
August 2006. Information kindly provided by Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises. No indi-
cator for the innovativeness or R&D expenditure was available to enable analysis of the financing situati-
on of “young innovative companies”. N=831. The number of responding companies in the group planning
to close operations within the next year was only seven.
catalyze and finance large and ambitious startup companies aiming at challenging
global markets.48 There are currently few sources of sufficient value-adding risk
capital for these growth-oriented and internationally focused ventures particularly
at the first rounds of external finance.49 In fact, very few Finnish companies have
received significant external investments in the seed, startup or other early stage
during recent years. According to FVCA data, only 7 seed, startup, or other early
stage ventures received initial investments of €2m or more in 2004–2005.50
There are quite clear sector differences in both the need and sourcing of support for
early stage firms. For example, in the information and communications technology
sector (ICT) business ideas leading to new enterprises very frequently come from
prior work experience.51 In contrast, new product and process opportunities in
bio-technology are much more likely to stem from academic research. Accord-
ingly, Bio is often more dependent on public funding than ICT.52 In ICT, including
software enterprises, ‘bootstrapping’ the start-up of a new venture is often a popu-
lar strategy given that the new enterprise may well require little or no external
funding, particularly if it is not growth oriented.53 However, for growth-oriented
companies, major and rapid investments in product development and subsequent
commercialization are needed. These expenditures can be substantial and often re-
quire sizeable external involvement. Such risky investments are more likely to be
via equity type arrangements than from bank debt. Given the network externalities
in many ICT sectors, many successful ventures in the US market receive tens of
25
48 Research on growth-oriented ventures shows that experienced founders and a large startup size are com-
mon characteristics of rapidly growing and successful ventures, see e.g. Burgel, Fier, Licht, & Murray
(2004) Kaplan, Sensoy, & Strömberg (2005), and Pajarinen, Rouvinen, & Ylä-Anttila (2006b).
49 This was probably the clearest conclusion from interviews and is fully in line with the view presented in
many recent evaluations (e.g. Brännback, Jalkanen, Kurkela, & Soppi, 2004; Hyytinen et al., 2003d; Kari,
2005; Lassila et al., 2006; LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 2005; Luukkonen & Maunula, 2006; Maula et al., 2006a;
Maula et al., 2003a; Paasivirta et al., 2004).
50 Based on public sources, examples of larger investment rounds in early stage companies include €3m in-
vestment in Codenomicon in 2005 by Eqvitec Partners Oy and Prime Technology Ventures NV in 2005
and total €4.5m investments in Ipsat Therapies Oy in 2005–2006 by Bio Fund Management Oy, Finnish
Industry Investment, Sitra and others. Both of these were started already earlier with smaller investments.
Perhaps the biggest recent startup Blyk by Finnish founders was established in London with investments
from private individuals and the Sofinnova Partners without funding from Finnish venture capital firms.
Another recent big startup Igglo was established in 2005 again with funding from individuals and Taivas
group with €12.5m expansion capital in 2006 from Benchmark Capital Europe (€10m) and Taivas Group
(€2.5m) again without funding from Finnish VC firms.
51 (Kaplan et al., 2005)
52 (Hermans & Tahvanainen, 2002; Tahvanainen, 2003)
53 (Harrison, Mason, & Girling, 2004; Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2005b; Lassila et al., 2006)
millions dollars of VC investment in a time span of a few years before breaking
even, making an IPO or being acquired. Emerging technological advances in
bio-technology, nano-technology and new materials will all require substantial
and long term financing for both product and market development.54 Given the ex-
pressed preferences of the Finnish and European venture capital industries, it is un-
likely that such investments will occur in young and unproven enterprises without
substantial and patient public support provided through the public innovation sys-
tem.
To accurately assess the demand for financing need of young innovative compa-
nies, it would be very useful to have clear indicators of their number and financing
needs. Unfortunately, such numbers do not currently exist. The currently available
numbers are just estimates based on various assumptions. In 2005, the Statistics of
Finland registered 26 543 new companies, of which only about 60% is likely to
have started business operations.55 Of these, depending on measure, about 7–40%
claim to be growth oriented resulting in a range of about 1 000–6 000 new compa-
nies per year with some level of growth intent. Tekes has earlier estimated that
there would be annually about 100–500 new growth companies established in Fin-
land with an assumption that 1–5% of new companies would be growth compa-
nies.56 Between 2003–2006, about 300 companies 6 years or younger have re-
ceived finance from Tekes each year.
In the most recent SME barometer, the share of SMEs established 2001 or later
was 24%. According to the Statistics Finland, the total number of SMEs in Finland
was 227 900.57 The number of SMEs six years old or younger would then be
around 55 000. Whereas the overall share of “strongly growth oriented” SMEs in
the barometer was 10% in fall 2006 (up from the low 6% between fall 2002 – fall
2003), the corresponding share within a subset of companies established 2001 or
later with maximum 49 employees was 15%. The number of strongly growth ori-
ented SMEs would then bemost likely in the range of 5 500–8 000. To estimate the
number of young innovative companies i.e. companies less than 6 years and inno-
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54 (Brännback et al., 2004)
55 For an analysis of the share of new, activated entrepreneur-driven companies, see Pajarinen and Rouvinen
and Ylä-Anttila (2006b).
56 (Hyvärinen & Rautiainen, 2006)
57 http://www.stat.fi/til/syr/2005/syr_2005_2006-11-30_kat_001.html
vation goals or R&D min 15% of total expenditure, many additional assumptions
would be needed.58
Concerning the deal flow of early stage companies to early stage venture capital
firms, recent research based on number of unique companies in the deal flow lists
of early stage VCs and several alternative methods suggests that there have been
800 to 900 different Finnish companies attempting to raise early-stage venture
capital each year in 2004–2005.59 Including firms seeking Tekes startup equity
loans, the number would increase up to 1 000 companies per year.
In matching annual supply and demand, the different companies seeking venture
capital investments in 2004–2005 identified in the study can be compared to the re-
ality of 97 completed early stage VC investments recorded by the Finnish Venture
Capital Association. Thus, the market-level success rate for an early stage venture
capital applicant is 5.7%.60 Figure 3 shows the wide discrepancy between firms
seeking funds and those actually funded by Finnish venture capitalists in
2004–2005.61
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58 Statistics Finland collects information on the overall number of companies, but does not have an indicator
for innovativeness. The bi-annual SME barometer of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises
(2006) similarly collects useful information, but has not so far separated YICs. The same applies to the fi-
nancing survey of non-financial corporations of the Bank of Finland and the Ministry of Trade and Indust-
ry (2006). Measurement of the number, growth-orientation, realized growth, and financing needs of YICs
based on the “young innovative enterprise” definition in the new EU state aid regulation (i.e. small enter-
prise 6 years or younger with goal to create a significant innovation or min 15% expenditures dedicated to
R&D (European Commission, 2006a)) would be a useful addition in the statistics.
59 (Tiainen, 2006) These numbers refer to seed, startup and other early stage ventures sought from Finnish
VC funds focused on investments in companies in these development stages. The estimate excludes fun-
ding sought from expansion and later stage investors as well as from buyout investors.
60 When interpreting these statistics, it is important to understand the difference between market level vs.
firm level deal flow statistics i.e. the overall market (overlaps eliminated) vs. what individual VC firms
see. For instance, if in a market of 100 deals each were shown on average to 2 VCs, and if 10 companies re-
ceived investments, the firm level investment rate would be 10/100*2=5% and themarket level investment
rate would be 10/100=10%.
61 Again, this pattern is replicated in virtually every national VC industry’s statistics.
Figure 3. Market-level early stage venture capital deal flow and realized
investment rounds by round size (averages 2004–2005)62
As shown in Figure 3, the greatest demand for early stage VC, measured in num-
bers of companies, focuses on very small investment rounds below €600k. This
analysis also suggest that small investments between €200–600k are themost chal-
lenging to receive given the penal effects of small scale on the VC fund.63 In the
smallest end of the scale, below €200k, Tekes startup loans that are not included in
these figures further improve the chances of getting finance. However, above
€600k level, both the volume of deal flow and the number of financed VC invest-
ments are small.
The low level of growth ambition by a large share of entrepreneurs reflected in the
small amounts of finance sought and the lack of investments (and availability of
investors that make such investments) appear to create a ‘chicken and egg prob-
lem’ that hinders growth oriented entrepreneurship in Finland. Recent examples
also suggest that the introduction of new investors into a market can also stimulate
further demand side activity from entrepreneurs thereby increasing the ‘size of the
pie’. The more unique the fund’s focus and the greater the expected value-added
support to the growth and internationalization of the portfolio companies of the
new fund, the greater the new deal flow generated.
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62 (Tiainen, 2006) Concerning these figures, it is very important to understand that they measure the deal
flow of such Finnish VC funds that are focused on early stage venture capital. The figures do not contain
the deal flow of larger growth and later stage focused VCs.
63 (Murray et al., 1998)
Venture Capital Investment
Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the relative number of companies receiving VC
funding, the average VC investment size, and the volume of the early stage venture
capital investment as a percentage of GDP in selected countries. In this compari-
son Israel excels significantly above others with early-stage venture capita invest-
ments corresponding to 0.45% of GDP. In Israel, the overall high-tech venture
capital investments totaled $1.34bn in 2005 and are estimated to total $1.5bn in
2006,64 corresponding to about 1.0% of GDP. This figure is way beyond Finnish
activity where €89m early-stage VC (0.06% of GDP) or €187m total VC (0.12% of
GDP).65 In R&D, Finland has been continuously among the top countries with
R&D expenditure of 3.5% of GDP just behind Israel (4.7% of GDP) and Sweden
(3.8%) in 2005.66 Finland’s goal is to raise R&D expenditure to 4.0% by the end of
this decade.67 The ambition and focus on investments in the commercialization of
R&D has unfortunately been much lower.68
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64 Source: IVC Research Center
65 Source: FVCA 2006
66 However, it needs to be remembered that a large share of the Finnish R&D expenditure is based on Nokia.
According to recent estimates, Nokia accounts for 45% of the total business sector R&D and a third of total
national R&D (Hyytinen, Paija, Rouvinen, & Ylä-Anttila, 2005a). It is difficult to assess the relative role
such R&D creating opportunities for the creation of venture capital backed companies compared to other
R&D. During the recent years, many of the most visible ventures have been spin-offs fromNokia, founded
or lead by former Nokia employees, or operating in closely related business areas.
67 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2006; Science and Technology Policy Council, 2006)
68 The Science and Technology Policy Council (2006) notes: ”Different development stages of companies
and the associated different financing needs have not been sufficiently considered. Innovation finance and
the functioning of financing instruments as a whole have not received enough attention by the Science and
Technology Policy Council (authors’ translation).”
Figure 4. Average number of VC-funded early stage companies and investment
size 2001–2005 in selected countries and regions69
Figure 5. Early-stage venture capital investments as a percentage of GDP in
selected countries and regions70
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69 Sources: IVC, EVCA, FVCA and VentureXpert. The figures should be considered as illustrative given po-
tential differences in the definitions in different regions and databases.
70 Sources: IVC, EVCA, FVCA and VentureXpert. The figures should be considered as illustrative given po-
tential differences in the definitions in different regions and databases.
In Finland, the number of venture capital funds that invested in seed, startup, and
other early stage ventures dropped significantly from 2001 to 2003. Finnish expe-
rience reflected a major worldwide reduction in technology-based investment post
2000. After the low point in 2003, early stage VC investment has started to grow
again in Finland and most of the other countries (Figure 6). Figure 7 also illustrates
the market dynamics by showing how the number of initial investments dropped
from 271 in year 2000 down to 127 in 2003. After 2003, slow recovery has started.
Figure 6. Venture capital and private equity investments by stage in Finland
1996–200571
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71 FVCA statistics and yearbooks 1990–2005. When considering the volume of VC investments in Finnish
ventures, it is important to understand that the country-of-management based figures are increasingly irre-
levant as the share of foreign VC investments in companies increases (OECD 2000). In 1999, 43% of in-
vestments in Finnish companies were foreign (2000). In 2006, many of the largest VC deals in Finland ha-
ve been cross-border investments e.g. €12.8m round in Ekahau including 3M with Nexit Ventures and ot-
hers, €12.5m round in Igglo led by Benchmark Capital Europe, an undisclosed large round led by Sofinno-
va Partners in Blyk, $7.7m round in Silecs backed by Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers, a €4M round in
Solid by Apax Partners and CapMan, among others.
Figure 7. Initial and follow on investments in venture capital and private equity
in Finland 1990–200572
In Finland the mild upturn in early stage finance since 2003 was largely the result
of strong government support via the new Seed Finance program of Finnish Indus-
try Investment (FII) (since 2004) and Seed Fund Vera Ltd (since 2005, hereafter
‘Avera’). The share of private investors in all early stage investments has dropped
from above 60% in 2000 to around 30% 2005. Most of the public early-stage in-
vestments were made by Sitra and Sitra-owned regional funds until around 2002
and recently by FII and Avera (Figure 8).
32
0
100
200
300
400
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Investments (€m)
0
100
200
300
400
Initial (MEUR)
Follow -on (MEUR)
Initial
Follow on
Investments (number)
€m)
(€m)
(#)
(#)
72 FVCA statistics and yearbooks 1990–2005
Figure 8. Seed- and start-up stage venture capital investments by private and
public investors.73
Concerning business angels, Sitra’s INTRO market place has currently 450 regis-
tered business angels in comparison to 100 angels in Sitra’s Matching-service ten
years ago in 1996. The volumes of business angel investment are hard to estimate.
However, according to Global Entrepreneurship Monitor which measures infor-
mal venture capital (a broader concept than professional business angels), the vol-
ume of informal venture capital as a percentage of GDP in Finland was among the
lowest of the participating countries in 2005.74
3.1.3 Venture Capital Firms
The Finnish Venture Capital Association has currently 42 ‘full’ (i.e. investor)
members of which 15 have announced their willingness to invest in seed stage ven-
tures and a total of 21 (including the 15 seed firms) are prepared to invest in startup
ventures. In addition, ten other Finnish VC firms have not set stage-related invest-
ment criteria.75 Very few of these investors have above €50m under management.
One major consequence of this small fund structure is that their ability to scale
companies rapidly to international growth is very limited. Very few of those VC
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73 FVCA statistics
74 (Minniti, Bygrave, & Autio, 2006)
75 However, only two of these firms are known to invest in seed or startup stages.
firms with fund sizes above €50m have made initial investments in early stage
companies in 2006. This is because remaining funds have been reserved for fol-
low-on investments or changes in the funds’ investment strategies have moved
them towards a preferred focus on later stage deals.76 Only four Finnish VC inves-
tors (three of them public) with managed capital greater than €50m made initial in-
vestments in Finnish seed or startup stage companies in 2006.
There are very significant entry barriers to venture capital, largely given the reluc-
tance of institutional investors to back first-time funds.77 Many of the key institu-
tional investors in Finland do not currently consider European or Finnish VC
funds attractive in general. They are categorically negative about first time funds.
Many of the current private VC firms have been established as spin-offs/manage-
ment buyouts from public investors e.g. Eqvitec Partners (Ex-Sitra Technology
Management), Biofund Management (ex-Sitra Biofund Management), 3i Finland
(ex SFK Finance Oy, ex-Startfund of Kera Management) and most of the currently
primarily privately owned regionally operating venture capital funds came about
as management buyouts from Sitra (e.g. Aboa Venture Management, Innofinance,
Midinvest, Sentio Invest, Teknia Invest, Teknoventure Management, among others).
While it is important that new general partners emerge in a competitive environ-
ment, it may not be optimal if the only route to create sufficiently large funds is by
employees of public organizations privatizing public VC programs through MBOs
to become venture capitalists. For instance, few world-class serial entrepreneurs
work in public funding organizations. The insider nature of these transactions has
reduced the opportunity of non public servants to engage in Finnish risk capital ac-
tivity. Yet, it is exactly the experience of world-scale serial entrepreneurs that is
urgently needed in Finnish early stage ventures. To the outside observer the Finn-
ish venture capital structure looks a rather tightly knit network of former civil ser-
vants. This is a very different structure and character to that pertaining in early
stage VC funds in either Israel or the USA. Several countries have launched gov-
ernment backed programs based on incentives and open bidding to catalyze new
professional private venture capital funds.78
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76 Dimov&Murray (2007) show that, in the US, larger VC funds continue to invest in seed capital activity as
a means of new technology market intelligence.
77 In Europe institutional investors are more reluctant to invest in first time funds compared to other regions
with only 35% of LPs definitely investing and additional 8% considering whereas the figures are 49% and
6% for the USA and 54% and 11% for Asia (Private Equity Intelligence Ltd, 2006). Based on interviews,
the situation in Finland appears to be even worse for initial funds than in Europe in general.
78 See chapter 2 and Appendix 1 for reviews of programs such as New Zealand venture Investment Fund,
Israeli Yozma, Australian Innovation Investment Funds, and the British Enterprise Capital Funds.
3.1.4 Institutional Investors
One of the constraining factors in the development of private funding of young in-
novative companies is the availability of institutional funds to privately managed,
venture capital funds. In Finland, as in many other countries, large pension funds
are one of the core sources of funds in venture capital and private equity.79 In Fin-
land, pension funds are quite new to this asset class. In particular, they first in-
vested significantly in domestic early stage venture capital in 1998–2001, just be-
fore a major crash of the technology market. This lead to worse than expected re-
turns and scared away new investors that had burnt their fingers in the first round
of VC funds in which they invested. Since then, very little finance has been in-
vested by institutional investors in venture capital funds focused on early-stage
ventures (see Figure 9).
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79 In Finland, the most important sources of funds of venture capital and private equity funds in 2005 were
pension funds (31%) followed by fund of funds (14%), capital markets (14%), insurance companies
(12%), corporate investors (10%), government (9%), banks (5%), private individuals (3), academic insti-
tutions (1), and other sources (3%.). Given the dominant role of pension funds as investors, and their cur-
rently very low interest in early and growth stage venture capital funds (opposite to buyout funds), the go-
vernment has had negotiations with the pension funds to find ways how they could continue to invest also
in Finnish venture capital funds (Prime Minister’s Office, 2006).
Figure 9. Finnish early-stage VC commitments and European VC, NASDAQ,
and OMX Helsinki 1-year returns80
This recent limited appetite of Finnish institutional investors towards venture capi-
tal has been largely in line with broader European market behavior.81 In Europe
and in Finland, in comparison to the United States, most institutional investors
were new to venture capital until the late 1990s. Therefore, they did not benefit
from the good exit markets available to incumbent investors by the end of the
1990s. Unfortunately, many inexperienced investors belatedly moved to venture
capital at the peak of the market. Thus, for many European institutional investors,
their limited experience of European venture capital performance is uniformly
poor (as apposed to their returns to private equity). Given the effects of rolling av-
erage IRR calculations, this period of 2000 to 2004 has severely depressed Euro-
pean VC performance figures. However, importantly, current research,82 and a
number of recent success stories suggest that there are no fundamental reasons
why venture capital could not work in Finland or the rest of Europe. Contemporary
statistics show clearly improved returns to venture capital investments in Europe
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80 Sources: NASDAQ, Datastream, VentureXpert. For performance measures of all segments of venture ca-
pital and private equity in Europe, see EVCA (2006).
81 (Coller Capital, 2006)
82 (Lindström, 2006)
and Finland.83 However, it is sensible to note that many European national VC in-
dustries are extremely inexperienced compared to their US equivalents. This is
likely to impact negatively on VC returns for some considerable period in all but
the biggest and most international of European VC funds.
As of now, Finnish institutional investors are still very reluctant to invest in Finn-
ish early stage venture capital funds. Only few trusted VC firms have attracted suf-
ficient funds from the market. Others, particularly those with no prior track record,
are not of interest to still very cautious investors.84 The Finnish Pension Alliance
TELA has carried out analysis on their venture capital investment activities and
notes that in addition to unsatisfactory past returns they are concerned about lack
of management teams with appropriate track records.85 Recent research supports
the importance of background of venture capitalists as an important performance
determinant.86 From that perspective there might be a clear need to rethink the
Finnish VC policy measures which have been quite passive from the perspective
of catalyzing or even enabling experienced individuals for instance with serial en-
trepreneurship background to become venture capitalists.
However, from the perspective of analyzing future prospects of different segments
of venture capital and private equity, the ongoing analysis appears to be somewhat
limited. The large weight that has been given in Finland and in Europe in
2003–2006 for performance figures dominated by investments made less than six
years ago at the top of the peak around 2000 suggests possible limited awareness of
the temporal dynamics of the venture capital market i.e. the importance of the cy-
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83 (Braun & Clovis, 2006; EVCA, 2006; Fricke, 2006)
84 It is interesting to note that some of the Finnish institutional investors who categorically reject investment
opportunities in first-time-funds in Finland or Europe are happy to let their funds be invested in first time
funds in the USA through their investment in US fund of funds with “emerging teams” programs. One furt-
her problem in Finland may be the cumbersome previously common practice of involving limited partners
in operational decision making concerning first investments and follow-on investments in Finnish funds
(Passinen, 2004). This practice can focus LPs to invest in few experienced late stage, low risk funds rather
than diversify, take more risk and invest also in early stage. However, not all funds use this practice any-
more.
85 (TELA, 2006)
86 (e.g. Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006a; Maula et al., 2006a; Söderblom, 2006; Zarutskie,
2006)
cles as well as the J-curve effect.87 Within the next five to seven years, it is possible
that we will for instance see an increase in global interest rates, which could reduce
the present attractiveness of highly leveraged buyout and hedge funds and improve
the relative merits of venture capital funds. From future pensioners’ perspective,
one can only hope for better vintage diversification compared to the late entry in
VC at the top of the peak in Europe in 2000–2001. In venture capital and private
equity, diversification across vintages is extremely important.88
Given the changing, and improving, performance of early stage investment returns
over time in Europe, it is important that the FVCAensures that institutional investors
are properly and fully informed about contemporary VC performance trends. If the
industry is primarily interested in later stage or private equity type deals, there is
likelihood that this important information role may not be fully implemented.
3.2 Government Policy and Funding Instruments
3.2.1 Evolution of the Government Innovation Finance Policy
in Finland
Government has had an active role in the development of venture capital market in
Finland.89 Already in 1967, government backed Sponsor Oy was established with
the support of Bank of Finland as a first venture capital company in Finland.90 In
1978, government created a tax incentive for riskcapital by making dividend in-
come from portfolio companies’ tax exempt on application basis.91 Sponsor first
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87 For instance, the association of Finnish pension funds TELA in its analysis (2006) cites performance figu-
res of Finnish, European ands US venture capital and private equity investments including investments un-
til the end of 2003 without mentioning the J curve effect or any other considerations such as the heavy do-
mination of the investments at the top of the bubble on the relevance and validity of the statistics concer-
ning the future prospects. See e.g. Meyer and Mathonet (2005) and Grabenwarter and Weidig (2005) for
clear presentations of the dynamics of venture capital market from the perspective of institutional inves-
tors. Similarly, the research paper commissioned by EVCA (2004a) is useful in analyzing the performance
of European venture capital and private equity with implications to the asset allocation. From a pension
fund perspective, the book by Fraser-Sampson (2006) is also likely to be useful.
88 Lerner et al. (2006) concludes in their study on the investment performance of limited partners: “The
strong pro-cyclicality of capital flows into the private equity industry seems to be mainly driven by less
sophisticated LPs, which subsequently have very poor performance”
89 The early part of this chapter draws heavily from Seppä (2000). See also Hyytinen and Väänänen (2003e)
for a review of the evolution of government finance of SMEs in Finland.
90 (Seppä, 2000)
91 Applications were handled by the Ministry of Finance, the first one granted for Sponsor in 1978.
relied on management resources from Industrialisation Fund. However, establish-
ing an own organization, Sponsor was relatively quick in redirecting its focus from
early stage investments to financially attractive later stage investments. Sponsor
was privatized in 1983. In 1971, government established Kehitysaluerahasto Oy
(later Kera and currently Finnvera). In 1990, SFK Finance Oy was created as a
subsidiary of Kera to manage a new venture capital fund (Start Fund of Kera).
Sitra has played a very important role in the inception and development of the
Finnish VC market. In 1987–1989 Sitra carried out research on venture capital and
was influential in the establishment of the Finnish Venture Capital Association in
1990. After Sitra’s transfer from the supervision of Bank of Finland to the Finnish
Parliament in 1991, Sitra became active as a venture capital investor. A very large
share of the current privately managed VC funds are spin-offs (often management
buyouts) from Sitra.
In 1994, government established the Finnish Industry Investment Ltd to act as a
fund of funds.92 By 1997 there were several public VC management firms (Start
Fund of Kera, Finnish Industry Investment and Sitra) undertaking several roles.
Inevitably, there was some confusion about the precise roles of specific public or-
ganizations, particularly Kera and FII. Finnvera was established in a merger of
Kera and the Finnish Guarantee Board in 1998. Start Fund of Kera was moved to
FII, which focused on equity investments.93 Between 1997-2000 a large share of
government owned venture capital operations were privatized through manage-
ment buyouts.
After the market crash in 2000–2001 and the subsequent flight of private early
stage VCs from the market, challenges were again observed in adequate provision
of early stage finance in Finland.94 As a direct result, government policy sought to
improve the supply of VC finance for early stage companies. FII started a seed pro-
gram in 2003/2004 and Tekes started to provide startup loans. In 2004 Ministry of
Trade and Industry completed a strategy for the seed finance and services available
to young innovative companies.95 The Government passed a new law on Finnvera
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92 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1999/19991352
93 When establishing Finnvera in 1998, a central argument for transferring Startfund of Kera to Finnish
Industry Investment was that equity investments and loan provision should be separated in different or-
ganizations due to their different characteristics and to avoid conflicts of interest. (e.g. a press statement:
“Venture capital is so different in nature that it is not rational to keep it together with loan provision
(authors’ translation)”, Kauppinen V, Industrial Counselor, Ministry of Trade and Industry in Kauppalehti
29.1.1998, page 5).
94 (e.g. Maula et al., 2003a)
95 (Paasivirta et al., 2004)
enabling venture capital activities. This replaced the 1998 law that excluded such
investments.96 In 2005, based on the financing strategy of the AISP-strategy for
years 2005–2007, Finnvera started a “feeder fund” Seed Fund Vera Ltd (Avera),
which makes investments in early stage companies that have been ignored by pri-
vate investors. It is hoped that such early stage support will identify attractive
young companies that will subsequently spur the interest of private investors.
In 2005–2006 there have been again some growing concerns about the fragmenta-
tion of the public service including perceived overlaps in programs and provision.
Table 1. Time line of the evolution of public financing of young innovative
companies in Finland since 199097
Start fund of Kera established as a subsidiary of Kera
Sitra starts venture capital investments after transfer under the parliament
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. (FII) started as a fund of funds
MTI analyzing reorganization of the public finance of startup companies
Sitra establishes Sitra Bio Fund management Oy
Finnvera founded in the merger of Kera and Finnish Guarantee Board, the new
law on Finnvera excludes venture capital activity from the remit of Finnvera
FII acquires Start fund of Kera from Kera
Management buy out of SFK Finance Oy from Kera
Sitra Technology Management Oy established by Sitra and FII
Bio Fund Management Oy (Ex-Sitra Bio Fund Management Oy) established as
a spin-off from Sitra
Eqvitec Partners Oy (ex-Sitra Technology Management Oy) established
as a spin-off from Sitra
New law on FII with more emphasis on early stage and regional focus as
well as channeling EU funding
Regional funds privatized through management buyouts from Sitra
FII directed to focus on early stage. The roles of FII
and Finnvera/Veraventure clarified in the manage-
ment of funds
FII launches the Seed Finance Program
Sitra introduces a new strategy with reduced
venture capital activities
AISP-strategy published by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry
Government enacts a new law on Finnvera ena-
bling venture capital investments
Tekes launched a startup capital loans program
Avera founded by Finnvera as a direct
seed investor
MTI considering the roles of public fi-
nancing organizations
Sitra proposing a merger of Avera, FII
Seed program and Sitra PreSeed ac-
tivities
Korona Finance Oy established as a
spin-off from Sitra
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96 Law on Finnvera (Laki valtion erityisrahoitusyhtiöstä 18.6.1998/443, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajanta-
sa/1998/19980443)
97 Annual reports, Kauppalehti archives, The Business Information System (BIS)
3.2.2 Public Funding Instruments
Finnish government policy concerning the public financing of young innovative
companies has evolved significantly over the past ten years and particularly over
the past couple of years. Many of the current major instruments are less than 3
years old. Furthermore, there are ongoing strategy discussions between govern-
ment and the existing agencies as to how the public financing of young innovative
companies could best be developed in the future. Therefore, when considering the
evolution of public financing instruments during the next 5–7 years, any analysis
of today’s situation should be seen within this changing context. However, the cur-
rent situation is an important and necessary starting point for future development.
Therefore, we will first provide a description of the existing instruments. We will
then use this analysis to examine policy programs’ strengths and weaknesses in-
cluding the possible opportunities that a revision of the current policy structures
may bring.
Figure 10. Mapping the roles of key actors in the finance of young innovative
companies in December 2006 (long-term core areas dark gray, newer areas in
light gray)
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98 2005 annual reports, Ala-Opas et al. (2006), Grönholm (2006), Tekes web page and other sources
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Tekes,99 the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation is a ma-
jor funding organization for young innovative companies through their primarily
R&D finance remit. Overall, Tekes provided €429m of funding in 2005, of which
€250m went to company projects and €179m to projects of universities and re-
search institutions. In 2005, Tekes funded projects of 1826 companies. A large
share of young innovative companies in Finland has received funding from Tekes
to support their R&D work. However, after the collapse of the technology-boom,
the lowered availability of private funding somewhat constrained the use of Tekes
funding because of the ‘matching’ requirement of investing own funds to get
Tekes funding.100 Between 2003–2006, Tekes has provided annually some €40m
funding for about 300 companies with the age of 6 years or younger. During the
past few years, Tekes has expanded its role from technology to innovation includ-
ing increased support for commercialization. In 2004, Tekes established a startup
loan instrument, which can provide a maximum of 80% of the eligible start-up
costs for new companies (max €100k in Phase I, max €200k in phase II since July
2006). Furthermore, Tekes has financed the TULI program (max €10k grant to buy
expert services to prepare research commercialization)101 and the LIKSA program
(max €20k grant from Tekes + €20k convertible loan from Sitra to buy support for
business plan development to improve investment readiness). Other products in-
clude VARA funding to prepare business plans and KAUPPI for innovation cen-
ters in universities to help commercialize the results of a group of research projects
(€1.8m for 8 KAUPPI projects in 2005). In 2006, Tekes has also provided
KEPARA funding to buy advisory services for new companies.
For many reasons, including the perceived need to reduce the fragmentation of its
instrument portfolio and improve customer orientation, the need to deepen the sup-
port for young innovative companies, and the new framework conditions stem-
ming from new EU legislation,102 Tekes is currently developing its portfolio quite
significantly. Year 2007 will be a transition year during which some old instru-
ments such as TULI, LIKSA and startup loans will be downscaled in their current
form and new instruments will be introduced and promoted. The new EU legisla-
tion will allow a larger proportion of public investments in individual companies
where a market failure is evident. As a consequence of this policy change, Tekes is
currently revising its portfolio of policy instruments and considering whether and
how it could develop a more selective approach. One priority, reflecting the new
interest in commercialization of R&D, is the challenge of how Tekes can best col-
99 http://www.tekes.fi/eng/
100 (e.g. LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 2005)
101 (Valovirta, Oosi, Uusikylä, & Maula, 2006)
102 (European Commission, 2006a)
laborate with private investors and thereby connect its young client enterprises
more directly to growth markets and new customer needs.
Some of the strengths of Tekes include the relative clarity of its original purpose
despite its recently expanded role. For most activities, there are no close substi-
tutes from other government funding activities. The organization’s personnel are
widely respected for their technical understanding and competencies. Tekes is
seen as an important contributor to Finland’s internationally recognized innova-
tion status. Also the sizeable annual budget based financing gives strength, allows
research activities, and enables Tekes to be more counter-cyclical compared to
those institutions with a more immediate profit orientation. Tekes has also been
seen as proactive and development oriented, although this view is not universal.
Some of the challenges from the perspective of finance of young innovative com-
panies are that Tekes has until lately been very technology-focused with less em-
phasis and understanding of the commercialization challenges. Furthermore,
Tekes has been seen to have somewhat limitedmarket and customer information in
project selection, which is particularly important attribute for any commercializa-
tion activity. Also lack of coordination between products (i.e. underdeveloped ac-
count management / customer service) has been seen as a weakness.
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd103 is a government-owned investment com-
pany. It engages in equity capital investment and invests in venture capital funds,
private equity funds and, increasingly, directly in selected target companies
through an FII controlled seed fund. Finnish Industry Investment Ltd is adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In the end of 2005, the investments
and investment commitments of FII totaled €325.6m. The primary mandate given
to the Finnish Industry Investment by government has been to stimulate the cre-
ation of new, privately managed venture capital funds in Finland.104 However, dur-
ing the past few years, FII has enjoyed somewhat limited success in this primary
activity.105 This is in largely due to the unwillingness of Finnish pension funds to
co-invest with government in Finnish early-stage focused venture capital funds.
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103 http://www.industryinvestment.com/ For recent evaluations and impact analyses, see Maula & Murray
(2003a) and Hjelt & Vanhanen (2005).
104 The Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. 1352/1999 (http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1999/
19991352) sets the objective for FII: “The purpose of the state-owned company Finnish Industry Invest-
ment Ltd. is to improve the conditions particularly for small and medium-sized firms by making equity in-
vestments in venture capital organizations. The companymaymake equity investments directly into target
companies particularly when long-term risk taking is required.” (authors’ translation). The primacy of
fund of funds activity has been further clarified in the recent Government bill to replace the existing law on
FII (HE 180/2006 vp).
105 Between 2002–2006, FII has not been able to influence the creation of many new Finland-based VC funds
with an early stage focus and sufficient size (e.g. above €40m as a lower end of commercially viable VC
funds).
FII has held to a very strong principle of investing on equal terms (pari passu) with
private investors. Although the principle ensures certain commercial discipline, it
has further limited the public tools available to incentivize private investors when
they would not otherwise invest.106 However, FII has also had a clear drive to-
wards increasing its role as direct investor in ventures.107
As a response to the identified gap in the financing of young innovative companies
in 2003, FII first attempted to catalyze new funds, but without success, started a
new seed finance program in 2004 establishing a €50m seed fund. In this recent
program, FII invests directly in ventures on equal termswith private investors. The
deals are sourced by private investors and FII normally does not take a board seat
in the companies which it funds. The lead role in this public/private syndication is
always taken by the private investor. In 2005, FII made 47 investment decisions in
this program. In December 2006, the board of FII made a decision to allocate fur-
ther €50m to the second internal seed fund.
One of the strengths of FII is that it is the most important public channel for
fund-of-fund investments in venture capital funds. FII has clearly improved the
supply of capital to the Finnish VC industry during difficult years, both through its
fund of fund operation as well as through its direct seed program. FII is widely per-
ceived to have a commercially focused and experienced management team. Some
of the challenges relate to the tight profit orientation and pari passu principles of
45
106 In our view, pari passu is a good default option for government fund of funds operation under circumstan-
ces when it is sufficient to catalyze the private investment needed to rectify an identified market failure.
However, usually market failures result from private investors perceiving too low return/risk ratio in a cer-
tain market segment. If the government cannot alter the perceived return/risk ratio and is tied to investment
decisions of private investors, any government intervention is likely to be pro-cyclical and potentially
ineffective in correcting the market failure. Asymmetric profit sharing models with open bidding process
have been adopted in certain countries to tackle this problem (See Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 for reviews).
For some additional views of these issues in the Finnish context, see Hyytinen and Väänänen (2003e) and
Hyytinen, Rouvinen, Toivanen and Ylä-Anttila (2003d). In the past, the EU notification process used to be
a significant delay in developing new venture capital fund models using asymmetric profit sharing, but the
process is nowadays likely to be faster for programs such as the UK Enterprise Capital Funds after its posi-
tive evaluation by the Commission in 2005 and the recent new guidelines on state aid to support risk capi-
tal investments in SMEs (European Commission, 2006e).
107 One reflection of the increasing role of direct investments in the organizational identity of FII is its state-
ment of its objectives. The currently stated objectives emphasize direct investments in seed and growth
stage companies and excludes the primary task of helping create new venture capital funds (“to promote
product realization and commercialization of new innovations by investing in seed and growth-stage Fin-
nish enterprises, to promote regional venture capital investment, promote efficient and appropriate chan-
neling of risk capital from EU sources to funds and companies. to use direct investments to enable major
investments in corporate development, corporate restructuring and the launch of new industrial pro-
jects.”(partially authors’ translation from the objectives stated on the web page http://www.teollisuussijoi-
tus.fi/yhtio/index.html, the same version also stated in the introduction of the impact analysis commis-
sioned by the board of FII (Hjelt et al., 2005)). This has changed since prior evaluations (Hyytinen et al.,
2003e; Maula et al., 2003a).
FII. These have reduced the agency’s opportunities to act counter-cyclically and
the opportunity to fulfill its primary goal, i.e. helping to create new, viable venture
capital funds that invest in early stage companies. As a fund-of-funds investor, FII
has been perceived to be an important, but somewhat passive investor. A more ac-
tive role for FII in helping catalyze new funds would have been warranted in the
opinions of a number of respondents interviewed. It has also been felt that FII’s
mixed portfolio of direct and indirect VC investments obfuscates the original remit
of FII. The agency’s newer seed program has been perceived to be important dur-
ing the recent years of few active private seed capital funds. However, it has been
criticized for not rewarding co-investors’ contribution to value-added in portfolio
firms. Furthermore, one perceived threat is that the seed program is growing into a
very large direct investment program with significant implications for future gov-
ernment commitment of further finance.108 From the value adding perspective for
globalizing ventures in direct investments, there are some limitations in the avail-
ability of serial entrepreneurship background and in the use of global market infor-
mation and network connections. This lack of specialist enterprise support is a par-
ticularly serious weakness for an organization investing directly in new and grow-
ing firms in technology domains. Concerning ideas presented by FII’s manage-
ment of introducing carried interest compensation in FII’s internal funds, although
such incentives are important and appropriate in private venture capital funds that
are raised competitively, we are skeptical about their appropriateness in internal
funds of a government organization with the remit to rectify market failures pri-
marily as a fund of funds catalyzing new privately managed funds.
Sitra, The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development109 is an inde-
pendent public foundation under the supervision of the Finnish Parliament. It has
had a major role in the development of the Finnish venture capital market since the
beginning in 1990. In the end of 2005, it had total assets of €642m. Until recently,
Sitra has had a broad range of direct investment activities. However, in 2004, Sitra
announced a new program-based strategy110 which has resulted in the agency
largely withdrawing from an involvement in the financing of young innovative
companies. Sitra has refocused its activities on a small number of strategic pro-
grams some of which have a venture capital involvement. However, overall Sitra
has clearly reduced its role as an early-stage venture capital investor. Another role
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108 However, the management of MTI has convinced that based on their modeling the operation of the seed in-
vestment activity as an evergreen operation including any follow-on investments in the ventures should
never commit more than some €85m.
109 http://www.sitra.fi/en/
110 “New system of programme working means considerable challenges for Sitra.” Sitra press release
22.11.2004, Finnish National Fund for Research and Development Sitra, Helsinki, Finland.
Sitra has played is in developing the finance of young innovative companies is its
role in matching entrepreneurs and business angels, which it started in 1996.
More recently, Sitra has focused this and related activities in Sitra PreSeed, an en-
tity which implements the INTRO, LIKSA, and DIILI services. INTRO is an intro-
duction service for entrepreneurs and business angels based on a register of some
450 business angels and five annual INTRO Forums in which selected entrepre-
neurs present investment opportunities for ventures. These events are coordinated
by Sitra, which also selects the companies that are invited to present to informal in-
vestors (37 companies presented in 2005). In addition to coordinating the market
place, Sitra also acts as an investor.111 LIKSA, implemented in collaboration with
Tekes, supports entrepreneurs in the development of business plans by offering
max €40k to buy professional advisory services (half of the amount is grant from
Tekes and half is a convertible loan from Sitra).112 In the DIILI service, Sitra
matches entrepreneurs with seasoned sales executives.
Some of the clear strengths in Sitra PreSeed’s activities are the centrality of Sitra as
an actor, its resources, and to date its long term commitment to establishing the in-
formal venture capital market in Finland. INTRO is seen as a very important mar-
ketplace, but according to some stakeholders it is slightly constrained by the con-
trolling role of Sitra. As a rule, Sitra views its role as developer of the innovation
system rather than an operator of existing activities. Thus, both Sitra and other
stakeholders view that there could be changes in the future management arrange-
ments of these operations. Some of the extant challenges are that Sitra’s profit ori-
entation may hamper activities that cannot easily be profitable (e.g. platform
building). Furthermore, Sitra’s strategy to pioneer new things and spin them off af-
ter the initial program period can be challenging in areas that require longer-term
public support. Many interviewees also expressed concerns about the perceived
lack of openness and transparency of INTRO market place activities. In their opin-
ion, this has lead to full potential of the marketplace not being realized. There were
some concerns of adverse selection in the deal flow on both sides partly due to both
Sitra’s tight control and investment objectives. Some of the problems were seen as
related to Sitra’s prior goal of sourcing its own investment opportunities from
match-making activity. Sitra’s own interests were perceived to influence the
match-making activity.
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111 “In addition to managing the investment process, Sitra considers the companies presented at INTRO as an
investor.” http://www.preseed.fi/intro/default.asp?l=1
112 LIKSA has been decided to be discontinued in the current format in the end of 2006. Sitra will continue to
provide similar convertible loans and Tekes will renew its funding and service portfolio in 2007 and in the
mean time can provide equivalent funding e.g. through it’s VARA instrument.
Finnvera Plc113 is a government owned, specialist company offering financing
services to promote both the domestic operations and internationalization activi-
ties of Finnish businesses. Finnvera is fully owned by the Finnish state. It is also
Finland’s official Export Credit Agency (ECA). In 2005, Finnvera provided
€895.3m domestic financing (€405.8m loans, €425.6m domestic guarantees, and
€63.9m export guarantees). Finnvera has several products for SMEs including
Finnvera Development Loan for financing development projects of SMEs
(50-75% of project’s costs, usually max 5 years, with subsidized interest and secu-
rity negotiated case by case) and Finnvera Entrepreneur Loan for the founder,
someone taking over a business, and for a shareholder working in the enterprise
(max €100m, max 80% of the cost, subsidized interest, max 10 years with max 3
years amortization free). Concerning equity finance for young innovative compa-
nies, Finnvera’s 100% owned subsidiary, Veraventure Ltd, has had a central role
since 2003. Veraventure has two related activities. First, it is a ‘fund of funds’
owning the government stakes in the 14 regional ‘evergreen’ venture capital funds
which are structured as limited companies with a total capital base approximately
€70m. Secondly, Veraventure Ltd serves as the management company of Seed
Fund Vera Ltd (Avera), which began operations in August 2005 following the
AISP strategy of theMinistry of Trade and Industry published in the previous year.
The initial funding was €11.5m and recently €38.5m of new funding was allocated
for the years 2007-2009. Avera can invest in Finnish start-up companies without
requiring the co-investment of syndicating partners. The target is to complement
the funding available from other investors and fill a funding gap between R&D fi-
nance and private or public venture capital for early stage commercialization of
R&D.114 However, very commonly portfolio companies receive simultaneously
R&D funding from Tekes as well as funding from other sources, e.g. business an-
gels. Avera investments are typically a combination of equity (around 40%) and
equity loans (around 60%) with the total investment ceiling of below €500k.
Some of the strengths of Finnvera’s operations related to young innovative compa-
nies have to do with its local presence in all Finnish regions. Finnvera is perceived
by interviewees as an appreciated professional provider of loan and loan guarantee
instruments. Some of the challenges include the variation in operations, invest-
ment criteria, and instruments employed between different regions. Related to
venture capital activities (Avera) there are several particular challenges pointed
out by many interviewees: (1) Avera has little global market information (a partic-
ularly serious weakness in equity funding of growth-oriented young innovative
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113 http://www.finnvera.fi/index.cfm?id=3, for a recent review, see Heinonen and Smallridge (2004).
114 The stated purpose of Avera is: ”…to eliminate the point of discontinuity existing between financing sche-
mes for product development and private venture capital investment.” http://www.veraventure.fi/in-
dex.asp?language=2
companies);115 (2) the handover exit model in direct seed investments is likely to
be challenging in practice; (3) the approach where Avera invests in ventures in
which no private investor or FII is willing to invest has been seen as having a clear
risk of distorting the market.116 Furthermore, mixing the roles of debt provider and
venture capitalist has been seen as problematic given the potentially conflicting in-
terests of creditors and equity holders.117
T&E Centres118 i.e. Employment and Economic Development Centres were es-
tablished by The Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry, and the Ministry of Labour to combine and integrate their regional
forces. Fifteen centers countrywide provide a range of advisory and development
services for businesses, entrepreneurs, and private individuals and funding for in-
vestments, for development of SMEs, for processing and marketing of agricultural
products, and for improvement of the business environment of enterprises.119 In
2005, T&E centres provided total of €125m funding for 2 415 companies. The
funding from T&E centres for SMEs is discretionary support, which is granted on
the basis of a company or project analysis of each project. The aid is directed at
projects in which the aid is estimated to make a substantial contribution to the im-
plementation of the project. The aim is to promote general economic development,
business policy objectives and employment by means of corporate financing. T&E
centres also channel significant amounts of the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) funding. Although many of the interviewees in our context of highly
growth-oriented young innovative companies were not familiar with the services
of T&E centres, we heard about examples of small scale support having been re-
ceived e.g. to enable important foreign customer presentations. Some early stage
investors also saw it possible to receive some support to cover due diligence costs.
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115 Themanagement of Veraventure admits that Avera’s due diligence process is not designed so that it would
be possible to systematically assess whether e.g. an identical venture has already been financed in Sweden
or the United States.
116 For instance, private investors might not want to invest (a) if there is something that needs to be corrected
in the company (e.g. dysfunctional team) or (b) if the valuation is too high. If the company received a VC
investment without identified problems being fixed or with too high valuation, it is very hard to receive
follow-on funding.
117 Finnvera argues that this problem is solved by separating the two activities within the organization. In the
evaluation of Finnvera it was earlier urged that the existence of a “Chinese wall” separating loan and risk
finance is evaluated and ensured (Heinonen et al., 2004). As pointed earlier, in 1998 equity investment ac-
tivities were moved fromKera to FII in 1998 largely to separate these different types of investment activi-
ties.
118 http://www.te-keskus.fi/web/ktmyht.nsf/FrameSetENG?OpenFrameSet
119 http://www.te-keskus.fi/web/ktmyht.nsf/UNID/33892C303219F6DCC22571920030C91E?OpenDocument
Overall, however, the funding levels of T&E centres are small per company and
not among the key instruments by many high growth ventures.
Foundation for Finnish Inventions120 supports and helps private individuals and
entrepreneurs to develop and exploit invention proposals both within Finland and
internationally. The Foundation is mainly funded by the Finnish Ministry of Trade
and Industry. The staff includes 24 technical and commercial experts and in addi-
tion there are 28 innovation managers in universities or Employment and Eco-
nomic Development Centers in different parts of Finland. Besides the evaluation,
protection, promotion and product development of Finnish inventions, the Foun-
dation’s services include: financial support (risk financing, grants and loans); mar-
keting and commercialization of inventions; search for Finnish and/or foreign
partners; licensing offers; information on inventions and innovations through me-
dia coverage, seminars and relevant trade affairs; and legal and other assistance in
licensing negotiations and preparing agreements. FFI has seen as a problem that
many promising inventions cannot be supported to the proof of concept stage and
has therefore proposed a capital loan instrument for that purpose (nb. decision sus-
pended so far). However, e.g. Tekes has already related instruments, so enhanced
coordination and collaboration with Tekes and other relevant organizations is im-
portant.121
Finpro122 is an association founded by Finnish companies focused on supporting
the internationalization of Finnish companies. It does not provide funding, but has
services in which it acts as an advisor to companies seeking finance. In 2005
Finpro operated 53 export centers in 40 countries. It receives funding from the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The financial support from the Ministry of Trade
and Industry has been €20.3m per year. Finpro collaborates with other organiza-
tions including Tekes. Finpro plays an important role in new international innova-
tion centers FinNode123 and FinChi124. Many internationalizing young innovative
companies use Finpro’s services e.g. when entering new markets. Finpro has also
played sometimes a role in facilitating cross-border investments in Finnish ven-
tures.
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120 http://www.innofin.fi/
121 This has also been pointed in a recent evaluation of the Foundation for Finnish Innovations (Kutinlahti et
al., 2006).
122 http://www.finpro.fi/en-US/Finpro/
123 http://www.finnode.com/
124 http://www.finchi.cn/
Invest in Finland125 is an expert service organization promoting foreign direct in-
vestment in Finland funded by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. It mainly fo-
cuses on assisting foreign companies make ‘green field’ entries into Finland, i.e.
establishing new subsidiaries. However, it has so far excluded from its scope the
support of foreign investors who might wish to invest in Finland via venture capi-
tal investments in Finnish companies or by setting up Finnish R&D centers based
on acquired Finnish technology companies. Collaboration increased with Finpro
and Tekes in 2005.
Some perceived challenges in the public provision of risk capital. Amajority of
the instruments reviewed are targeted to address an identified problem. However,
in the light of experience there are a number of difficulties or inefficiencies in their
design. Of the various instruments, the programs providing direct seed financing
(FII’s seed financing program and Avera) are the closest to each other in design
and purpose. Based on the interviews, most perceived overlaps concern these two
instruments, even though there has been an agreement between the agencies that
basically should create a “territory” for each (i.e. Avera does not invest if private
investors or FII are willing to invest). They both employ different types of invest-
ment criteria to avoid the ‘crowding out’ of private investment. However, each ap-
proach appears to have its limitations. In FII’s case, there is an absence of incen-
tives for private lead investors that would compensate them for the necessary time
and attention they have to allocate to early stage enterprises. This is likely to result
in managerial talent avoiding early stage funds to work at the later stages of the VC
or PE industry.126 In some sense, the strong drive by FII to make profits may be
counterproductive from the perspective of the key purpose of the public agency’s
intervention. In Avera’s policy, one problem is the negative certification effect it
might provide for its portfolio companies when the condition for receiving invest-
ment is that they are not of interest for other investors at the time of the investment
as stated in interviews. Furthermore, the investment policy of government investor
investing alone in companies that have not attracted funding from other investors
appears to be quite clearly against the cumulative international (and Finnish) expe-
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125 http://www.investinfinland.fi/
126 In a model where government investor is passive and private investor is expected to do all the work, and
where both invest with same terms without any compensation for the private investor, the management
fees can be argued to be in effect halved for the private investors for the money they effectively manage
(their own investment + matching government share assuming 1:1 match). For business angels, in compa-
rison to VC funds, co-investments are more logical complement given their more limited ability to raise
additional funds – co-investments help them make bigger deals with their own funds and to cross the
so-called secondary gap (e.g. Sohl, 2007). To facilitate a flourishing private early stage venture capital
market attractive for competent venture capitalists and capable of producing good returns, a high priority
should be placed on ensuring sufficient fund size of private venture capital funds (e.g. European Commis-
sion, 2005a; Murray, 2007; Murray et al., 1998; United States Department of Commerce and European
Commission, 2005).
rience and research knowledge on effective government VC policy and can be ar-
gued to have a clear risk to distort the market.127 Although there is still somewhat
limited evidence on the real magnitude of these problems, they are perceived to be
serious by many of the few private actors these schemes are supposed to support
and activate. Therefore, if the purpose of the government policy is to help create a
thriving private risk capital market and not replace it by government activity, in
our view it would be unwise to ignore them and to not try to further develop the
government intervention to eliminate these perceived problems and to ensure that
the government policy optimally catalyzes value adding private investment activity.
3.3 Change Drivers
There are several drivers that are likely to cause pressures to develop the public fi-
nancing of young innovative companies within the time horizon of this report i.e.
the next five to seven years. Some identified issues are discussed in the following
chapters.
3.3.1 Globalization of the Marketplace128
The business operations of young innovative companies have been very interna-
tional for a long time. The term “born global” was coined in the early 1990s and
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127 OECD (1997) recommends: “Fund management – Public officials should not be directly involved in the
investment process. Rather, this responsibility should be delegated to top-quality venture capitalists from
the private sector. While the government should monitor programmes, its involvement in investment de-
cisions should be minimal and the decision-making mechanism should be transparent.” See also Gilson’s
(2003) arguments related to lack of proper incentives and competencies, Lerner’s (2002) arguments con-
cerning potential political distortions in decision making,Manigart et al. (2002) arguments on lower return
expectations of the government investor crowding out private investors and possibly actually prevent the
creation of an active and flourishing private VC market as well as several other arguments in Manigart et
al. (2001) and Murray (2007). Concerning the crowding out argument, Leleux and Surlemont (2003) sum-
marize: “Finally, and more damaging to the industry as a whole, if public funds forego some expected re-
turns for their policy objectives, financing projects at below-market rates, they may end up attracting the
best projects, leaving only ‘‘lemons’’ for private VC firms to fund, making the entry of new, independent
private equity funds more difficult.” Armour and Cumming (2006) find empirical evidence on the crow-
ding effect in a sample of 15 countries over a period of 14 years. As a recent exception to models trying to
catalyze privately managed funds instead of direct government investments, Germany launched in 2005
High-Tech Gründerfonds program (http://www.high-tech-gruenderfonds.de/en/index.html), in which in-
vestments up to €500k will be made in about 300 technology-based companies with an opportunity for an
additional €500k round for selected companies. The management of Avera views this model as a compara-
ble model, although there are differences between them and as a new model there is little knowledge of its
performance.
128 (Deloitte, 2006b; European Commission, 2006d)
presently for instance 59% of all Finnish software ventures have international op-
erations.129 In a recent survey of all Finnish companies less than 1 year old, ap-
proximately one quarter (27%) had targeted international markets.130 The impor-
tance of international sales in growth plans is significantly greater for growth ori-
ented companies. For such firms internationalization is imperative.131 For smaller
economies such as Finland, Denmark or Israel the limited revenue potential of the
domestic market obliges ambitious young firms to internationalize rapidly and
substantially in order to establish a viable economic position in their specialist
technical markets. In practice, based on experiences of several successful and in-
novative Finnish ventures, there are a number of requirements if such firms are to
internationalize successfully. For example, it is desirable to establish English as
the company language from the time of firm formation to be able to recruit interna-
tional talent and to make the company transparent to foreign partners and inves-
tors.132 Strategically, such firms face major decisions extremely rapidly including,
for example, the need to recruit experienced foreigners from key target markets to
complement the senior management team, and major decisions on locating sales
and service functions outside the domestic market and close to the key foreign cus-
tomers.
Although a large share of growth oriented ventures have understood international
(if not ‘global’) operations as a necessity for a long time, many investors and sup-
port organizations are only slowly waking up to this reality. It is still quite recently
that Finnish venture capitalists have internationalized their own operations beyond
an exclusively domestic or (at best) a Nordic focus. Very few of them have re-
cruited foreign expertise to their boards of directors or to the highest management
levels of their executive teams. The situation is worse still in public organizations
supporting growth oriented ventures. Tekes, Sitra, Finnvera or FII have sought or
attracted extremely few foreigners as senior employees. This is possibly because a
majority of such public agencies operate largely in the Finnish language making it
hard for non-natives to remain other than peripheral to the main decision pro-
cesses. For example, at the time of completing this report (December 2006), Tekes
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129 (Lassila et al., 2006)
130 (Pajarinen et al., 2006c)
131 A long term study of NTBFs in the UK and Germany found a strong association between internationaliza-
tion and continuing growth with a majority of high tech young firms internationalizing within two years of
having a saleable product or service. By year 12, the average UK and Germany NTBF had sales in 16 and
10 countries respectively (Cowling, Fryges, Licht, & Murray, 2007).
132 See also Cardwell et al. (1999). This has been pointed out publicly e.g. by founders of Smartner (now part
of Seven Networks) and CRF, both rapidly growing international ventures rated among the best in Europe
by Red Herring, Tornado Insider and other ranking lists.
does not provide funding application instructions in English on their web page.133
Such a clear statement about the predominance of a domestic Finnish focus has not
made it any easier to attract talented and experienced foreigners to come and build
new business in Finland. This behavior is in strong contrast to efforts within the
UK, Australia, Canada or Israel to recruit international managerial talent from the
potential immigrant pool. It is even more salutary to compare the Finnish record to
recruitment practices in the USA, a country which remains a magnet for highly
skilled and motivated entrepreneurs across the world. It is a hugely telling statistic
that in the United States approximately 47% of current, venture capital backed
ventures have been founded by immigrants.134
3.3.2 Maturation of the Marketplace
European and the Finnish venture capital have changed dramatically over the past
ten years. Whereas experienced venture capitalists and growth oriented high tech
entrepreneurs were nearly nonexistent in 1996, the current cadre of Finnish ven-
ture capitalists is on average much more experienced.135 Also serial entrepreneurs
have started to emerge.136 The understanding of entrepreneurship among students
and research communities is also much wider in Finland.137
Overall, it seems that some of the recent pessimism towards the prospects of
early-stage venture capital firms in Finland, and more generally in Europe, is
likely to be unfounded. While there is a lot still to be improved in the functioning
of venture capital both in Finland and in Europe, there is no reason why venture
capital cannot evolve to become an attractive asset class in Europe.138 If there is
one clear lesson from the last twenty years of venture capital activity in Europe it is
that talented and incentivized investors and fund managers learn quickly in com-
54
133 http://www.tekes.fi/eng/ (cited December 30, 2006)
134 (Anderson & Platzer, 2006)
135 (Bassi & Jormakka, 2006; Passinen, 2004)
136 In the United States serial entrepreneurs are an important source of deal flow to venture capitalists with
about 10% of the VC-backed entrepreneurs being serial entrepreneurs and the share being somewhat
higher, about 15% for the leading VCs (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006b).
137 As one example, already 2018 teams have participated in the Venture Cup Business Plan competition in
Finland during the first seven seasons of the competition in 2000–2006.
138 (Lindström, 2006)
petitive and open markets.Many recent European success stories139 and the greatly
improved European short-term returns in early stage VC140 provide some further
evidence supporting this conclusion. Overall, European venture capital is clearly
on its way to a stage of professional maturity.141 However, there are likely to be
several stages of maturity as the industry repeatedly adapts and re-invents itself to
reflect both contemporary opportunities and threats.142
3.3.3 New EU State Aid Regulation and Funding Programs
In 2006, the European Commission has made several relevant changes in the state
aid regulation as a part of its state aid reform. These changes have a direct effect on
the flexibility of member states to provide financial support for young innovative
companies and early stage venture capital funds. A number of changes were made
to make it easier to set up public supported, early stage VC funds in areas where
there were clearly problems of limited interest and activity by private and commer-
cial financiers. The European Commission has now relaxed a number of con-
straints which have previously limited the degree of involvement of public agen-
cies in the creation and operation of such funds. Changes in the new state aid regu-
lations include:
• New de minimis regulation, exempting aid notification below
€200k.143 The Regulation exempts small subsidies from the obligation
to notify them in advance for clearance by the Commission under EC
Treaty state aid rules. Under the new Regulation, aid of up to €200k per
company, granted over any period of three years will not be considered
as state aid. Loan guarantees will also be covered to the extent that the
guaranteed part of the loan does not exceed €1.5m. In order to avoid
abuses, forms of aid for which the inherent aid amount cannot be calcu-
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139 e.g. Skype as en example of one of the best early stage investments ever. A large number of Finnish ventu-
res have been recognized among the best in the ranking lists of Red Herring, Tornado Insider and Deloitte
during the recent years (e.g. CRF, Futuremark, Hybrid Graphics, Jutel, Leiki, Liekki, Meridea, Smart-
ner(Seven), Sulake, Wicom) and many others such as Digital Chocolate, MySQL, Silecs and Trulia have
Finnish entrepreneurs. Some founders of these and other leading Finnish ventures have already esta-
blished new ventures and become serial entrepreneurs.
140 (e.g. Braun et al., 2006; EVCA, 2006; Fricke, 2006)
141 (Bassi et al., 2006)
142 (Murray, 1991)
143 (European Commission, 2006b)
lated precisely in advance (so-called ‘non-transparent’ aids) and aid to
firms in difficulty have been excluded from the Regulation.
• New state aid framework for research, development and innovati-
on.144 The new framework introduced an aid for young innovative en-
terprises “to deal with the market failures linked with imperfect and
asymmetric information, which harm these undertakings in a particular-
ly acute way, damaging their ability to receive appropriate funding for
innovative ventures” According to the framework, the following condi-
tions must be fulfilled:
(a) The beneficiary is a small enterprise that has been of existence for
less than 6 years at the time when the aid is granted and
(b) The beneficiary is an innovative enterprise, on the basis that:
i) theMember State can demonstrate that the beneficiary will in the
foreseeable future develop products, services or processes which
are technologically new or substantially improved compared to the
state of the art in its industry in the Community, and which carry a
risk of technological or industrial failure. This evaluation must be
done by an external expert, notably on the basis of a business plan or
ii) the R&D expenses of the beneficiary represent at least 15% of
its total operating expenses in at least one of the three years prece-
ding the granting of the aid or in the case of a start-up enterprise
without any financial history, in the audit of its current fiscal pe-
riod, as certified by an external auditor.
(c) The aid is not higher than €1m. This aid may not exceed €1.5m in re-
gions eligible for the derogation in Article 87(3)(a), and €1.25m in re-
gions eligible for the derogation in Article 87(3)(c)
The beneficiary may receive the aid only once during the period it quali-
fies for young innovative enterprise. This aid may be cumulated with
other aid under this framework, with aid for research and development
and innovation block-exempted by Regulation 364/2004 or any succes-
sor regulation and with aid approved by the Commission under the risk
capital guidelines. The beneficiary may receive state aid other than
R&D&I aid and Risk Capital aid only 3 years after the granting of the
young innovative enterprise aid.
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144 (European Commission, 2006a)
• New guideline on state aid to support risk capital investments in
SMEs.145 The new guidelines include a ‘safe harbour’ of €1.5m invest-
ment per SME over 12 months (below which a market failure has been
found to exist), a light assessment procedure for clear cut cases fulfilling
certain conditions and assessment criteria which ensure that state fun-
ding will leverage private investment, target market failures and be pro-
portionate. The Guidelines replace the 2001 Communication on state
aid and risk capital.
These new regulations will have implications on the future development of the
public finance of young innovative companies. For instance, Tekes has started a
planning process to completely renew its services, including the discontinuation
and replacement of Startup loans, the TULI program146 and the LIKSA program,
with new services enabled by the new regulations. The direction is towards less
fragmented services with amore professional focus on customers. The new regula-
tion may also have other implications on existing programs. Avera was designed
on prior De Minimis regulation. Similarly, the FII seed program was also struc-
tured in the light of the prevailing and strong constraint that the total of public fi-
nance (regardless of source) in companies or funds must not exceeding 50% of to-
tal transfers. The new state aid to support risk capital investments in SMEs im-
proves significantly the flexibility in setting up government sponsored venture
capital programs such as the UK Enterprise Capital Funds scheme.
In addition to the more flexible state aid regulation, the commission has new fund-
ing programs that are of high relevance to young innovative companies and their
financiers CIP and JEREMIE:147
Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme (CIP)148 is intended
to be a coherent and integrated response to the objectives of the renewed Lisbon
strategy.149 Running from 2007 to 2013, it has a budget of approximately €3.6 bn.
It represents a 60 % increase in annual spending on actions related to competitive-
ness and innovation by 2013 compared to 2006. There are three specific programs
in the CIP framework: (1) Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (€2166m
of which €430m eco-innovation and €1130 financial instruments managed by
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145 (European Commission, 2006e), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/reform/reform.html
146 (Valovirta et al., 2006)
147 (European Commission, 2006c)
148 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/cip/index_en.htm
149 (European Council, 2005)
EIF); (2) ICT Policy Support Programme (€728m); and (3) Intelligent Energy-Eu-
rope Programme (€727m). In addition, Eco-innovation will be a transversal theme
of the whole program.
Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) 150
is a joint initiative of the European Commission, European Investment Bank and
European Investment Fund to improve SMEs’ access to finance in the framework
of European Regions. The initiative will enable European Member States and Re-
gions to use part of their structural funds (ERDF funding) to obtain a set of finan-
cial instruments that are specifically designed to support micro and small and me-
dium enterprises. JEREMIE will be complementary to other SME finance initia-
tives at EU level, notably the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework
Programme (CIP) that EIF will operate from 2007 on behalf of the European Com-
mission’s Directorate General for Enterprise (DG ENTR). JEREMIE will offer
different financial instruments from those available under CIP. JEREMIE will
provide a range of instruments focused on regional level, such as investments in re-
gional venture capital funds, technical assistance or the provision of equity to fi-
nancial intermediaries and eligibility will be limited to “objective” regions.
3.3.4 Internal Pressures to Develop the System
Excessive reliance on government funding or services solving problems. Gov-
ernment intervention in the financing of young innovative companies has so far
most often meant government funding being channeled through government agen-
cies. Considering the vast research knowledge (summarized partially in chapter
2.2) showing clearly that primary role of the government should be to improve the
functioning of the private market and only secondarily supply capital, there has
perhaps been too heavy emphasis on government funding as a solution to under de-
veloped risk capital market for young innovative companies in Finland. The vol-
umes of direct government venture capital investments have increased lately. Fur-
thermore, the relaxation of EC regulations may act as a perverse incentive to in-
crease the amount of public finance available in the funding system. There is a
temptation for policy makers to take full opportunity to increase the levels of pub-
lic funding in the innovation system. Such a response may well exacerbate prob-
lems of crowding out private sources of funds which have to meet market deter-
mined rates of return on any monies raised. Early-stage funding in Europe is al-
ready heavily skewed towards public rather than private provision of risk capital.
The immediate crafting of public, supply side strategies takes little cognizance of
alternative policy instruments which may increase the commercial logic of private
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investors addressing existing market gaps. It is worth regularly repeating that it is
the primary task of the government is to ensure that the framework conditions for
investment in innovative young companies are as attractive as possible in order to
encourage private commercial activity.151 Government’s role is to address and re-
move market failures rather than to provide alternative non-market routes via pub-
lic subsidy. This primary task of the government is regularly neglected in the do-
main of innovation finance.
Fragmentation and inefficiencies of the public structure. A clear conclusion
from the interviews, analysis, and prior research152 is that the current structure of
public finance available to young innovative companies is somewhat fragmented.
This fragmentation makes it difficult for entrepreneurs easily to comprehend the
system or to approach the right channels for their financing and support needs.153
The problem is exacerbated given that the fragmentation largely takes place hori-
zontally. Thus, the inexperienced entrepreneur will repeatedly have to negotiate
the interfaces between various organizations. From a company perspective, it has
to sell itself several times to a number of related government agencies.154 This cre-
ates delays in the process and wasted efforts at a time where the young firms are
likely to face major managerial demands on its scarce time. The collaboration be-
tween government organizations is important but its dereliction comes at a cost in-
curred primarily by the applicant company.155 In comparison, e.g. in the SBIR pro-
gram in the United States, there are also many organizations involved. However,
from the perspective of individual company applicants, the organization remains
the same (depending on the industry sector) and there are clear performance mile-
stones to be met rather than new organizations to negotiate at each stage of the de-
velopment process.
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151 (e.g. Armour et al., 2006; Cumming et al., 2006a; Gilson, 2003; Hyytinen et al., 2003d; Mason et al., 2001;
Maula et al., 2003a; OECD, 1997; Paasivirta et al., 2004).
152 (e.g. Georghiou et al., 2003; Grönholm, 2006; Hjelt et al., 2005; Hyytinen et al., 2003e; Maula et al.,
2003a; Paasivirta et al., 2004; Saapunki, Leskinen, & Aarnio, 2004)
153 However, it has been rightly pointed by some interviewees, that smart entrepreneurs will find their way
around the system.
154 From the asymmetric information perspective, it is hard for a new investor to assess the prospects of a
young innovative company. Therefore, the certification role of existing investors and their continued com-
mitment are extremely important for being able to attract new investors and other partners (see e.g. Hsu,
2004). For instance, in the SBIR program in the United States such a certification role has been considered
to be a very important feature (Lerner, 1999).
155 There is evidence even from competition between the agencies, although the evidence is limited to a very
small number of cases. However, the threat of competition has been considered as a serious problem
(Grönholm, 2006).
Undervaluation of the critical role of world-class competencies.156 It has been
widely acknowledged that financial capital is just one element of the venture capi-
tal process. The best venture capitalists are not primarily defined by the size of
funds at their disposal. Indeed, some of the very best VC partnerships are very
wary of taking in new limited partners and increasing in size of funds under man-
agement beyond what they believe is for them an optimal scale. Rather, the most
important ingredient is the superior ‘human capital’ represented by the skills and
experience of the investment teams (e.g. world-class serial entrepreneurs). Some
of the most effective general partnerships have now raised five or more funds over
the last fifteen years. This represents a huge accumulation of industry, financial
and technology experience. In Finland, there are still only a few investment man-
agers that have undergone a full investment cycle with more than just a handful of
portfolio companies. This is to be expected from ‘home grown’ investors when the
industry has a history of less than a decade. No Finnish early stage funds follow a
popular US practice of “entrepreneur in residence”. That is the speculative backing
of experienced entrepreneurs who are presently seeking a new business opportu-
nity with the active support and encouragement of the VC fund managers. The
Finnish venture capital industry is still relatively inexperienced and, as a conse-
quence, remains relatively conservative in behavior.
Excessively modest (and parochial) ambitions. Government agencies often-
times appear to assume that they see a majority of the deal flow available to the in-
novation financing system and build their view of the market based on the deal
flow they receive and companies they finance. However, companies tend to seek
financiers and advisors they believe can help them reach their goals and particu-
larly some of the most growth oriented born global ventures may not find the pub-
lic structures that require months to get tens or hundreds of thousands very relevant
when they are competing with global ventures starting in the USA and elsewhere
raising millions within the first years. The reality in a small economy is that invest-
ment volumes and risk taking that can be generated through a public system are not
compatible with what is needed to ensure the likely outcome of a stream of interna-
tionally successful companies over time. This raises important issues as to the na-
ture and geography of the frontiers of the Finnish innovation system. As we have
argued, the Israeli innovation system is considerably more international and
pro-active in its definitions of operating scope and public interests.
Potential conflicts between innovation and regional policy execution. Finn-
vera’s remit largely centers on regional policy whereas the responsibilities of FII,
Tekes and Sitra are focused on innovation policy rather than location issues. How-
ever, these agencies use similar risk capital and debt instruments to pursue their
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objectives. The use of similar instruments from different providers is likely to pre-
cipitate duplication of effort. In the existing case of Finland, where the same in-
struments are offered by multiple providers but at different required rates of return
to potentially identical young firm clients, the stage is set for inter agency rivalries.
On occasions, it is almost inevitable that there will be direct competition between
different public providers, as noted recently by many observers. Over time, the op-
portunity for such ‘skirmishes’ will increase even in an ordered and professional ad-
ministration. The limited existence of regular multi-lateral discussions between the
four major agencies at the highest management levels removes one important means
of adjudication and pragmatic resolution from the public financing system.157
Proposals for merging of public support services. In the interviews, almost all
possible merger combinations of the government activities were casually sug-
gested by one or more interviewees to reduce the complexity and fragmentation
and to improve the efficiency of the system. More concretely, in fall 2006, Sitra
made a proposal for the government suggesting a merger of Sitra PreSeed activi-
ties, the Seed Financing Programme of the Finnish Industry Investment, and Seed
Fund Vera Ltd to create a single company owned equally by Sitra, Finnish Indus-
try Investment Ltd. and Finnvera/Veraventure. In the proposal it is suggested that
current employees of the three separate programs would be recruited to run the
newmanagement company. The key logic in the suggestion was to bind the match-
ing and development activities of Sitra PreSeed (INTRO, DIILI, LIKSA) to public
funding activities (FII and Avera). The proposal suggests several advantages such
as more streamlined provision of public finance, pooling existing expertise and re-
sources, combination of investment readiness development, business angel net-
works and public finance, aswell as a criticalmass and contacts for European collab-
oration including a potentially better access to EIF funding. The proposal concludes
that there are not likely to be any reasons why such a merger would not be imple-
mented. However, several considerations have been raised, some of which are listed
below. The list is described not tomake a case against this or any other consolidation
between public finance agencies, but rather to show that there are many important
considerations despite the potential benefits such an amalgamation may yield.
• The proposed new entity owned equally by Sitra, FII and Finnvera
could be viewed as creating yet another public funding organization in
the Finnish innovation system. From a customer perspective, this chan-
ge might reduce the number of organizations with which an entre-
preneurial firm has to deal. However, if the company also uses other
funding sources from Finnvera, Sitra, or FII, which is quite possible un-
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157 Bi-lateral discussions do occur regularly in the system. The point being made is not all of the agencies par-
ticipate in a regular forumwhere such potential conflicts can be discussed, and resolved, at an early stage.
der the present system, there is likely to be little real reduction in time
commitments or in the overall complexity of the system as viewed by
inexperienced firm applicants.
• The creation of a single company may further raise the specter of crea-
ting a quasi-monopoly provider of Finnish public seed capital in the ab-
sence of sufficient number of private and fully commercial financiers.
The lack of alternative providers could mean that if one organization
does not like the business proposal of the applicant there are now no lon-
ger any other alternative source of public funds to which the entre-
preneur could apply.
• The increasing integration of public support services combining mat-
ching services and direct public funding via supported early stage funds
can be problematic for the healthy development of the market. For some
companies being matched and invited to accept public investment might
be a highly desirable course of early stage support. But for many other
vigorously entrepreneurial and independent firms such public ow-
nership and influence may be seen as a major disincentive or constraint
on their autonomy of actions. While there is a great need for support in
matching entrepreneurs and investors, there are indications that com-
bining the matchmaker and the investor roles is likely to cause some ad-
verse selection and lack of transparency in the operation in the operation
of the matching market.
• It is no trivial task to merge together the personnel of three quite dispara-
te organizations. The literature ofM&A and takeovers repeatedly obser-
ves that good economic plans can be brought to their knees by ‘soft
issues’ of conflicting or immiscible cultures. It would be unwise to assu-
me common and congruent interests among the staff from the three rep-
laced programs who ‘survive’ to manage the new entity.
• Current research tells that the most important success factor in first-time
early stage venture capital funds is that where the investment team in-
cludes both serial entrepreneur(s) and experienced venture capitalist(s)
working in active collaboration.158 In Finnish public funding organiza-
tions such arrangements remain exceedingly rare. There is no present
indication that the proposed merger would change this situation for the
better.
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4 Conclusions and Recommendations
4.1 Conclusions
Almost unanimously, all interviewees considered the question of how the public
financing of young innovative companies could best be developed as both impor-
tant and relevant. The widespread perception that the public financing and devel-
opmental support for young innovative companies in Finland is fragmented and
becoming more complex to understand or use has also been stated in several recent
evaluations.159 However, there is not a clear consensus of opinions on how public
support for young innovative companies could best be improved and streamlined.
Several experts with more than a decade of experience in the area simply felt that
there is too little funding available to start-ups and young firms at the early stages
of their development. Improving this shortfall was deemed by such respondents as
the first priority. The specific nature of the funding mechanisms was considered to
be of secondary importance. In contrast, some stakeholders opined that in Finland
there are no serious problems in the availability of finance citing e.g. the situation
of average SMEs reported in the two regular barometers that show that only a
small percent of SMEs consider the availability of finance is a serious challenge.
Such persons tended to argue that “good ventures always get funded”. However,
such opinions were rare among our interviewees. In direct contrast, most of those
who paid closest attention to the contemporary funding mechanisms in Finland
and who had specialist (and international) knowledge of long term developments
in the financing of young innovative companies were often the most critical of the
present situation. They were much more likely to point out and detail problems in
existing finance mechanisms including the limited incentives put in place to en-
courage individual entrepreneurs to engage in risky ventures and to invest the con-
siderable time and effort necessary for the successful growth of portfolio compa-
nies. In the end, nearly all interviewees agreed that there is a very clear need to en-
sure the primacy of a well functioning, privately led (i.e. commercially driven)
market. Given this view, the pre-eminent role of the government becomes focused
on providing the enabling environment that will allow informed and transparent
markets to work efficiently.
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159 See e.g. Grönholm (2006) Georghiou et al. (2003), and Paasivirta et al. (2004). The problem is not new.
Already a decade ago it was concluded in a survey that the lack of information concerning existing support
services was the most serious gap, not the adequacy of available support services itself (Autio, Jutila &
Kivisaari, 1995). Although some new steps have been taken towards reducing the fragmentation during
the past few years such as the new service Enterprise Finland (http://www.enterprisefinland.fi/), a portal of
Finnish government agencies supporting innovation and entrepreneurship, it appears based on interviews
that introduction of new partially overlapping instruments has amplified the perceived fragmentation and
created some unnecessary tensions.
The clearest need for the financing of young innovative companies expressed by
the interviewees was to have more Finland-based, industry focused, and properly
resourced private VC general partnerships with world-class competencies and
strong international connections to help ventures grow and internationalize. The
requirement from such companies is to follow the example of their US peers by
making initial investments in young innovative companies at the startup stage and
being prepared to aggressively follow on invest and support their portfolio busi-
nesses to rapidly achieve an international commercial presence and, thus, the con-
ditions for commercially attractive exits.160 A common fear expressed by many
was the government’s investor role becoming too dominant and in real danger of
crowding out both current and future private investment activity.
One important challenge in the public financing of young innovative companies
relates to globalization. On one hand, public investors invest taxpayers’ money
and will always consider the primacy of benefits to the Finnish economy. A com-
mon approach has been to view with some suspicion any serious dilution of Finn-
ish ownership, e.g. the sales of successful Finnish companies to foreign acquir-
ers.161 On the other hand, a successful innovation is an invention that is widely and
profitably taken up. In high technology products and services, the markets are
meritocratic and increasingly global. To many users, it is irrelevant if the technol-
ogy is derived from Finland, the US or China so long as the product or service per-
forms in an expected and cost efficient manner. The global nature of markets and
the increasing need for scale in order to develop and to gain sufficient returns from
high cost and still risky technical developments poses a problem for Finland and
other developed but small economies.162 There is little room (and negligible com-
mercial logic) for a domestic-only ‘high tech’ company. This is particularly the
case in Finland where the domestic markets generally represent less than one per-
cent of the equivalent global markets. Furthermore, building global sales channels
is an extremely risky, expensive and long term commitment for a new venture.
Therefore, examples where a Finnish venture has first developed a leading tech-
nology, built its own global distribution channels and then has been able to take a
significant global market share in its segment – are very few indeed. Much more
common and practicable routes to international markets involve arrangements
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160 Such new funds were warmly welcomed even by such private VCs with whom such new funds could po-
tentially compete. The emergence of new industry focused value adding investors with global perspective
were unanimously seen as important to improve the entrepreneurial dynamics and make the building of
world-class ventures more feasible and amore attractive opportunity for individuals with world class com-
petencies and experience.
161 E.g. the press release of the Ministry of Trade and Industry” Teknologiatukien takaisinperintään tulossa
täsmennyksiä”. 17.10.2006, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki, Finland.
162 Israel and Ireland could be cited as two countries with few large indigenous businesses in relation to the si-
ze of their economies.
which include joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions with foreign entities. Here,
real and large scale value is created by combining superior Finnish technology, in-
cluding design and application experience, with the existing global distribution
channels and complementary resources of world class partners.163
In the following section, we provide a brief synthesis of our answers to the re-
search questions which wewere requested to address in this project. Our responses
are informed by the above analysis.
1 To what extent does the large number of public finance organizations
cause problems particularly in the development of young innovative
companies and how could these problems be reduced or eliminated?
There is some variation between countries as to how centralized is the public financing
of young innovative companies or indeed SMEs in general. In Finland, the support
system is clearly quite decentralized with several strong and relatively autonomous
public organizations providing public finance for SMEs. However, there are some po-
tential problems in the large number of partially overlapping public agencies.
On one hand, the relatively large number of public finance organizations in Finland:
(1) requires an unnecessarily large share of the attention of stakeholders,
including entrepreneurs and their financiers, in order to navigate be-
tween and collaborate with several alternative domestic support organi-
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163 For instance, Israel views the role of foreign exits as positive because they have lead to a large number of
large multinational corporations creating R&D centers in Israel and $20bn from sales of Israeli companies
to foreign investors + $7bn from foreign IPOs + $16bn capital raised by Israeli VCs and foreign VC invest-
ment in Israeli companies (over 50% of investment by foreign VCs, 133 foreign VC funds invested inmore
than one company in Israel from 2000-2004) (presentation by Yoram Oron, Managing Partner, Vertex
Venture Capital, Chairman of Israeli Venture Association in Helsinki on November 8, 2006 and a recent
evaluation by EconomicModels (2005)). Referring to the benefits of acquisitions by foreign multinational
firms,De Fontenay and Carmel (2004) conclude “Thus, the Israeli firmswere able to realize large financial
rewards from their innovations without having to successfully reach final customers.” Teubal et al (2000)
consider that mergers and acquisition process serves as a shortcut to the market allowing more Israeli firms
to enter and realize profits than would otherwise have been possible. Mason and Harrison (2006) found in
an analysis of five Scottish technology-based firms that were acquired by non-UK companies that such
exits have lead to valuable “entrepreneurial recycling” of wealth and experience which has been ignored in
most of the prior research. Molander (2005) analyses both Finnish cases and European data and finds that
foreign trade sales exits create more value on average than domestic ones given the synergies in leveraging
a strong technology base of the target company with the global distribution channels of the bigger interna-
tional acquiring company. Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) conclude their results on OECD countries: “This
result casts some doubt on the usual fears regarding foreign takeovers and their impact on local R&D acti-
vity.” A recent review of acquisitions or mergers of Finnish wireless technology companies with foreign
companies such as Smartner with Seven Networks, Hybrid Graphics with Nvidia, Bitboys with ATI Tech-
nologies and Sumea with Digital Chocolate also resulted in similar positive conclusions (Digitoday
27.9.2006 “Companies remain, competencies recycled: Mobile work grows in Finland with foreign fun-
ding” (authors’ translation) http://www.digitoday.fi/page.php?page_id=12&news_id=200616151)
zations. This takes up valuable management time that could better be
used by growing firms in serving the needs of customers and their inter-
national partners;
(2) diverts publicly allocated resources from their proper purpose of
supporting young Finnish ventures to managing the costs of the collabo-
ration with other public support organizations. Such complexity obliges
entrepreneurs to adopt an overly domestic and inward orientation;
(3) increases the misalignment of resource allocation between develop-
ment stages of companies given that firm clients need to contact differ-
ent agencies focused on different stages of development (with little sec-
tor specialization);
(4) increases fragmentation of policy delivery;
(5) reduces the responsibility and accountability of public support orga-
nizations given their entrepreneurial development remit; and
(6) creates uncertainty and competition between agencies for finite pub-
lic budgets. This, in turn, leads to the agencies directly lobbying for po-
litical support.
One the other hand, it is clear that having just one potential public financier (‘mo-
nopoly’) could also be harmful in the absence of sufficient number of strong
enough private investors. In venture capital, beauty is often in the eyes of the be-
holder. The value of a new enterprise or novel idea significantly depends on the in-
vestors’ capability to understand its potential, their risk preferences and their abil-
ity and willingness to help realize the ambitions of the young enterprise. Thus, a
vigorous early stage financing industry needs heterogeneity of skills, experience
and opinions. In short, effective markets are characterized by choice. Instead of
taking a passive role and relying on arbitrage i.e. buying assets undervalued due to
information asymmetries, early stage venture capital activity is about helping cre-
ate and nurture new value. Competition in high-tech is global and advanced tech-
nology can become obsolete very quickly. Ventures need to be scaled rapidly
when the timing is right (not too early, but not too late either). Such timing is an
‘art form’ learned from considerable professional experience (including failure!).
Good public support mechanisms need to understand the evolution of nascent
companies over time and the different challenges they face at start up, early stage
development and beyond. The Finnish innovation support system needs to appre-
ciate that depth of support over time is at least as important as providing resources
to merely start new enterprises. The key activities are advising, supporting and
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promoting those very high potential businesses that have internationally valuable
resources in novel products and technologies until such times when rapid growth
becomes endemic and sustainable by the firm from market returns alone. Thus, the
Finnish support system needs more vertical focus rather than its present, primarily
horizontal replication of several agencies working in virtually the same space.164
Effective support needs to ensure not just the provision of generic consulting ser-
vices but, preferably, young innovative companies’ access to highly skilled and in-
ternationally experienced management and board members incentivized and com-
mitted via co-ownership and board responsibility.
All of the agencies reviewed in this report have done an important job of support-
ing entrepreneurial activity in Finland during a recent period of considerable chal-
lenge for early stage investors in new enterprises. Yet no public system can ‘rest on
its laurels’ in aggressive and dynamic world markets. Over the longer term, the
Finnish support system needs to change, sometimes radically, in order to reflect
future circumstances and new challenges. There appears to be some room, and
need, for the consolidation of existing services.
It is clear that the organizational structures, the principles and management prefer-
ences of the agencies, EU notification requirements and other external factors may
be used as plausible arguments to delay action on the choice of alternative ways to
address market failures in the finance of young innovative companies. However,
we stress that it is the responsibility of the Ministry and the government to ensure
that such short term constraints do not prevent or impede the major changes neces-
sary to support the continuing effectiveness of the Finnish innovation system over
the longer term. The state through its responsible ministries needs to show strong
and unequivocal leadership in the execution of such changes. In guiding long term
development, we propose that the government (primarily the Ministry of Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Finance) creates an advisory panel: the Young In-
novative Company Finance Task Force. This independent panel would consist of
industry experts recruited to give independent advice and counsel directly to gov-
ernment for the purpose of ensuing the continued development and relevance of
the Finnish innovation financing system within a global context.165
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164 With this we do not mean that government should necessarily place bets which industries or technologies
are going to be winners, but instead of having a myriad of different products ands providers for each com-
pany in different stages, the support should be more customer oriented, milestone based and better connec-
ted to the global industry understanding.
165 Such a forum has been found very relevant and useful in the United Kingdom in advising government in
the development of the British venture capital market. For details on the Small Business Investment Task-
force in UK, see http://www.sbs.gov.uk/sbsgov/action/layer?topicId=7000000164
2 Is the division of labor between public finance organizations clear and
appropriate, is their collaboration coordinated sufficiently from the
perspective of individual client companies, and/or how the coordination
could be improved?
Based on interviews and other related evidence, it is our view that the division of
labor and responsibility between agencies could be further improved. Its present
configuration is not optimal – but nor is it catastrophic. That these public agencies
have helped make Finland one of the most innovative economies in the world is a
cause for genuine pride. None the less, the challenge is to turn the nation’s world
class inventions into a stream of profitable innovations. This second goal has not
been achieved. The present structure of public finance and support needs to be reg-
ularly appraised, and changed where necessary in order to meet these major future
challenges. Some recommendations are provided in Chapter 4, Section 2. How-
ever, we want to stress that we do not believe that a single transaction to consoli-
date some existing activities would be alone a sufficient solution to the develop-
ment of the availability of risk capital for young innovative companies in Finland
over the next five to seven years. Some streamlining of the public finance may be a
part of the evolution over the next five to seven years, but it is clearly not the sole
or perhaps even the key issue in our opinion. Catalyzing more high quality private
VC funds and business angels is a more important task to be kept in mind.
3 What problems does the limited availability of private finance/private
financiers cause in the finance of young innovative companies, how
could those problems be reduced, and how could the willingness of pri-
vate investors to invest in young innovative companies be improved?
In our view, the current limited availability of private finance/private financiers for
growth oriented, young innovative companies is a major challenge for the produc-
tivity of the Finnish innovation system. As argued above, the disappearance of
many private financiers after the market crash in 2000 forced public organizations
to step into a common problem area. It has been this uniform (and legitimate) pub-
lic response that has largely caused the current perceived overlaps between the
agencies.
In addition to a reduction in risk capital, the dearth of private investors also reduces
the entrepreneurs’ access to the (sometimes equally or more valuable) advice and
support from experienced and professional investors. Substituting the missing pri-
vate investors with public organizations has reduced the value added received by
talented but inexperienced entrepreneurs alongside the funding. This loss of ad-
vice and experience from professional investors is likely to influence the type of
companies that are established, seek external funding or are eventually funded.
Some currently successful ventures would not have been established unless the
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founders (usually in high flying careers elsewhere) had been prepared to place
considerable faith in the quality of advice and stewardship available from venture
capitalists whom they believed could help the startup to advance rapidly to global
markets. Without deep personal experience and strong incentives, it is hard for
professional investors to justify the levels of risk taking typically undertaken in the
United States and Israel. As noted above, risk capital in Finland is dispersed
among relatively more companies but in smaller stakes. Low availability of private
funding also prevents young firms benefiting from public funding when the former
is a condition of public support.
Encouragement of new private investors with world-class skills and quality of ex-
perience should clearly be a primary goal in the development of the Finnish risk
capital market. This was perhaps the clearest common message that emerged from
the interviews. The biggest fear for manywas increased government domination in
the financing of young innovative companies with little focus on the necessary
skills and incentives for high quality entrepreneurs and private investors. More se-
rial entrepreneurs and private investors are needed to actively and aggressively
seek out new commercial opportunities from Finland’s as yet under-exploited in-
novation system.
4 What conclusions can be drawn from the recent development trends in
public finance of young innovative companies in comparable coun-
tries?
As summarized in Chapter 2 Section 3, there is some variation between countries
in terms of the centralization of the public financing of young innovative compa-
nies. This governmental structure is often a result of ‘path-dependent evolution’,
i.e. historical and political reasons often limit the feasible development opportuni-
ties. However, in many countries, there appears to be one central agency that has
more integrated and coordinated approach to funding and services for SMEs. This
can be compared to the Finnish system with a structure characterized by several
strong and relatively autonomous agencies. Similarly, in many countries, there is
also a close coordination between tax and regulatory issues and provision of public
finance. In the absence of such desirable co-ordination, public finance programs
often are used to ‘patch up’ problems stemming from the tax and regulatory envi-
ronment.166
There are also some other important trends or issues that are clearly relevant for
Finland. In many advanced risk capital markets (particularly markets that can be
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166 UK is a good example of a country with a very close collaboration and coordination in enterprise policy
between Small Business Service and HM Treasury.
viewed as successful in producing rapidly growing new companies, e.g. US and Is-
rael), there is much stronger reliance on the dominant and leading role of private
actors. Such programs include strong incentives to help steer investors’ behavior.
This system is not prevalent in Finland. Tax incentives, substantial investor re-
wards for success, and tough and open bidding processes in expediting govern-
ment venture capital programs are also commonplace in many countries. With the
exception of business angel co-investment funds and public finance for very early
stage R&D/proof of concept funding, a clear trend in public programs in advanced
economies is to use indirect approaches. This allows the state to tap into the best
available talent and experience from the professional labor market. Professional
investors acting as highly incentivized agents of government make the company
level investment decisions and value adding support decisions. Civil servants are,
thus, not required to act in a commercial context or role for which they have little
experience or training. With a robust and professional selection process for the al-
location of public finance to recipient firms, its receipt can act as an external signal
of merit or certification. This can encourage further private finance and support,
thereby leveraging government finances.167
In Finland, these issues have been well understood as a result of many publicly
funded analyses. However, theoretical understanding has not necessarily been
translated into the implementations of relevant policy instruments. Given that Fin-
land has already major challenges in encouraging growth oriented entrepreneur-
ship given both a national disinclination to assume high risk and the country’s geo-
graphic remoteness from key markets for young innovative companies, the adop-
tion of conservative or inappropriate policies and instruments is a serious limita-
tion. For Finland to gain full benefit from its significant R&D investments, it is
likely to have to be as innovative and advanced in its commercial implementation
policies as in its scientific research.
5 How is the finance of young innovative companies estimated to evolve
over the next five to seven years and how is this taken into account in the
development recommendations?
Given the cyclicality and volatility of the risk capital market, the development of
the financing of young innovative companies over the next five to seven years is
certainly challenging (and heroic) to forecast. It is a relatively long time period in
terms of how the business environment can change. Looking back some seven
years to 1999, the dot.com bubble was inflating rapidly attracting new and inexpe-
rienced VCs to the market. Since then, the market has experienced a collapse (and
a partial recovery) and many new investors and their funds disappeared leaving a
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167 Both the SBIR and the SMART awards in the US and the UK, respectively, have generated certification ef-
fects with private investors tracking the recipients of public merit grants.
gap in the market. Before 2000, a large number of public VC firms had just been
privatized. In the last few years, several new government venture capital functions
have again been established. In 2006, venture capital again seems to be on a
growth cycle. None of these trends can be guaranteed to be maintained over an-
other seven year period. For good or ill, much of government policy has to be con-
ducted in an environment of extreme uncertainty.
However, compared to the situation before the new millennium, there is much
more experience among investors (both public and private) and entrepreneurs.
This growth in experience, acting as a virtuous circle, is likely to improve the prob-
ability of successful investment activity in Finland. Experience and increased re-
search knowledge should help entrepreneurs and their investors focus on more via-
ble models. It will also increase the awareness in Finland of the necessity to partici-
pating in a globalizing venturing community.
Any recommendations on the policy options of Finland for themedium term future
should not be based on the authors’ ability to ‘guesstimate’ unknowable future
events. Rather, it should be based on a foundation of existing research knowledge
and practitioner/policy experience as to desirable elements in policy aimed at de-
veloping a sustainable market for the financing of attractive, young innovative
companies originating from Finland’s innovation and science capabilities. This
premise has directed our emphases as to the recommendations presented in the
next section.
4.2 Recommendations
It is important to note that our recommendations focus on changes to the Finnish
innovation and support system that are specifically aimed at improving the oppor-
tunities for, and incidence of, fast growth young innovative firms. While our rec-
ommendations will have relevance for publicly financed agencies that currently
support the start-up phase of new enterprises, the key policy issue is: how may more
young innovative firms be assisted to grow rapidly, and continue to grow rapidly
into internationally important enterprises? This question is our foremost concern.
In making our recommendations to MTI, the authors are mindful that changes are
made in a context that is neither politically neutral nor without a substantial his-
tory. In addressing the brief given to us, we do not refer to the complex political de-
cisions which will necessary influence the execution of our recommendations. We
are mindful of these factors but they remain rightly outside our remit. None the
less, we would wish to stress that any significant re-organization of an existing and
effective, national innovation finance and support system will require consider-
able political leadership. Entrenched interests will strongly defend present institu-
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tional autonomies. They will cite the impressive progress of the Finnish innovation
system, to which the existing agencies have clearly contributed, as a reason for, at
best, modest and non-disruptive change.
In this respect, we would refer to those exemplar companies that are globally suc-
cessful in advanced technology and new knowledge-based markets. If there are
common characteristics among the leadership of such companies, it is in their
shared fear of the potential complacency of success; their recognition that excel-
lence – unless repeatedly reappraised and renewed – is transitory; and their ability
to emulate and improve ideas and examples harvested from global sources. We be-
lieve that successful nations and their policy makers have to share identical
mindsets with such leading companies.
In making our recommendations to the government, it is appropriate to note that
the organizational lines of reporting and responsibility by which public agencies
are managed appear to be manifold at the executive levels of government. MTI
may wish to consider if a revised support structure along the lines that we have
suggested should also be reflected in changes internal to the Ministry. To this end,
one of our recommendations (see below) is that MTI maywell wish to consider the
introduction of an Young Innovative Company Finance Task Force (along the
lines of the UK’s Small Business Investment Taskforce) whereby ministers and
civil servants may access a diversity of entrepreneurial skills and experience with a
strong practitioner and commercial influence to identify new and timely policy ini-
tiatives. Our recommendations are as follows:
4.2.1 Ambitious Goal
Improve the ambition level in growth oriented enterprises and set a national goal
to make Finland one of the most vibrant investment markets in the world for invest-
ing in and creating and capturing value from young innovative companies. This
market should be privately led and provide clear incentives for professional inves-
tors as well as for the entrepreneurial owner-managers to invest in and create and
capture value from young innovative companies.
Finland has become one of the most R&D intensive countries in the world. It is
currently targeting an R&D spend of 4.0% of GDP.168 As a direct result of the na-
tion’s long-run commitment to innovation, Finland’s competitiveness has been
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168 (Science and Technology Policy Council, 2006). However, Finland has not yet set quantitative goals for
access to risk capital. See e.g. European Commission (2005b) for quantitative goals set by several other
European countries.
evaluated to be among best in the world for several years.169 While the achieve-
ment in R&D is exceptional, without equally impressive commercialization rou-
tines and investment the job is only half done.
In contrast to R&D, early stage VC provision is often compared favorably to EU
averages and found to be better than most. Such comfortable acceptance of
merely ‘above average’ commitment is inconsistent with Finland’s world class
R&D performance. This contradiction between R&D and commercial actions is
an anomaly that must be addressed. In short, Finland’s current and future entre-
preneurs, including the agencies and partners that advise them, need to be
incentivized to be considerably more ambitious in their global commercial goals
and achievements. One of the clearest messages that emerged from the inter-
views was the need to catalyze far greater amounts of value-adding private early
stage venture capital and business angel investment in Finnish young innovative
companies.
Some potential trend indicators to be considered when assessing the progress of
Finland to become one of themost vibrant markets in the world for investing in and
creating value from young innovative companies include (1) the number of
growth-oriented young innovative companies; (2) the volume of early stage ven-
ture capital investments in Finnish ventures as a percentage of GDP compared to
the best countries or regions (currently Israel, Massachusetts and California); (3)
the share of private investment of the total early stage venture capital activity; and
(4) returns to investment in early stage venture capital.
4.2.2 Clear Signals of Commitment
Make a clear statement that high growth entrepreneurship and private risk taking
is highly valued and rewarded in Finland. Use tax incentives to catalyze entrepre-
neurial activity and private investment and to reinforce this signal. Improve the
coordination of the tax and legal environments and the provision of public financ-
ing in order to facilitate a more effective enterprise policy.
The development of Finland to become one of the most innovative countries in
the world has been a result of heavy and consistent investments in R&D over the
years, among other factors. Recently more emphasis has been put also on encour-
aging growth-oriented entrepreneurship which is needed to create value from the
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169 E.g. Finland’s competitiveness has been evaluated to be among the best of the world according to World
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index and Institute for Management Development (IMD) al-
ready for several years.
R&D investments. In practice it has meant increased provision of public financ-
ing to young innovative companies. However, the crucial role of entrepreneurial
intent and the willingness of entrepreneurs and other concerned individuals such
as business angels to take significant risk has been largely ignored. The engage-
ment of highly experienced individuals in investment activity has been low, and
there has been little focus in enterprise policy on the incentives necessary for the
most professional individuals to invest their wealth and experience in young in-
novative companies.170
Given that formal venture capital alone is unlikely to resolve the funding chal-
lenges of growth-oriented young innovative companies in Finland or anywhere
else, business angels and informal venture capital in general has potentially a very
significant role as a more appropriate form of equity funding for young innovative
companies.171 As a funding mechanism, it can bring both the risk capital and rele-
vant skills sets of experienced individuals to entrepreneurial ventures in order to
support their growth and development. Business angels are the predominant
source of external, early stage funding to new and young enterprises within the US
economy. Thus, personal tax incentives are a very important tool for encouraging
informal investment in entrepreneurial ventures particularly when combined with
supportive measures such as training of investors and entrepreneurs.
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170 The problem has been common in Europe, particularly in the Nordic countries. For instance, based on a
large scale quantitative analysis, Da Rin et al. (2006) conclude: “…[European] Paradox [the fact that Euro-
pe suffers from an inability to turn scientific competence into commercially successful ventures] seems to
be due not to a lack of funding or of attractive technological opportunities, but rather to the difficulties to
earn large profits from the creation of new companies.” and continue: “we believe our results have a clear
message: sensible policy should consider a wider set of instruments than simply channeling more funds in-
to venture capital”. This conclusion is supported by related research in Sweden (Henrekson, 2005) and
Finland (e.g. Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2005c; Hyytinen et al., 2005e; Hyytinen et al., 2003d) and elsewhere
(Armour et al., 2006). Considering how to facilitate growth entrepreneurship to maintain the welfare state
in Sweden, Henrekson (2005) recommends, among others: “…capital gains taxation of long-term holdings
of firms where the individual takes active part could be abolished (long-term capital gains taxation is in
fact zero in the majority of the EU-15 countries). Such measures would send strong signals to existing and
potential entrepreneurs, while costing little in terms of taxes forgone.”
171 This was a clear conclusion of the Norface venture capital policy research seminar held in Helsinki in
October 2006
Based on a very strongly expressed view in the interviews,172 supported by avail-
able research evidence and experience from other countries,173 we believe that well
designed tax incentive for business angels or informal venture capital investors in
more general could have a significant positive effect both in (1) catalyzing highly
needed, informal investments from experienced investors and in (2) clearly dem-
onstrating the willingness of the government to facilitate and reward growth-ori-
ented entrepreneurship and personal risk taking. It is hard to imagine a more credi-
ble signal from the government than a tax incentive policy initiative to show that
Finland is serious about promoting growth-oriented entrepreneurship by all means
at its disposal.
Some potential trend indicators to be considered when assessing the success in
commitment to make private risk taking and entrepreneurship acceptable and val-
ued include (1) the development of the entrepreneurial intent in Finland (e.g. GEM
research and/or Flash Eurobarometer); (2) number of young innovative companies
(3) the share of Finns investing in young innovative companies (e.g. GEM re-
search); and (4) business angel investment as a percentage of GDP.
4.2.3 Open and Global Approach
Leverage all available financial and human resources to the nation’s long term
advantage regardless of their origin. Invite foreign investors and entrepreneurs to
invest in young innovative companies in order to help commercialize rapidly and
worldwide Finnish R&D outputs. Innovate new ways to create and capture value
from Finnish R&D investments in global markets.
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172 In interviews, the most common proposal for measures not yet used was tax incentives for business angels,
which was raised by a large number of interviewees. The biggest fear of many interviewees was that early
stage investment activity would become largely government dominated activity. Considering tax incenti-
ves to catalyze informal venture capital in Finland has been proposed in several recent evaluations and re-
ports (e.g. Grönholm, 2006; Hyytinen et al., 2003b; Hyytinen et al., 2005e; Hyytinen et al., 2003d; Kari,
2005; Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö, 2004; Lahti, 2004, Forthcoming; Maula et al., 2005; Maula et al.,
2006a; Maula, 2007; Maula, Salmenkaita,&Uusitalo, 2004; Ministry of Finance, 2005; Niemi, 2003; Paa-
sivirta et al., 2004; Science and Technology Policy Council, 2006; Sitra, 2005; Valtioneuvoston kanslia,
2004, 2006; Virtanen et al., 2006).
173 See e.g. Boyns et al. (2003b) and Ward (2006). For a recent review of the literature, see Maula (2007).
OECD (2004) concludes: “In general, countries should focus on greater neutrality and reduced complexity
in the taxation of capital. In many countries, however, targeted reductions in capital gains tax rates could
stimulate the supply of venture funds and increase the incentives to make risky investments.”
High tech business is normally global in both terms of customers and competitors
– and so increasingly is VC.174 In most business areas, the Finnish market repre-
sents less than one percent of the world market.175 For young innovative compa-
nies in Finland, as well as larger economies like Germany and the UK, a priority
focus on international growth is a necessity. Furthermore, Finnish companies cur-
rently enjoy a large market share and global distribution channels only in small
number of international business areas. Building global distribution channels is
expensive, slow, and risky. It is not a practicable choice for other than the largest,
established businesses. As a consequence, Finnish R&D will remain underutilized
if it relies only on the limited distribution channels of domestic companies. To suc-
ceed in global competition as an innovative small open economy, there is little
room for reactive protectionism. Ministry and relevant agencies should therefore
be careful in their interpretations of the so called “Finnish interest” concept re-
cently added in many regulations of the agencies to avoid creating harmful con-
straints for the value creation and capture from the Finnish RD& investments.
To make the best use of the Finnish R&D investments, Finnish companies and
public organizations should actively develop alternative ways to create and cap-
ture value from knowledge assets in addition to the traditional approach of export-
ing Finnish products to foreign markets.176 On a company level, this idea is inher-
ent in the so called “open innovation paradigm”.177 Its adoption by leading compa-
nies like Intel, IBM and others with large intellectual property pools has resulted in
the development of new collaboration models with leading venture capitalists and
other external parties. These new partnerships have allowed companies to convert
underutilized inventions into commercially attractive and cash generating innova-
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174 (e.g. Baygan et al., 2000; Deloitte, 2006a; Maula et al., 2003b)
175 E.g. for new drug development companies, Finland represents about 0.4% of the world market (Brännback
et al., 2004).
176 Summarizing Israeli experience, Teubal et al (2000) conclude: “During the 80s difficulties in accessing
specific “complementary assets” (such as those related to ‘implementation’ of R&D results such as assets
related to production and marketing) were considered as a important causes for lack of positive profitabili-
ty of inventors and firms pioneering important innovations (Teece, 1986). One substitute mechanism avai-
lable today and operative in Israel for accessing such assets (and much less available and widespread then)
is acquisition of the domestic company by a large foreign multinational (M&A) possessing such assets.
Inventors and associated investors and companies could thereby profit without having themselves acces-
sed complementary assets and without having undertaken substantial commercialization of the invention.”
177 See e.g. Simard and West (2006) for some considerations on applying the open innovation ideas in re-
gional and national levels.
tions.178 In Finland, it could be helpful to consider implementing similar ideas on a
national level given our large R&D investments and IPR base which also contains
a stock of inventions that we have not yet been able to turn to profitable innova-
tions (Figure 11 presents the idea in national context). Overall, in a small nation
open economy like Finland, the understanding of the crucial role of access to nec-
essary ‘complementary assets’179 (such as global distribution channels) is criti-
cally important to create and capture value from significant R&D investments.
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178 See e.g. Microsoft IP Ventures (http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/may05/05-04IPAllBiz
PR.asp), and IBM Venture Capital Group (http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/19042.wss)
were established to monetize intellectual property rights that cannot be optimally commercialized through
the distribution channels of the corporations. In Finland, an existing approach with some resemblance to
this idea of public agency helping face the information gaps between inventors and potential international
commercializers could be the invention market (http://www.inventionmarket.fi/) operated by the Founda-
tion for Finnish Inventions. However, there is clearly scope for more effective international collaboration
and new approaches to create commercial benefits from the R&D investments.
179 The concept ‘complementary assets’ was first introduced by Teece (1986). For instance in the evolution of
the Israeli venture capital market, understanding of the need for access to complementary assets has been
central (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2004a, 2004b; Avnimelech et al., 2006).
Figure 11. Path to more open approach to innovation180
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180 Framework adopted from Chesbrough (2003) and applied on a national innovation system level
Finland should be increasingly open to leveraging additional foreign financial and
human resources in order to help young innovative companies to successfully con-
quer global markets.181 Cross-border venture capital can play a very significant
role in innovative, open economies.182 It is of critical importance for the success of
the Finnish innovation system to be able to attract investors and foreign companies
who are willing to pay high valuations for Finnish technology ventures.183 Such
firms can very materially help Finnish ventures internationalize184 and facilitate
additional funding when needed.185 However, to be able to attract foreign inves-
tors, a necessary condition is often having strong and respected local investors
with contacts to foreign investors investing first, signaling quality, and being close
to monitor the investment.186
It is noticeable that in a number of the world’s most innovative regions (e.g. Israel,
East and West Coast America), immigrant entrepreneurs with high levels of hu-
man capital have played a very significant role in establishing growth-oriented
ventures.187 Given the risk aversion and still relatively low entrepreneurial intent
of Finns,188 the potential, commerce-enhancing role of foreigners could be even
higher. The importance of indigenous knowledge in target markets significantly
increases for Finland when dealing with regions that are geographically remote
from Northern Europe.
Regardless of the need for a global perspective in technology and other innovation
driven markets, the interviews and other indicators tell a very clear message: the
existing international community in Finland and the Finnish communities abroad
are currently significantly underutilized. This is partly because of the limited open-
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181 An OECD report (2004) concludes: “For smaller countries, integration into global equity flows and the
consolidation of secondary stock markets is better than developing isolated national venture arenas.” In
Israel, about two thirds of the $1.5bn invested in venture capital comes from abroad.
182 (Baygan et al., 2000; Maula et al., 2003b)
183 (Cardwell & Maula, 2004; Cardwell et al., 1999)
184 (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005)
185 (Hursti & Maula, 2006)
186 (Brännback et al., 2004; Deloitte, 2006a; Maula et al., 2003b; Mäkelä et al., 2003)
187 47% of the current USVC-backed companies have been founded by an immigrant (Anderson et al., 2006).
188 (European Commission, 2004b; Minniti et al., 2006)
ness and accessibility of the Finnish national innovation system.189 In line with the
realities of companies aggressively aiming at global markets and which set English
as the single, company-wide language from day one, English should similarly be
chosen as the default language for any publicly sponsored activities in Finland that
are targeted at supporting growth-oriented, young innovative companies aiming at
global markets.190
There have been various projects and ad hoc efforts to help Finnish young innova-
tive companies to network and identify investors abroad.191 There is room for im-
provement. The centrality of Finnish companies and their supporters has remained
relatively low in international networks. However, there are encouraging new de-
velopments. The newly opened FinNode innovation center in Silicon Valley192
and the FinChi innovation center in Shanghai, and the International Business Ac-
celeration Center (INBAC) in Silicon Valley are visible indications of growing
Finnish ambitions. Similarly, Sitra’s participation in PreSeed/EASY project pro-
moting cross-border business angel investments in Europe is encouraging.193 Like-
wise, other international initiatives such as the proposed Nordic fund of funds194
can also be seen as important steps in right direction. However, the openness and
global orientation of Finnish enterprise still rests excessively on the shoulders of
small number of enlightened individuals and projects. A global perspective and
implacable ambition should be made a core value of the Finnish innovation sys-
tem. As yet, this goal still remains merely an ambition.
Some potential indicators to be considered when assessing the success in improving
the openness and global perspective in the financing of young innovative companies
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189 As examples, most of the seminars organized by public finance organizations are organized in Finnish wit-
hout opening them to non-Finnish professionals in Finland or partners abroad. Furthermore, most of the
documentation even in high-technology sectors is only available in Finland. For instance, out of publica-
tions published by Tekes in 2005–2006, clearly less than a half is available in English. Similar examples
can also been found from the most of the other relevant public organizations. See also conclusions and re-
commendations on making Finnish young innovative companiesmore accessible for foreign investors and
partners in Cardwell et al. (1999).
190 This use of English does not presume that national languages, e.g. Chinese, Spanish etc., will not continue
to be essential in individual national markets.
191 E.g. Seed Forum supported by Finpro (www.seedforum.org) and many others
192 FinNode – the new Finnish innovation centre in Silicon Valley http://www.finpro.fi/en-US/About+Fin-
pro/FinNode.htm
193 ”Sitra’s PreSeed to provide expert advice in creating a European-wide market place for initial invest-
ments”. Sitra press release 15.11.2006, Finnish National Fund for Research and Development Sitra, Hel-
sinki, Finland.
194 (Nordic Innovation Center, 2006b)
include (1) the share of early stage VC investment in YICs coming from abroad and
(2) the number of R&D centers of multinational corporations in Finland.
4.2.4 Determined Execution
Remove duplication, fragmentation and unwarranted growth of public services.
Improve inter-agency coordination and improve the customer orientation in the
provision of public finance.
The role of public finance organizations is to address their objectives, typically the
identification and correction of serious market failures. Given the development of
the financial markets in Finland,195 it is important for the organizations to reassess
regularly the salience of their role and current activities together with their spon-
soring ministry. Over the long time horizon, the success of public organizations
that are established to address market failures is ideally measured in their ability to
make themselves redundant. Yet, given human nature, few organizations willingly
seek their own demise.
Although public organizations can manage overlapping activities through in-
creased coordination, in the longer term it is still important to question whether the
effectiveness and efficiency of the public support and finance system could be im-
proved. Clients’ take up of extant services is often improved by making the service
more understandable. Therefore, one objective to optimize is the simplicity of sup-
port systems. Unnecessary complexity should be avoided. The Finnish support
system is not simple.
Customer orientation is another dimension that should be centrally important to
consider when developing the organization of the public finance of young innova-
tive companies.196 So far, the structure has been largely product or provider ori-
ented with little coordination between instruments and organizations. Client com-
panies have had to maintain a large number of relationships and provide overlap-
ping reporting just because of underdeveloped and unconnected account manage-
ment and supporting infrastructure in the funding organizations. So far different
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195 (e.g. Hyytinen, Kuosa, & Takalo, 2003a; Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2003c; Hyytinen et al., 2005d, 2005c;
Hyytinen et al., 2003d)
196 With this we do not mean “key account programs” which could further amplify the problems of certain
companies specializing for grant seeking (for a description of the problem, see e.g. Hyytinen et al., 2005d;
Hyytinen et al., 2003e; Lerner, 2002). Instead, we see a need for better customer orientation and monito-
ring to ensure better information availability for decision making both to enable right products being offe-
red when needed and to prevent further funding being provided when track record tells it is not likely to be
effective.
instruments have often been developed and offered by different providers for each
stage of development of client companies. This proliferation of programs and ser-
vices by separate public agencies has a major cost for young innovative compa-
nies. In order to succeed in meritocratic and volatile technology markets, they have
to scale up their commercial activities very quickly. Complexities in accessing
support services have a high cost for senior management in fast growth enterprises.
Rather than having different instruments for each development stage, it would be
beneficial to a continuity of agency support based on agreed milestones.197
For Tekes, the suggested future goal in financing YICs would be to become the
primary public partner in developing and commercializing Finnish technology
globally. Tekes’ role would be to act as the specialist provider for growth-oriented
young innovative companies. Of the public finance organizations, based on it’s
role and experience, Tekes appears to be according to the interviews in the best po-
sition to develop a robust market and technology-focused due diligence process to
evaluate and to certify the global competitiveness of the earliest stage young inno-
vative companies given its large scale investments in R&D and teams of specialists
with sector specialization. Such an evaluation competency would be a necessary
requirement for agencies making direct capital loan investments in young innova-
tive companies.198 However, development is clearly needed.
First, the current level of global market information and the contact networks em-
ployed by Tekes in decision making is insufficient for allocating larger resources
more selectively and to support rapid and continuing company development.199
Development of the selection process including a robust market and technol-
ogy-focused due diligence process would be highly important. There is a clear
need to bring in more global market insight. This may be achieved by the develop-
ment of internal data resources as well as linking both domestically and interna-
tionally with leading venture capitalists, business angels, and other commercial-
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197 E.g. SBIR/STTR programs in the United States have three milestones. Each firm has to deal with its sector
specialist, not three separate entities that focus on different development stages. For details, see
http://www.sba.gov/SBIR/
198 So far Tekes has e.g. had a startup capital loan instrument with investments up to €200k (Phase I max
€100k and Phase II max €200k. From the beginning of 2007, the Phase II will be discontinued due to the
changed De Minimis regulation of the European Commission). If the intent is to increase the size of the in-
vestments enabled by the new EU state aid regulation on R&D&I (European Commission, 2006a), the
instrument and the selection process should be developed carefully in cooperation with VC industry to en-
sure the maximal additionality and cost-efficiency (and avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard) and
enabling good access to further funding from private sources (and avoiding crowding out private invest-
ment).
199 The recent decision of Tekes to merge its international and regional networks appears to be one useful step
to the right direction (Tekes press release on December 22, 2006).
ization experts.200 These networks need to be nurtured not only in Finland but even
more importantly in the main countries and regional markets targeted by Tekes’
client companies.
Second, Tekes should increase its customer orientation in the finance of young in-
novative companies. Although many individuals within Tekes are seen as very
professional and supportive, the service has been found to vary between offices.
Tekes could adopt more clear account management teams and supportive informa-
tion systems that would guarantee good services using appropriate instruments.
Third, Tekes needs to develop a more streamlined and integrated portfolio of in-
struments to support rapid development from research to proof of concept and
early commercialization.201
Fourth, a much more open approach is needed to facilitate the global commercial-
ization of Finnish inventions. Tekes should more proactively use all available re-
sources in Finland and abroad to help turn Finnish inventions to commercialized
innovations. It should be easier than it is at present for global markets to identify
relevant and valuable Finnish technologies. A bigger risk to the Finnish economy
is not that Finnish inventions are being misused but, rather, they are not being used
at all.202 Given Tekes’ new mission to focus more on innovation in comparison to
its traditional remit of invention, this will not be seen as a success until a larger
number of customers worldwide use Finnish solution/inventions to meet their
needs. Tekes should innovatively develop new approaches to help transform Finn-
ish inventions to innovations and thereby help capture financial and other benefits
to the Finnish economy. This is also an area where Sitra, Finpro and Invest in Fin-
land play major roles, so close collaboration with them is very important.
For Finnvera, the suggested future goal in financing YICs should be the primary
public provider of loans and loan guarantees at the local level. Finnvera has strong
local presence in Finnish regions and is recognized for its professionalism in the
delivery of loans and loan guarantees. Having a regional presence is not the most
critical issue when considering the relatively small number of the high growth ori-
ented young innovative companies aiming at global markets to compete with com-
petitors from the United States and Asia among others. Therefore, a decentralized
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200 E.g. Hsu (2006) shows that VC involvement in the US SBIR funded companies boosts cooperative activity
the likelihood of an initial public offering of the companies.
201 Some suggestions concerning the proof of concept funding in Hjelt, Niinikoski, Syrjänen, Valovirta, and
Törmälä (2006).
202 See Hjelt et al. (2006), who also suggest a more open look to international commercialization oppor-
tunities.
regional presence is only a limited advantage in making equity investments that
are needed in the funding of such companies.
However, in the provision of loans and loan guarantees to small firms a regional
presence is highly effective. Equity investments are only relevant for small share
of the most growth-oriented ventures while loans and loan guarantees aremore rel-
evant for a much wider group of companies. Therefore, in the development areas,
it is suggested that Finnvera focuses on this primary activity, i.e. loan and loan
guarantees, which is the traditional focus of Finnvera. Second, Finnvera should
harmonize operations, investment criteria, and financial instruments between re-
gions. There are currently examples of significant variation in the investment crite-
ria and in the instruments employed between different offices of Finnvera. Third,
Finnvera should carefully monitor the need for direct equity investments and pre-
pare for phasing out direct seed (equity and capital loan) investment activity if and
when it is no longer needed. This will help avoid crowding out private activity.
Companies aiming at rapid international growth can be born anywhere in Finland.
However, regardless of their regional beginnings, they should be entitled to receive
the best possible support to help them grow and conquer global markets. Therefore,
wherever possible, it is important to recognize such exceptional companies early and
to direct them to specialist services that are tailored for such companies. This is a
better prescription than attempting to replicate such services in every region with lit-
tle access to global market information and global investor networks.
For Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (FII), the suggested future goal in financ-
ing YICs should be to become the most professional fund-of-funds investor cata-
lyzing significant amounts of new privately managed risk capital. There are some
areas of organizational responsibility that need further development. First, the
fund-of-funds activity should be prioritized. FII should develop a primary role in
the creating of new privately managed, venture capital funds and particularly early
stage funds. FII should also develop a more robust due diligence process in order
to help raise the professionalism of the state supported Finnish funds and to certify
their quality.203 Such improvements will allow these funds to improve their capa-
bility to raise funds from both domestic and foreign investors. As Finnish institu-
tional institutions diversify internationally, an important role for FII is to help en-
sure that corresponding flows from international investors are attracted in funds
based in Finland. The challenge is particularly important and challenging for funds
with early stage venture capital focus.
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203 In the institutional investor community, the due diligence process of European Investment Fund have been
seen to provide some certification of the investment grade of the fund. Similarly, venture capitalists feel
that the responding to the requirements has helped to improve their professionalism and make it easier to
attract investments from other sources.
When investing in funds, the future viability of such funds should first be ascer-
tained.204 Many success factors of early stage venture capital funds are very well
known: e.g. world-class experienced and competent individuals (i.e. serial entre-
preneurs and venture capitalist skills and contacts), global industry focus and
reach, sufficient fund size, and close contacts to leading companies and research
institutions in their industry to speed development from research idea to a fully
fledged business.205 It is a high priority to be able to actively catalyze world class
teams to make informed investments and support their portfolio companies in
global competition.206 Second, FII (and MTI) should regularly review the contin-
ued need for its different types of direct investment activities and be prepared to
phase out direct investment activities if and when they are no longer needed to
avoid crowding out private activity and to specialize as a more proactive fund of
fund management team.
For Sitra’s PreSeed activities, the suggested future goal in financing YICs should
be to become a more open and effective informal venture capital market place.
Sitra’s INTRO and DIILI services have been considered as valuable but currently
do not reach their full potential partly because of perceived tight control, lack of
openness to deal flow, and somewhat unscaleable processes. Furthermore, Sitra’s
present strategy of pioneering new initiatives and then spinning them off after the
program period can be challenging in areas that require long-term public support.
Therefore, there are some development areas needing attention. First, Sitra should
work to find a way to increase the openness, scale and the effectiveness of the
INTRO market place. Second, it could be useful for Sitra to consider opportunities
to establish the INTRO market based on a non-profit funding model with all rele-
vant stakeholders involved to improve the openness and inclusiveness of the mar-
ketplace.
These findings have also important implications for the Ministry of Trade and
Industry. First, MTI should develop amore integrated management responsibility
to remove inter-departmental competition and to create more coherent and coordi-
nated direction. Currently, the supervision and representation of the sister agencies
is somewhat dispersed within the Ministry. For instance, each organization has a
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204 As a public investor with the key remit to facilitate the creation of new venture capital funds with early sta-
ge focus, the role of due diligence should be tough but constructive, i.e. improving the investment rea-
diness of emerging teams.
205 (e.g. Gompers et al., 2006a; Maula et al., 2006a; Söderblom, 2006; Söderblom et al., 2006; Zarutskie,
2006)
206 Israeli Yozma, Australian Innovation Investment Funds, New Zealand Venture Investment Fund program,
and UK Enterprise Capital Funds programs of government sponsorship in VC funds have been explicitly
planned to support the emergence of new very strong VC teams.
different representative from the Ministry as a board member or no MTI represen-
tation at all. Therefore, the boards of these agencies cannot act as an effective
mechanism for aligning the separate interests of the organizations and their collab-
orators. The risk is that they focus too much on developing the longevity and
growth of their own organization without taking fully into account what their sister
organizations are doing. This organizational responsibility structure is suboptimal
from the innovation and financing system perspectives. The Ministry has so far
had a parallel supervisory mechanism based on separate supervisory meetings and
directions from the Ministry. However, it has become common practice that the
guidelines given through this channel have been only partially implemented. This
has occurred particularly when the supervisory guidelines have been in conflict
with strategies drafted by the separate Boards of the agencies.
Secondly, MTI should review how government could best support enabling infra-
structures,207 which are typically difficult to sustain or at least start on fully com-
mercial basis, but whichmay still be best implemented by independent actors. Cur-
rently the innovation system including MTI and Tekes are prepared to fund pro-
jects, but not structures, and Sitra also does not consider continuing funding of
such operations being its responsibility. However, such enabling infrastructure
roles may be far more important and better justified compared to direct investment
activities alongside private actors.208
Thirdly, and very importantly, the collaboration between the Ministry of Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Finance should be further developed and deep-
ened to facilitate a more integrated enterprise policy. Although enterprise policy
has been seen as primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
many of the core areas such as the development of the tax and legal environment
86
207 See e.g. Hyytinen et al. (2003d). Some examples of such services could be business angel networking, in-
vestment readiness training of business angels and entrepreneurs currently carried out by Sitra PreSeed,
business plan competitions such as Venture Cup (http://www.venturecup.fi/default.asp?site=3, see also
Kari (2005)), and internationalization programs such as Global Software (Niinikoski, Valovirta & Kontio,
2006). Of course, potential overlaps with commercial services should be continually monitored to avoid
crowding them out.
208 Georghiou et al. (2003) note: “…the public sector may have a relative advantage in carrying out complex
tasks the outcomes of which are difficult to measure (e.g. design of policies that take the wider social bene-
fits into account). As a general rule, careful consideration should take place on whether the government
could achieve its aims better indirectly by enhancing opportunities, rather than through direct involve-
ment. As an example of a task where the public sector may have a relative advantage is the collection and
dissemination of information. To reap the highest returns to such activity, information thus collected
should be distributed as widely as possible among Finnish users. This implies that information should be
priced at marginal cost. By definition, therefore, such activities cannot support themselves. Credible go-
vernment impartiality may allow the government to perform tasks that are difficult for profit-oriented
firms.”
come largely under the control of the Ministry of Finance.209 This latter ministry
understandably has focused on ensuring a broad tax base and fiscal neutrality.
However, to create a globally competitive environment for employment creation
through investments in young innovative companies, a more integrated approach
is needed. The government should have an innovation finance system that avoids
having to use public finance to resolve problems stemming from the tax and legal
environment. It appears that the dialogue and collaboration between the ministries
on innovation and enterprise policy has improved during the past years particu-
larly on an individual level. Furthermore, Ministry of Finance has recently con-
ducted some very useful research on the potential to develop the Finnish risk capi-
tal market.210 None the less, overall Ministry of Finance has little resources com-
mitted to consider the entrepreneurship and innovation perspectives. Coordinated
development between these two principle ministries could be further strengthened
by an advisory panel along the lines of the UK small Business Investment task
force as suggested above.
When assessing the effectiveness of the public financing of young innovative
companies as a system, in our view progress in the indicators suggested above
should provide useful evidence. In addition, more specific impact analyses of vari-
ous instruments and a continuous assessment of the public system, possibly sup-
ported with a taskforce as suggested above, are of course needed.
Final Remarks
Many of the findings and recommendations presented in this report are not novel.
Support for greater customer orientation; the use of tax incentives to incentivize
experienced individuals to invest their wealth and competence in developing new
ventures; and an increased focus on non-financial support in the development of
the supply of venture capital have each been regularly cited in a number of inde-
pendent studies over the past years.211 Despite of this, there has been a tendency to
focus on easy solutions (i.e. invest some funds in a new or existing government or-
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209 For instance, many key priorities such as developing exit markets for investors and rewarding success with
policies (European Commission, 2006c) fall largely in areas under the control of or at least heavily influen-
ced by the Ministry of Finance.
210 (Niemi, 2003)
211 (Aho et al., 2006; LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 2005; Maula et al., 2006a; Maula &Murray, 2006b; Paasivirta et al.,
2004; Science and Technology Policy Council, 2006; Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2004; Virtanen et al.,
2006)
4.2.5
ganization) and ignore the more difficult, but often more important issues for the
development of sustainable risk markets.212
In concluding our report, it needs to be emphasized that in developing the public
financer of young innovative companies in Finland, the key goal should be devel-
oping a thriving international market for Finnish innovation over the next five to
seven years (i.e. until the end of 2013). Cycles are difficult to predict, but public
policy and related instruments should be developed with this long-term goal in
mind, and with flexibility to scale up (or down) according to the market needs.
Such goals, we believe, are best met by Finnish companies ultimately being able to
compete internationally on their own commercial merits in aggressively
meritocratic markets. Public agencies can support such ambitions particularly for
the earliest stages of firm genesis and growth. However, at the danger of repeating
ourselves, over the longer time horizon, we believe that the success of public orga-
nizations that are established specifically to address market failures is best mea-
sured in their ability to recognize the transience of their role and make themselves
redundant when their public remit is completed.
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212 As an example, the problem in the tax treatment of foreign institutional investors (effectively a risk of
double taxation) in Finnish venture capital and private equity funds was finally largely solved in 2005 (the
new law effective from the beginning of 2006) nearly a decade after the problemwas clearly identified and
widely known. Yet even the new legislation only partially solves the problem (Nordic Innovation Center,
2006a; Viitala, 2007). There are also many other similar issues reducing the competitiveness of Finland
compared to other countries as a target of investments in new funds and ventures (see e.g. EVCA, 2004b;
Heikkilä, 2004; Niemi, 2003; Nordic Innovation Center, 2006a; Viitala, 2007)
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Appendix 1
International Experience
A.1 Country Comparison
Challenges related to the financing of young innovative companies have received
continuous attention in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.213 In several
parts of the United States, particularly in the Silicon Valley and the Boston re-
gions, the financing of young innovative companies is very developed with the
help of vibrant venture capital and business angel communities. Yet even in the
United States the fact is that government has had a major role in facilitating the
early stage finance.214 There are currently major challenges in the financing of the
early stage ventures in the US due to the venture capital focus having moved to
later stage investments.215 Increasingly the role of making seed investments has
moved from formal to informal venture capital.216 In Europe the situation has been
more difficult. Institutional investors have had little interest in exploring commit-
ments to early stage ventures.
Sweden. In Sweden, there are several public organizations providing financing for
young innovative companies in different stages.217 In the proof-of concept stage,
there are many sources of grants e.g. from university holding companies,
VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems),218 Inno-
vationsbron,219 ALMI220 and some other sources. In the seed stage, VINNOVA
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Barriers and Mobilizing Resources to Develop the European Risk Capital Market, October 17-18, 2006,
Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, Finland.
217 For a more detailed description of the organizations and their budgets, see report by Nutek (2006).
218 http://www.vinnova.se/default____612.aspx
219 http://www.innovationsbron.se/Templates/157.aspx
220 http://www.almi.se/almi_in_english.html
and NUTEK221 can provide grants, ALMI can provide convertible loans, and
Innovationsbron and university holding companies can provide both convertible
loans and equity. In startup stage Industrifonden222 can provide equity investments
or convertible loans alongside business angels and/or private venture capitalists.
Concerning the organizations, VINNOVA’s role is primarily related to innova-
tions linked to research and development. NUTEK is a central agency in the Swed-
ish innovation system with diverse activities and around 200 employees in three
regions in Sweden. ALMI Företagspartner AB is owned by the state and is the par-
ent company of a group of 21 subsidiaries in each Swedish county (subsidiaries 51
per cent owned by the parent company with other owners being county councils,
regional authorities and municipal cooperative bodies). It has is approximately
450 employees. Innovationsbron has provided seed investments since 2005. There
are 7 Bridge funds which do co-investing and fund-of-funds activities in separate
organizations. The Innovation Bridge Scheme is linked to university and regional
innovation system with incubator services offered. Given the newness of the
scheme, it is early to make comments about future successes but the scheme is seen
as evergreen fund with government top up over time. Innovation Bridge funds will
also invest in angel deals. The Scheme has a bit over €200m under management
mainly from public sources. Industrifonden, an evergreen fund established in 1979
by the government, has some €350m under management and makes investments in
start-up, development and early expansion stages (typically co-investments with
other investors with investments ranging from €500k to €5m). Industrifonden can
provide both convertible debt and equity based instruments. Industrifonden also
acts as a fund of funds investor and has invested in 11 seed and regional VC firms.
In Sweden, there are no tax incentive schemes to catalyze business angel activity.
However, business angels have been connected to the Swedish Venture Capital
Association. It is estimated that there are some 3000–5000 active business angels
in Sweden investing around €160–220m per year.223
Denmark. In public finance of young innovative companies in Denmark, state
backed investment company Vaekstfonden224 plays an important role with a capi-
tal base of about €300m. Vaekstfonden is both a direct VC investor and a fund-
of-funds investor. In addition, Vaekstfonden administers Vaekstkaution, a national
loan guarantee scheme for business. Vaekstfonden also initiated the creation of the
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Danish Business Angel Network (DBAN) in 2000. The organization behind
DBAN has set up 5 Regional BANs (Business Angels networks), each one associ-
ated with a state sponsored technology incubator (Innovationsmiljøer). In 2006,
the Technology and Life Science investment activities of Vaekstfonden were pri-
vatized to be managed by a privately held management company Sunstone Capital
owned by its eight partners.225 With four funds and over €350m under manage-
ment, Sunstone became one of the biggest VCs in Denmark. Vaekstfonden has
among its strategic objectives to work actively to facilitate access to international
venture capital and drive the development of an internationally competitive pri-
vate equity environment in Denmark. Vaekstfonden has set a goal: “to make the
Danish venture market the best-functioning market in Europe.” In 2004, about
25% of the Danish VC funded companies were funded by Vaekstfonden.226 Some
identified key development areas in the Danish VC market are: (1) to streamline
the commercialization of public research; (2) to increase fundraising at Danish
venture and buy-out investors; (3) to extend the integration of foreign markets for
venture capital; (4) to improve exit conditions; (5) to strengthen the entrepreneur-
ial incentive.227 In Denmark, there was also an identified need to develop public
proof of concept funding.228 There is a new Proof of Concept pilot program with
€1.6m budget for 2006–2007 focused on this stage.229
Ireland. In Ireland, Enterprise Ireland (EI)230 has played a central role in the gov-
ernment support for SMEs.231 EI’s role in the VC industry is to be the agent of the
State, and in this regard EI runs the Seed and Venture Capital Programme on be-
half of the State. Under the 2000-06 Programme, EI has (1) invited applications for
Programme support, which has so far been carried out on an open competitive ba-
sis; (2) assessed these applications and selecting approvals for funding (with the
assistance of a Seed and Venture Capital Approvals Committee, which includes
both EI members and other external public and private sector members); and (3)
disbursed of funding to successful applicants and subsequent participation in VC
funds as limited partners. Funding support is provided up to a maximum of 50% of
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total fund size, which is the maximum amount of funding allowable under the EU
approval for the scheme.
In addition to EI which focuses primarily on SMEs with 10 to 250 employees and
startups and micro-companies with significant growth and internationalization orien-
tation, other significant public actors include 35 City and County Enterprise Boards
(CEB)which provide financial and non-financial supports and assistance tomicro-en-
terprises in their respective areas; Business Innovation Centres (BIC) operate in five
cities providing primarily services for SMEs; FÁS which is the State training and em-
ployment authority; LEADER, the EU Community Initiative for Rural Development
which provides approved local groupswith public funding to implementmultisectoral
business plans for the development of their areas; and Údarás na Gaeltachta which
works to develop the economies of Gaeltacht areas and to encourage the preservation
and extension of Irish as the principal means of communication in the Gaeltacht.
In Ireland there is general acceptance that the roles of Enterprise Ireland, the City
and County Enterprise Boards and the other enterprise-related entities are rela-
tively well established and defined at the strategic level – that is, there is clear un-
derstanding of the broad remit of the agencies, and the eligibility for support from
the agencies. However at a more operational level, concerns have been raised re-
garding possible duplication and overlap of services, as it is possible for some
companies to meet the eligibility criteria of different agencies. Therefore, despite
recent memorandums of understanding and agreements between agencies, some
recent evaluations have recommended improved coordination.232
United Kingdom has the most developed venture capital and private equity mar-
ket in Europe with a long history, e.g. 3i plc starting in 1945. The UK venture capi-
tal industry has its origins in the early 1980s with the advent of a government under
Margaret Thatcher with a very strong remit to increase the role of free markets in
all aspects of UK economic life. The UK has remained the single largest venture
capital market in Europe although this dominance has increasingly been the result
of the very large, international private equity industry operating out of London and
focusing on MBO opportunities worldwide. The success of private equity as an as-
sets class has left a clear lacunae in the earlier stages of risk capital finance.233 The
British example largely reflects the prevailing situation in Europe with later stage
deals being the dominant product across the venture capital and private equity
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product portfolio. Unlike much of the rest of Europe, the UK economy shows sev-
eral signs of growth in a burgeoning informal investor (Business Angel) market.234
The British government has had a strong and determined approach to “Making the
UK the best place in the world to start and grow a business” implemented in close
collaboration between the DTI’s Small Business Service and HM Treasury.235 Ac-
cordingly, the UK has made a very public commitment to Entrepreneurship as an
important plank in economic (and social) policy and has promoted a range of pol-
icy instruments and incentives to increase participation in Entrepreneurial activi-
ties. It is important to note that in the UKEntrepreneurship policy has been person-
ally and very publicly adopted by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of
the Exchequer. The two most powerful politicians in the UK since 1997 have con-
sistently supported a free market, entrepreneurial policy stance that has as strongly
reflected US rather than European experience. Policy initiatives have spanned in-
creased entrepreneurship education to both students at schools and universities;
support for social entrepreneurship in disadvantaged communities; fiscal incen-
tives for informal investors and retail investment funds focusing on young busi-
nesses; as well as a major program of direct financial support to address ‘equity
gap’ issues via a number of UK government supported venture capital funds.236
The three most important of these direct VC fund activities in terms of scale of involve-
ment and public funds committed are the UK High Tech Fund (a fund of funds struc-
ture); the Regional Venture Capital Funds; and the Enterprise Capital Funds
scheme.
If there is a single prevailing characteristic of UK venture capital policy since the
present government’s incumbency in 1997, it is the commitment to a market medi-
ated solution to address shortcomings in the supply of early-stage venture capital.
This philosophical as much as economic policy position is based on the belief that
government should not and cannot ‘second guess’ market behavior. The para-
mount role of the state is to provide conducive environments for private activity to
occur efficiently. Above all, the state should not attempt to become a professional
venture capital investor in a market already populated with more experienced in-
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vestment professionals.237 This stance closely reflects US policy enacted through
the Small Business Administration and particularly its Small Business Investment
Company (SBIC) program. The latter ‘equity enhancement program’ has been
adapted in the designing of both the Regional VC Funds and the Enterprise Capital
Funds programs in the UK. At present in the UK, there is no significant venture fi-
nance activity undertaken by public civil servants rather than by private sector in-
vestment professionals. It is highly unlikely that this policy stance will be re-
versed.238
The UK government has further removed itself from direct investment activity by
setting up an independent governance structure, The Capital for Enterprise Board,
to oversee its public commitment to extant programs and funds since 2006.239 The
CEB was formed to remove government civil servants from the danger of slipping
into an active investor role as a limited partner in several public-private schemes.
The CEB is staffed by investment professionals from the venture capital industry
employed on a professional and incentivized basis to manage the state’s equity and
debt interests.
This arms length position of the state may also be seen in the informal market in-
centives. The Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)240 incentivizes entrepreneurs
via both an ex ante relief on taxable income and an ex post advantage through a re-
duced capital gains tax. Similarly, the tax efficient Venture Capital Trusts offer a
solution for private investors via the vehicle of a professionally managed fund.
Again, a clear guiding principle has been to leverage the skills of private profes-
sional investors asmuch as possible towards governmentally desired policy goals.
The UK has frequently been seen as one of a number of countries at the forefront of
entrepreneurial policy. However, crafting a coherent set of SME/entrepreneurial
policies within the different agencies of the state is difficult particularly given the
changing loci of power in different government departments. The National Audit
Office criticized the UK government for having 15 departments managing 265
programs providing (in theory) some 3000 support measures to small business.
The Small Business Service was censured for not providing a more robust co-ordi-
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nation function. The adequate monitoring of the effectiveness of its policy mea-
sures was also criticized. However, the NAO also acknowledged that the SBS is
only responsible directly for £170m expenditure in a government spend on small
business of over £2.6bn.241
United States has without question the most developed risk capital industry. In
particular, the Silicon Valley area in the West coast and the Boston area in the East
Coast are global centers of venture capital. In a recent analysis242 of the sources of
funds for early stage technology development, it was found that most funding for
technology development in the phase between invention and innovation comes
from business angel investors, corporations, and the federal government. Venture
capitalists were quite marginal. Even in the USA, the markets for allocating risk
capital to early-stage technology ventures were not considered efficient. Conse-
quently, many institutional arrangements have developed for funding early-stage
technology development. This suggests that funding mechanisms evolve to match
the incentives and motivations of entrepreneurs and investors alike. The study also
found that the conditions for success in science-based, high-tech innovation were
strongly concentrated in a few geographical regions and industrial sectors, indicat-
ing the importance in this process of innovator-investor proximity and networks
supporting people and institutions.
Overall, the study found that the federal role in early-stage technology develop-
ment was far more significant than were expected. Central federal funding sources
include Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program. ATP was created to foster collaborative technology de-
velopment of high-tech industrial products with the potential to foster significant
future economic growth. The Small Business Innovation Development Act of
1982 created the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. ATP and
SBIR are cost-shared R&D programs, not investments in private equity, but they
are designed with the expectation of commercial exploitation of the R&D per-
formed in the firm. The SBIR program is described separately below.
Concerning the public financing of small business, the U.S. Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) plays a central role. It was created in 1953 as an independent
agency of the federal government to aid, counsel, assist and protect the interests of
small business concerns, to preserve free competitive enterprise and to maintain
and strengthen the overall economy of our nation. In addition to the SBIR pro-
gram, it has administered The Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) pro-
gram since 1958 to fill the gap between the availability of venture capital and the
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needs of small businesses in start-up and growth situations.243 At the end of FY
2005, SBA had over $6.3bn invested in 418 funds, plus another $5.1 bn in out-
standing commitments. Together with private capital topping $12 bn, the program
totals over $23bn in capital resources. In the program, the government itself does
not make direct investments or target specific industries. Essentially, the SBIC
program is a “fund of funds” meaning that portfolio management and investment
decisions are left to qualified private fund managers.
Israel. Outside the USA, Israel is arguably the most cited national venture capital
industry in the world. Its distinction is having the largest early stage investments as
a percentage of GDP (Figure 5) with the total venture capital investment in Israeli
technology companies estimated to reach $1.5bn in 2006, 2/3 of which comes
from foreign investors.244 Israel is also credited with having arguably the most suc-
cessful single policy program designed to stimulate venture capital: namely the
Yozma program (1993-1997).245 Israeli venturing community and the related pol-
icy initiatives have very proactively tapped foreign experience and resources.246
The model includes value creation by young technology companies being merged
with global market leaders, which has resulted in significant wealth creation, recy-
cling of entrepreneurial capabilities, and a very large number of R&D centers of
multinational corporations as a result of the acquisitions.247 In Israel, the Chief Sci-
entist’s Office has a fairly strong coordination of the most of the activities in the fi-
nancing of young innovative companies.248 Israel policy activity, while uniquely
its own, does reflect lessons learned from the USA. Given the very strong links be-
tween Israel and the USA in both centers technology and its commercialization,
this is not surprising. One outcome of this close association is a similar belief in the
ethos of a free market and competition.
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Israel’s early stage government supported risk capital activities include: Tnufa A
pre-seed investment grant that provides up to 85% of costs to a maximum of $50k
per project. Technology Incubators A similar program seeking to ‘provide a
framework and support for nascent companies to develop their innovative techno-
logical ideas and to form new businesses”.249 Heznek Government Seed Fund
takes an equity position in start-up companies (€900k) that will fund up to 50% of
and ‘approved work program’ and 60% of ‘approved expenses’. Government
gives an upside incentive for private investors to buy out the government stake
within 5 years at the initial price plus interest.
The schemes are designed to stimulate the supply of high quality start-up busi-
nesses. (Israel has in addition a considerable number of schemes covering the pro-
motion of R&D and technology transfer on an international basis, such as the
BIRD program which provides funding for projects in which Israeli startup com-
panies commercialize their technology with US companies).250 These cited
schemes are designed for nascent business and address the invention-innovation
divide. However, they are not designed to accelerate the growth of micro-firms. In
its place, Israel has created an international network of collaborations by which Is-
raeli technology is introduced into established firms, e.g. Matimop, ISERD, and
Eureka. The Global Enterprise R&D Co-operation Framework similarly links Is-
raeli technology-based start-ups to multi-national enterprises in order to “propel
R&D projects into global market (sic)251”.
A.2 Policy Instruments
The need for government intervention in the finance of young innovative compa-
nies is usually established based on the so called financing gap argument252 i.e. low
availability of private venture capital investments in early stage companies. Such
problem has been found to be prevalent in nearly all countries.253 The reasons for
low availability for private investment include significant asymmetric information
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between early stage ventures and potential outside investors, relatively very large
transaction costs, and high risk, among other reasons.254
When a financing gap has been identified, the government faces a question
whether and how it should intervene. Extant research provides quite clear recom-
mendations for governments: (1) Yes, functioning venture capital market is impor-
tant for the economy,255 so government should make sure the markets work well.
There are no venture capital markets in the world in which government would not
have played an important facilitating role;256 (2) When intervening, the first prior-
ity is on indirect measures, e.g. making sure the tax and legal environment is con-
ducive for efficient market;257 (3) if investing to improve the supply of capital, the
investments should preferably be made indirectly, i.e. using a bidding process to
select best possible private managers to make the portfolio company level invest-
ment decisions.258
Government Sponsored Venture Capital Funds
One of the common responses to the identified market failures in early stage ven-
ture capital finance have been government sponsored venture capital programs.
Most often, the goal is to jump start the venture capital market by creating new
general partner teams,259 e.g. Yozma, New Zealand,260 Australia and ECFs. Direct
investments are more prone to suffer from crowding out.261
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Table 3. Examples of government sponsored venture capital programs
Yozma ECFs Australia IIF New
Zealand VIF
Finnish
Industry
Investment
Veraventure
Government
investment
Max 40% Max 2:1 Max 2:1 Max 1:2 Pari passu,
max 50%
Incentives Option for
private
investors to
buy out
government
share
Upside Upside
(profit split
90:10 priva-
te/govern-
ment)
Upside None None
Foreign
investors
Key target
group
Limited role Some role Limited role Limited role Limited role
Due diligen-
ce
Outsourced Outsourced Outsourced Own Own
Established 1993 2005 1997 2001 1994 2005
Minimum
fund size
NZ$30M No limit No limit
Bidding
process
Round Rounds Rounds Rounds Continuing
application
Yozma262 has become one of the most well-known government initiated VC pro-
grams internationally. It reputation rests on three related outcomes: (1) Yozmawas
pivotal in creating an indigenous Israeli venture capital industry; (2) this was de-
monstrably achieved within five years; and (3) the government was able to with-
draw from an active involvement in the market place by selling, at a profit, its
shares of eight of the ten Yozma funds back to the Israeli and foreign private inves-
tors. These ambitious goals were designed into the original specification of the
Yozma program by creating attractive incentives for the private investors to act ac-
cording to the policy goals of Israel.
Yozma and the government’s finance were initially directed towards new funds
primarily created by experienced non-Israeli investors bringing their finance and
skills to Israel. Yozma had as its goals to import knowledge and experience to set
up and operate VC funds and to create local management teams as well as to create
an international network with foreign VCs and other investors.263 Yozma provided
up to 40% of the capital in each of the new funds but limited itself to not more than
$8m per fund with private partners contributing $12m. Thus, the overseas inves-
tors in the new funds had to find 60% of the funds under management. The incen-
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tive for private investors was the option to buy Yozma out of their funds after five
years at the pre-arranged option price of the investment value + LIBOR + 1% in
addition to 7% of the future profits. Yozma invested in 10 small new funds and 15
start-ups directly. The target funds had grown from the original $200m to $2.9bn
under management in 2001 by the subsequent ‘baby funds’.264
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF).265 The new Enterprise Capital Funds scheme
has been designed based on experiences from the U.S. SBIC and other schemes
and follows well the established good practice. It has some important characteris-
tics: (1) the instrument has been designed to target a market failure that has been
analyzed and documented; (2) the government improves the supply of funding, but
acts only as a fund investor to catalyze privately managed funds; (3) the structure
using asymmetric profit sharing model creates incentives by rewarding success
and enables competitive returns for private investors from early stage investments;
and (4) there is an open bidding process to get best teams to run the funds.
The objective of the program is to increase the availability of growth capital to
SMEs affected by the identifies ‘equity gap’ by encouraging an increased flow of
private capital into the equity gap, by adjusting the risk-reward profile for private
investors making such investment; and lowering the barriers to entry for entrepre-
neurial risk capital managers by reducing the amount of private capital needed to
establish a viable venture fund. The model is based on U.S. SBIC model but
adapted for UK: (1) government investment as a loan to fund; and (2) no downside
protection – instead addresses risk-return issue with enhanced return for investors.
The government loan is made at 10-year government bond rate (circa 5%). The le-
verage will not be more than 2 times the private investment. The scheme is open to
regulated managers or business angel syndicates to run funds. Funds will need to
invest in the identified Equity Gap (subject to EC clearance up to £2m). Part of the
bidding process is to demonstrate that they will not crowd out private provision.
Profit share to Government and fund management charges to be determined in bid-
ding process but; quality of team and investment strategy are very important. Profit
share is set to ensure that program is cost neutral in the medium term.266 The com-
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mission approved the scheme in 2005.267 The first bidding round resulted in 45
bids from prospective general partner teams in 2005, of which 4 were selected.268
In November 2006, the Minister for Industry announced the launch of a second
round competition for Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) expecting to commit up to
£50m in this round and further £50m in a later round in 2007.
Innovation Investment Funds (IIF)269 program in Australia was established in
1997 in order to stimulate the financing of small high-tech companies in Australia.
The objectives of the IIF fund are stated as follows: (1) to encourage the develop-
ment of new technology companies which are commercializing research and de-
velopment; (2) to develop a self-sustaining Australian early stage, technol-
ogy-based venture capital market; (3) to establish in the medium term a “revolv-
ing” or self funding scheme; and (4) to develop fund managers with experience in
the early stage venture capital industry.270 The IIFs are administered by licensed
private sector fund managers who make all investment decisions, subject to the
terms of their license agreements with the Australian Government and other gov-
erning documents. Key elements of the IIF program’s operating requirements are:
(1) the ratio of Government to privately sourced capital must not exceed 2:1; (2)
investments will generally be in the form of equity and must only be in small, new
technology companies; (3) at least 60% of each fund’s committed capital must be
invested within 5 years; (4) unless specifically approved by the Industry Research
and Development (IR&D) Board, an investee company must not receive funds in
excess of $4m or 10% of the fund’s committed capital, whichever is the smaller;
(5) distribution arrangements provide for: (a) both the Government and the private
investors to receive an amount equivalent to their subscribed capital and interest
on that capital; (b) any further amounts to be then shared on a 10:90 basis between
the Government and private investors; (c) the private investors’ component to be
shared with the fund manager as a performance incentive; (6) the funds established
under the IIF program will have a term of ten years, after which they will be closed
in a commercially prudent manner.271 The model has received positive evaluation
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in rigorous academic research.272 Following a review in May 2006, the Govern-
ment announced a 3rd round of the IIF program with $200m of capital to support
10 new funds. This new round of IIF funding will appoint up to two new managers
each year for 5 years with $40m in funding available per annum for successful
fund managers.273
New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF)274 is a fund-of-funds program
with NZ$100m of capital to be invested in venture capital funds focused on New
Zealand. The goals of the program are: (1) to accelerate development of the New
Zealand venture-capital industry by increasing the level of early stage (seed,
start-up and early expansion) investment activity in the New Zealand market; (2)
to develop a larger pool of people in New Zealand’s venture capital market with
skills and expertise in early stage investment; (3) to facilitate the commercializa-
tion of innovation from Crown Research Institutes, Universities and the private
sector; and (4) to get more New Zealand businesses on paths to global success by
increasing their access to international experts, networks and market knowledge.
The structure includes both constraints and incentives to attract highly competent
investors to invest in early stage ventures in New Zealand.275 Initial capital invest-
ments are to bemade in innovative NewZealand businesses (majority of assets and
employees in New Zealand at the time that initial investments are made). Further-
more, initial capital investments must be made in early stage (seed, start-up and
early expansion) businesses. However, investors also have a an option to buy-out
the VIF stake in funds to be exercised to the end of the fifth year in the life of the
fund, at a price that returns VIF its capital invested plus a rate of return on that capi-
tal equal to the yield on the five year Government bond rate. If VIF has not been
bought out before the fifth year of the fund, it will take a pro-rata share of the net
proceeds of the funds (including losses, if these have occurred), in the same man-
ner as all other investors, when the fund terminates.
Besides investments, NZVIF has also undertaken several activities to promote and
encourage the development of the sector, including:276 (1) Establishment of stan-
dard venture capital investment documentation, designed for the New Zealand
market. Such documentation was not previously available in the New Zealand
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274 www.nzvif.com/. For a recent evaluation, see Lerner et al., (2005)
275 http://www.nzvif.com/vcinvestmentterms.html
276 (Lerner et al., 2005)
market and was developed without antecedents, based on standard international
best practice; (2) Submissions to government on venture capital issues; (3) Spon-
sorship of NZVCA for specific market development initiatives; (4) A series of in-
stitutional investor seminars conducted in New Zealand, and annual one-on-one
education and promotion meetings held with targeted venture capital fund manag-
ers and Fund of Funds operating in the Australian market; (5) Commissioning of a
survey from US based Venture Economics, to identify international venture capi-
tal fund managers that may have an interest in New Zealand, and publication of ar-
ticles in relevant investor journals. The NZVIF’s selection process includes com-
prehensive due diligence to ensure that the fund is “investment grade” completed
for it by the international investment advisory firm Wilshire Associates.
Research Commercialization Funds
Several countries have implemented programs to support the commercialization of
the results from publicly funded R&D.277 Examples reviewed here include the
SBIR program in the United States, Commercialisation Fund of Enterprise Ireland,
COMET in Australia, and TNUFA in Israel.
TNUFA in Israel is intended for inventors, entrepreneurs and start-up companies
during the initial phase toward the realization of their ideas. TNUFA fund will
contribute toward getting patents, the construction of a prototype to verify the via-
bility of the idea, preparation of a business plan and themobilization of initial capi-
tal. The grant for this program is 85% of the approved costs up to a maximum of
NIS 210k (Approx. $47k).
Commercialising Emerging Technologies (COMET)278 program was estab-
lished to address a gap identified by private fund managers when the IIF program
was established – that most early-stage firms were not ‘investment-ready’ because
they suffer from a poor grasp of the realistic market opportunity for their product
and/or limited understanding of intellectual property and general business man-
agement skills. These high risk factors make it very difficult for venture capital
funds to undertake due diligence and feel confident in the prospects for the busi-
ness. COMET is designed to build business innovation by providing support in the
form of knowledge services that are tailored for each grantee depending on their
specific needs. It is available for individuals and small companies with ideas at the
earliest stage of development, when assistance with devising a marketing plan,
building a prototype, developing an intellectual property strategy, and other as-
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pects of business planning can make a big difference in attracting investor confi-
dence and growth capital.
The program provides around $56k/max 80% of costs or $64k/max 50% of costs to
each firm via the services of COMET business advisers operating across Australia.
The business advisers assist applicants to access the appropriate knowledge ser-
vices for their specific needs and identify possible growth paths and sources of
funding. The COMET program is assisting to build availability, capacity and ac-
cess for small firms to knowledge intensive services. A 2002 review279 found that
27 percent of businesses assisted by COMET had secured equity funding through
their experience in the program, with a further 31 per cent involved in negotiations
for equity funding. Thirty-seven percent of clients had finalized one or more stra-
tegic alliances, with 31 percent involved in negotiations. Joint ventures had been
completed by 16 percent of clients. The review concluded that the program was
making a “…very important contribution to the entrepreneurial economy.”
Commercialisation Fund280 of Enterprise Ireland seeks to encourage and facili-
tate high quality applied research aimed at the commercial exploitation of knowl-
edge. In doing so, it is recognized that this process is an uncertain activity and that
the conversion of scientific principles into the commercial environment requires
sustained support. As part of its commitment to facilitating the commercialisation
of research, Enterprise Ireland is bringing a range of supports together under a
Commercialisation Fund. EI provides support in three phases:
1. Proof of Concept Phase
2. Technology Development Phase
3. Business Development Phase – CORD281
Proof of Concept phase focuses on a “proof of concept” model. Individuals or
small groups work on short applied projects to develop a product concept through
to a stage where a route to commercialization is clear. Either a campus company or
licensing may be involved in the planned route to commercialization. Under the
scheme Enterprise Ireland supports academic researchers in establishing that a sci-
entific concept from whatever source (1) is sufficiently robust, (2) is seen to ad-
dress a viable market and (3) is not encumbered by intellectual property consider-
120
279 (Howard Partners, 2002)
280 http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/ResearchInnovate/Research+Commercialisation/Commercialisati-
on_Fund.htm
281 Under this phase EI also offers support through their Enterprise Platform Programme – EPP
http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/ResearchInnovate/Research+Commercialisation/Busines_Develop-
ment_Phase_-_EPP.htm
ations. Grants to an indicative level of €90k may be awarded for a period typically
of up to 12 months or exceptionally 18 months, subject to a competitive evaluation
process. The proposals are evaluated by panels of typically 6–8 evaluators invited
from academia as well as industry.
Technology Development phase of the Commercialisation Fund funds research
aimed at major technology development around platform technologies or groups
of products built around a new technology. The underlying technologies must be
sound and there should be an identifiable market. The fund supports research in ar-
eas of technology of medium term interest to industry in Ireland leading to technol-
ogies, products or processes that can provide the basis of new businesses in Ireland
or can improve the competitiveness of industry in Ireland through licensing agree-
ments. The Technology Development grants are subject to the terms of a grant
agreement between the host institution and Enterprise Ireland. They cover 100%
of all eligible costs (e.g. personnel, equipment, material and travel) and should typ-
ically be for no more than €350k–€400k for projects typically up to three years du-
ration.
Commercialisation of Research and Development (CORD)282 aims to bring a new
product idea/business ventures from our third-level educational institutions to
market. The grants are designed to enable the commercial viability of your project
to be assessed. Funding is available for market research, product trials/market as-
sessment, establishing links with potential joint venture partners, cost analysis,
and financial projections. CORD grants may be approved up to 50% of eligible ex-
penditure with a ceiling of €38k per grant.
Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)283 is a competitive pro-
gram to encourage small business to explore their technological potential and to
profit from its commercialization. SBIR was enacted in 1982 as part of the Small
Business Innovation Development Act. SBIR is based on reserving 2.5% of fed-
eral R&D funds for small business. Each year, eleven federal departments and
agencies are required by SBIR to reserve a portion of their R&D funds for award to
small business. These agencies designate R&D topics and accept proposals. Fol-
lowing submission of proposals, agencies make SBIR awards based on small busi-
ness qualification, degree of innovation, technical merit, and future market poten-
tial. Small businesses that receive awards then begin a three-phase program.
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Phase I is the startup phase. Awards of up to $100k for approximately 6 months
support exploration of the technical merit or feasibility of an idea or technology.
Phase II awards of up to $750k, for asmany as 2 years, expand Phase I results. Dur-
ing this time, the R&D work is performed and the developer evaluates commer-
cialization potential. Only Phase I award winners are considered for Phase II.
Phase III is the period during which Phase II innovation moves from the laboratory
into the marketplace. No SBIR funds support this phase. The small business must
find funding in the private sector or other non-SBIR federal agency funding.
The US Small Business Administration plays an important role as the coordinating
agency for the SBIR program. It directs the 11 agencies’ implementation of SBIR,
reviews their progress, and reports annually to Congress on its operation. SBA is
also the information link to SBIR. SBA collects solicitation information from all
participating agencies and publishes it quarterly in a Pre-Solicitation Announce-
ment (PSA). The PSA is a single source for the topics and anticipated release and
closing dates for each agency’s solicitations.
Business Angel Co-investment Funds
One of the financing instruments that have been introduced in several markets are
so called “co-invest funds” with the target to support business angel investments
by matching the investments made by business angels to improve the economies of
scale in the investment activity. The basic idea is that the funds come from public
sources and they supplement private investments so that investments are made
alongside private investors. The best known and often bench-marked model is the
instrument introduced in Scotland in 2003. Since then, somewhat similar instru-
ments have also been introduced e.g. in New Zealand.284 Finnish Industry Invest-
ment compares their seed program to these. However, despite similarities, there
are also differences between the programs (e.g. management fee issue). The
implementations of co-investment funds in different countries is briefly compared
in Table 4.
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Table 4. Co-investment funds
Scottish Co-
investment Fund
(SCF)
New Zealand
Seed Co-Invest-
ment Fund
Heznek Program
– The Govern-
ment seed fund
Finnish Industry
Investment Seed
program
Funding source £45m equity fund
partially funded by
ERDF
NZ$40m (100%
government)
Israeli govern-
ment
€100m (100% go-
vernment)
Fund manager Scottish Enterpri-
se
New Zealand
Venture Invest-
ment Fund Ltd
(NZVIF)
Office of the Chief
Scientist of the
Ministry
Finnish Industry
Investment
Applicable inves-
tors
Pre-qualified Pre-qualified Anyone with suffi-
cient resources
Anyone
Founded 2003 2005 2004 2004
Volume £45M $40m for 5-6
years
Investment policy Investments up to
£500k in deals of
up to £2M.
Passive
SMEs based prin-
cipally in Scotland
assets of less
than £16M
equal terms
Investments up to
NZ$250k + poten-
tial follow-on up to
NZ$250k
Equal terms, max
50%
In seed and
start-up stage
companies based
in New Zealand
Investments up to
NIS 5m per com-
pany per two year
period that will fi-
nance up to 50%
of the Approved
Work Program
(R&D).
Investments on
equal terms with
private investors.
Private investors
source the deals.
FII takes a passi-
ve d, approved
business sector,
up to 250 employ-
ees and net role.
Compensation/in-
centive for private
investors
Yes, governments
share of commit-
ment fee.
Yes (option to buy
out government
stake within 5
years with initial
price + interest)
No
Scottish Co-investment Fund (SCF)285 is a £45m equity fund which can invest
between £50k and £500k in company finance deals of up to £2m. Target compa-
nies have to be SMEs based principally in Scotland, in an approved business sector
with up to 250 employees and net assets of less than £16m. SCF is partially funded
by the European Regional Development Fund. SCF co-invests with pre-selected
private co-investors which are a range of corporate ventures; institutional inves-
tors; professional fund managers and investors; business angel syndicates; and pri-
vate individual investors (currently 23 nominated partners). Partner’s role is to
find the investment opportunity, negotiate the investment deal and invest its own
money along with SCF money on equal terms. Scottish Enterprise does not find
and negotiate investment deals on its own or take any part in deciding whether the
company is a good opportunity, or has been valued at the right level. As long as the
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business passes basic criteria (largely size, location and sector) the partner is the
one who will make the investments. Private sector investors usually charge a com-
mitment fee of 1%-2% on sums they invest from the target company, when sums
are drawn down. SCF usually passes its share of this commitment fee to its partner.
The leverage effect of SCF has been assessed to be substantial with the average
business angel deal size in 2004 increasing from £179k to £475k when business
angels co-invested with the fund.286
New Zealand Seed Co-Investment Fund287 is a new investment program aimed
at early stage businesses with strong potential for high growth. The fund was es-
tablished in late 2005 and made its first investment in 2006. It is a $40m fund
which co-invests with selected co-investment partners (currently 4 accepted part-
ners but seeking more). In October 2006 it had invested $16m. Investments
through the fund are limited to a maximum investment of $250k in any one com-
pany or group of companies; with the possibility of another $250k in follow-on
capital at the discretion of NZVIF. The key objectives of the Seed Co-Investment
Fund are to enhance the development of angel investor networks, stimulate invest-
ment into innovative start-up companies, and to increase capacity in the market for
matching experienced angel investors with new, innovative start-up companies.
Heznek Government Seed Fund.288 Israeli Government takes an equity position
in start-up companies (up to NIS 5m, i.e. €900k) that will fund up to 50% of and
‘approved work program’ and 60% of ‘approved expenses’. Like its earlier Yozma
parent, the government gives an upside incentive for private investors to buy out
the government stake within 5 years at the initial price plus interest.
Government Support for Business Angel Networks
Systemic market inefficiencies and persistent funding gaps (primary seed gap and
secondary post-seed gap) have led the angel market to adopt various organiza-
tional structures and market mechanisms to increase the efficiency of quality deal
flow and increase the availability of capital.289 Angels tend to syndicate often, and
have attempted to find effective ways to pool their capital.290 Adapting to changing
market conditions, multifaceted angel organizations have evolved. These organi-
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zations help entrepreneurs find potential investors and business angels find and
screen deals, syndicate into small groups to make an investment, and interact
within the larger angel market. It has been found that Internet-enabled solutions
are creating new opportunities for entrepreneurs and venture investors alike and
facilitate the emergence of new breeds of introduction services connecting these
parties more efficiently.291 There have been seen two simultaneous polar develop-
ments, one toward the mass distribution of information regarding start-up opportu-
nities (entrepreneur-centric networks) and the other, in reaction to the first, toward
extreme screening of the information for a select audience (investor-centric net-
works).292 In Europe, around half of the angel networks receive at least some pub-
lic support from local, regional or national authorities.293 Although public funding
is often needed particularly in the beginning, there are also disadvantages in too
high reliance on public funding.294
Tax Incentives for Business Angels
The realization that formal venture capital investors are unlikely to fully resolve
the funding challenges of growth-oriented young innovative companies, many
countries in Europe295 and many states in the United States296 have started to focus
on business angels. For instance, in 2005 when US venture capitalists invested in
192 seed and start-stage companies,297 US business angels invested in nearly 50
000 companies, the vast majority being start-up and early stage businesses.298 In
the US, 227 000 active business angels were actively looking for investment op-
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became identified with public service institutions, this might reduce their attractiveness from the individu-
al business angel’s point of view, as they might identify the networks with bureaucracy and rigidity.
However, in particular in the awareness raising stage a public support element is mostly necessary, espe-
cially because this is a general requirement for the angel market to take off.”
295 (EBAN, 2006)
296 (CDVCA, 2004)
297 PwC/NVCA Moneytree 2006
298 (Sohl, 2006)
portunities and developing their portfolio companies in 2005.299 Therefore, policy
makers concerned with encouraging investments in new enterprises should redi-
rect their energies from promoting venture capital to removing the barriers to in-
formal investing.300 The encouragement and incentivization of business angel ac-
tivity should be a priority policy goal. In addition to reducing capital gains taxation
of such investments, also other types of tax incentives have been considered to be
an important instrument for catalyzing business angel activity alongside other
measures such as support for business angel networks and various demand side
and investment readiness activities.301 Existing or proposed tax incentives in dif-
ferent countries are briefly compared in Table 3.
Table 5. Tax incentives for business angels
Enterprise Invest-
ment Scheme (EIS),
UK
Business Expansi-
on Scheme (BES),
Ireland
Réduction d’impôt
pour souscription
au capital de so-
ciétés non cotées,
France
Access to Capital
for Entrepreneurs
Act of 2006 (ACE),
USA
Tax credit 20% Income tax rate 25% 25%
Capital gains
tax relief
100% after 3 year
holding period
Not a part of the
model (currently
20% rate)
Not a part of the
model (currently
27% rate)
Not a part of the
model (varies
between 15–28%
depending on
circumstances)
Other
incentives
Capital losses on
shares treated as
income losses
Deferral of
chargeable gain on
any asset
IHT relief on shares
Required
holding period
3 years 5 years 5 years 3 years
Limit Max deductible in-
vestment £400k per
year
Max deductible
investment
€31.75k per year
Max deductible
investment €20k
per person or €20k
per couple per year
Max deductible
investments $500k
per person per
year (max $250k
per company)
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ves to catalyze business angel investments, see Maula (2007).
Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)302 in UK is considered by many as themost
advanced tax incentive scheme for business angels. It was introduced in 1994 to re-
place older Business Expansion Scheme (1983–1994) as a more focused scheme
and has been further developed since then. It has been estimated to be very impor-
tant catalyst of informal venture capital in the United Kingdom.303 The main fea-
tures of the scheme are 20% front end tax credit and exemption from capital gains
tax after 3 year holding period.304 Other features include a loss relief, deferral of
chargeable gain and IHT relief. The scheme has been targeted to catalyze informal
venture capital investments in young growing companies, so there are many con-
straints on the qualifying investments including the target company being
unquoted (AIM is acceptable, however) and gross assets being £7m or lower be-
fore investment (£8m or lower after). The main criticisms in the implementation of
the schemes have been the limitation to ordinary shares (business angels would
prefer other instruments) and the complexity of the rules of the scheme.
Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs Act of 2006 (ACE)305 was introduced in the
House of Commons in April 2006 and in the Senate in September 2006. Under the
proposed scheme, angel investors would be eligible for a 25 percent tax credit to
offset up to $500k of investments per year (max $500k per company). The scheme
is modeled based on the experiences from 21 states in the United States.306
Business Expansion Scheme(BES).307 In Ireland there has also existed a tax in-
centive for business angels since 1984. However, it has not been considered fully
successful given its somewhat limited use. In 2004, 320 companies raised a total of
€50.1m through the BES.308 One of the identified problems in the current instru-
ments is the very low limit of max €31.75k investment qualified for deduction,
which is not in line with the size of investments typically needed in young innova-
tive companies. Other perceived problems have existed in the targeting of the
scheme. Furthermore, BES specifically prohibits direct input of investors into the
management or direction of the investee company, which prevents potentially
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304 20% tax credit and CGT exemption evaluated to be clearly the two most important elements in the scheme
according to a survey of users of the scheme (Boyns et al., 2003b).
305 (109th U.S. Congress (2005-2006), 2006; Preston, 2006)
306 (CDVCA, 2004; Preston, 2006)
307 http://www.revenue.ie/leaflets/it_55.pdf
308 (Small Business Forum, 2006)
valuable operational advisory activity on the part of the investors.309 In 2006, it has
been recommended to raise the limit to €250k.310
Réduction d’impôt pour souscription au capital de sociétés non cotées.311
France has also had a tax credit scheme to catalyze business angel investment with
a 25% tax credit. However, the maximum qualifying investment €20k per person
or €40k per couple per year have been low for the purposes of business angel in-
vestments. France has recently developed other advanced schemes to further cata-
lyze business angel activity. One considered as important by experts is a new com-
pany form designed to subscribe for shares in startup companies (la Société
Unipersonelle d’Investissement à Risque, SUIR). SUIR company functions as a
partnership, is owned by one shareholder (a natural person) and is exempted from
corporate taxes and from the total annual taxation for a period of ten years both
from the income and the realized capital gains for the ten years following the estab-
lishment of the SUIR company. Some of the constraints in the scheme reduced its
attractiveness after the introduction in 2004, but in 2006 the scheme has beenmade
more applicable to business angel context.
128
309 (Enterprise Ireland, 2005)
310 (Small Business Forum, 2006)
311 http://www.apce.com/index.php?n=1&rubrique_id=500000000&type_page=IH&contenu_id=654&tpl_id=64
Julkaisusarjan nimi ja tunnus 
Käyntiosoite Postiosoite  KTM Julkaisuja 
Aleksanterinkatu 4 
00170 HELSINKI 
PL 32 
00023 VALTIONEUVOSTO 
Puhelin (09) 16001 
Telekopio (09) 1606 3666 3/2007
   
Julkaisuaika 
Tammikuu 2007 
Toimeksiantaja(t)
Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö 
Tekijät (toimielimestä: nimi, puheenjohtaja, sihteeri) 
Markku Maula 
Gordon Murray 
Mikko Jääskeläinen 
Toimielimen asettamispäivä 
Julkaisun nimi 
Alkavien innovaatioyritysten julkinen rahoitus Suomessa 
Tiivistelmä 
Alkavien innovaatioyritysten käynnistys- ja varhaisen kasvuvaiheen rahoitus on kehittynyt merkittävästi kuluneen 
vuosikymmenen aikana. Tästä positiivisesta trendistä huolimatta rahoituksessa on edelleen haasteita. Suomen kan-
sainvälisesti vahva maine innovaatioiden tuottajana ei ole toistaiseksi johtanut vastaavaan menestykseen innovaati-
oiden kaupallistamisessa. Internet-kuplan puhkeaminen vuosituhannen vaihteen jälkeen aiheutti merkittäviä haastei-
ta Suomen vielä epäkypsälle pääomasijoitusalalle. Lupaavat alkavan vaiheen yritykset kärsivät näistä ongelmista 
erityisen suuresti. Tekes, Suomen Teollisuussijoitus, Finnvera ja Sitra kaikki kohdistivat suoria toimenpiteitä ja ra-
hoitusinstrumentteja havaittujen markkinapuutteiden korjaamiseen auttaen merkittävästi uusia alkavia innovaatio-
yrityksiä syntymään ja olemassa olevia yrityksiä selviytymään vaikeassa rahoitusmarkkinaympäristössä. 
Seuraavien viiden-seitsemän vuoden aikana Suomen tulee edelleen kehittää alkavien innovaatioyritysten julkista 
rahoitusta sen tehokkuuden ja tarkoituksenmukaisuuden varmistamiseksi taloudellisten syklien eri vaiheissa. 
Suomen tulisi asettaa kunnianhimoinen tavoite Suomen kehittämiseksi yhdeksi suhteellisesti aktiivisimmista 
markkinoista alkaviin innovaatioyrityksiin sijoittamisessa ja taloudellisen ja yhteiskunnallisen hyödyn luomiseksi ja 
realisoimiseksi niistä. Markkinoiden tulisi olla yksityisvetoiset sekä kilpaillut ja houkutella osaavimpia yksilöitä ja 
organisaatioita sijoittamaan ja luomaan arvoa alkavista innovaatioyrityksistä. Valtion tulisi myös antaa selkeä 
signaali sitoutumisesta yksilöiden yrittäjyyden ja riskinoton kannustamiseen ja niiden arvostuksen nostamiseen. 
Verokannustimia voisi käyttää paitsi kasvuyritystoiminnan ja siihen liittyvän riskisijoittamisen kannustamiseen 
myös vahvistamaan tätä signaalia. Suomen tulisi myös ottaa avoin ja globaali lähestymistapa ja hyödyntää kaikkia 
taloudellisia ja inhimillisiä resursseja alkavien innovaatioyritysten kehittämiseksi ja taloudellisen ja 
yhteiskunnallisen hyödyn luomiseksi ja realisoimiseksi. Suomen tulisi määrätietoisesti toteuttaa tätä markkina-
keskeistä strategiaa ja poistaa tarpeeton päällekkäisyys ja sirpaleisuus, ehkäistä julkisen sektorin tarpeetonta kasvua 
sekä parantaa julkisen sektorin organisaatioiden yhteistyötä ja asiakassuuntautuneisuutta julkisen rahoituksen 
tarjonnassa. Valtiosektorin päävastuu on luoda toimivat puitteet kilpailluille ja tehokkaille markkinoille. 
Toimenpiteisiin, joilla julkinen sektori korvaa ja paikkaa yksityisten kaupallisten sijoittajien toimintaa tulee 
suhtautua suurella varovaisuudella ja niitä tulisi käyttää korkeintaan väliaikaisesti. 
KTM:n yhdyshenkilö: Elinkeino-osasto/Pertti Valtonen, puh. (09) 1606 3614
Asiasanat
riskipääoma, alkava innovaatioyritys, julkinen rahoitus 
ISSN
1459-9376
ISBN
978-952-489-105-9
Kokonaissivumäärä
128
Kieli
Englanti
Hinta
27 € 
Julkaisija 
Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö 
Kustantaja
Edita Publishing Oy 
Publikationsseriens namn och kod 
Besöksadress Postadress  HIM Publikationer 
Alexandersgatan 4 
00170 HELSINGFORS 
PB 32 
00023 STATSRÅDET 
Telefon (09) 16001 
Telefax (09) 1606 3666 3/2007
   
Publiceringstid
Januari 2007 
Uppdragsgivare
Handels- och industriministeriet 
Författare 
Markku Maula 
Gordon Murray 
Mikko Jääskeläinen 
Organets tillsättningsdatum 
Titel
Offentlig finansiering av innovationsföretag som inleder verksamheten i Finland 
Referat
Under det gångna decenniet har finansieringen av innovationsföretag som befinner sig i inlednings- och det tidiga 
tillväxtskedet utvecklats avsevärt. Trots denna positiva trend bjuder finansieringen alltjämt på utmaningar. Finlands 
internationellt starka anseende som producent av innovationer har tillsvidare inte inneburit en motsvarande fram-
gång i kommersialiseringen av innovationer. När internertbubblan sprack efter millennieskiftet medförde det bety-
dande utmaningar för Finlands tillsvidare outvecklade kapitalplaceringsbransch. Lovande företag i inledningsfasen 
led alldeles särskilt av dessa problem. Tekes, Finlands Industrifinansiering, Finnvera och Sitra riktade direkta åtgär-
der och finansieringsinstrument på att avhjälpa marknadsbrister och bidrog väsentligt till uppkomsten av nya inno-
vationsföretag och till att existerande företag klarade sig i en svår finansieringsmarknadsmiljö. 
För att trygga finansieringen effektivitet och ändamålsenlighet under olika faser av ekonomiska cykler bör Finland 
under de följande fem-sju åren fortsätta att utveckla den offentliga finansieringen av innovationsföretag som inleder 
verksamheten. Finland borde ställa ett ambitiöst mål för att utveckla Finland till en av de relativt sett aktivaste 
marknaderna i fråga om att placera i innovationsföretag som inleder verksamheten och för att skapa ekonomisk och 
samhällelig nytta samt realisera nyttan. Marknaden borde vara privatdriven och konkurrensutsatt samt locka de 
mest kunniga individerna och organisationerna att placera och skapa mervärde av innovationsföretag som inleder 
verksamheten. Staten borde också ge en klar signal om att förbinda sig till att sporra individer till företagande och 
risktagning och att höja uppskattningen av dem. Skattesporrar borde användas förutom på tillväxtföretagande och 
riskfinansiering i anslutning till den också på att stärka denna signal. Finland borde dessutom på ett öppet och 
globalt sätt angripa och utnyttja alla ekonomiska och mänskliga resurser för att kunna utveckla nya 
innovationsföretag för att skapa och realisera ekonomisk och samhällelig nytta. Finland borde målmedvetet
förverkliga denna marknadsorienterade strategi och avlägsna onödiga överlappningar och fragmentariska drag, 
förhindra att den offentliga sektorn växer alltför mycket samt förbättra samarbetet mellan den offentliga sektorns 
organisationer och deras kundorientering när det gäller att erbjuda offentlig finansiering. Statssektorns huvudansvar 
är att skapa en fungerande ram för konkurrensutsatta och effektiva marknader. De åtgärder som den offentliga 
sektorn vidtar för att ersätta och lappar till enskilda kommersiella investerares verksamhet bör bemötas med stör 
försiktighet och de borde tillgripas endast temporärt. 
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Public Financing of Young Innovative Companies in Finland
The access of young innovative companies (YICs) in Finland to professionally delivered sources
of start up and early growth finance has improved significantly over the last decade. Despite this
long-term positive trend, there remain a number of major challenges for public policy. Over the
next five to seven years, Finland needs to further develop the access of high potential and high
growth young firms to appropriate sources of support. The continuing effectiveness of the Finnish
innovation financing system across different stages of the economic cycle will require both pub-
lic and private initiative. A number of policy recommendations are made in this report.
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